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ABSTRACT
Author: Nguyen Vo, Dan Sinh. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Human Rights Treaty Commitment and Compliance: A Machine
Learning-based Causal Inference Approach
Committee Chair: Ann Marie Clark
Why do states ratify international human rights treaties? How much do human rights treaties infuence state behaviors directly and indirectly? Why are some
human rights treaty monitoring procedures more effective than others? What are
the most predictively and causally important factors that can reduce and prevent
state repression and human rights violations? This dissertation provide answers to
these keys causal questions in political science research, using a novel approach
that combines machine learning and the structural causal model framework.
The four research questions are arranged in a chronological order that refects
the causal process relating to international human rights treaties, going from (a) the
causal determinants of treaty ratifcation to (b) the causal mechanisms of human
rights treaties to (c) the causal effects of human rights treaty monitoring procedures
to (d) other factors that causally infuence human rights violations.
Chapter 1 identifes the research traditions within which this dissertation is located, offers an overview of the methodological advances that enable this research,
specifes the research questions, and previews the fndings. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and
5 present in chronological order four empirical studies that answer these four research questions. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the substantive fndings, suggests
some other research questions that could be similarly investigated, and recaps the
methodological approach and the contributions of the dissertation.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
Refecting on her seminal book Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in
Domestic Politics [Simmons, 2009] a few years after it was published, the political
scientist Beth Simmons issued a call for more “research on international law and
human rights because the claim that the former has had important consequences
for the latter is one of the more important claims of this century” [Simmons, 2012,
750]. Her book was also widely regarded as a milestone in the trend toward quantitative empirical research on human rights and human rights law [Hafner-Burton,
2010, Cingranelli, 2010]. This trend, which only dates back to the 1990s [Poe and
Tate, 1994, Poe et al., 1999, Keith, 1999] and early 2000s [Hathaway, 2002, Landman, 2005], is a recent addition and complement to the much longer qualitative
research tradition [Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009, Clark and Sikkink, 2013]. As
Simmons remembers, when she started working on her book in 2001, “there was
almost no quantitative empirical research on human rights practices around the
world” [Simmons, 2012, 731].
My dissertation, in a large sense, is a continuation of this research tradition of
quantitatively analyzing “the relationship between human rights law and indicators of states’ compliance,” one that “did not begin in earnest until the turn of the
twenty-frst century” [Fariss and Dancy, 2017, 274]. Where my research diverges
from, and contributes to, the existing literature is that it draws insights and employs methods from two other research areas that gained prominence roughly at
the same time as quantitative human rights research but have remained largely
separated from the felds of international relations and political science.
The frst research area from which I primarily draw on is the causality framework that the computer scientist Judea Pearl frst introduced in his monumental
book Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference [Pearl, 2000]. This work was later
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updated and expanded [Pearl, 2009a] and was also translated into a more accessible version [Pearl et al., 2016]. Even though scientists have wrestled with the
problem of making causal claims from observational data for quite some time, most
of the quantitative scholars of international human rights law, like most political
scientists and many other empirical scientists [Hernán, 2018], have yet to openly
embrace a causal language and a formal causal framework in which to express and
conduct their research. For some studies in political science that are more deliberate and open in their efforts to draw causal inference, almost all of them operate
within the potential outcomes framework, also known as the Neyman–Rubin model
of causal inference [Holland, 1986, Rubin, 2005, Sekhon, 2008]. This causal inference framework is more well known in political science and its allied discipline
of economics whereas Judea Pearl’s graph-based structural causal model (SCM)
framework proves more appealing in other felds such as epidemiology, cognitive
science, and computer science. Despite strong opinions on both sides, Pearl has
demonstrated that the two frameworks are logically equivalent [Pearl, 2009b, 126–
132] although, at least according to proponents of the SCM framework, they are
not equally transparent and effcient.
A combination of serendipitous exposure and considered personal preferences
has led me to adopt the graph-based SCM framework to tackle the task of making causal inference front and center. The broad rationale of my dissertation is
therefore to examine the relationship between international law and human rights
as Simmons [2012] and others have called for, but from a new and transparent
perspective of causal inference. Specifcally, the methods and insights from the
SCM framework enable me to revisit and investigate substantive questions about
the causal determinants, causal mechanisms, and causal impacts of major United
Nations (UN) human rights treaties as well as the causes of state repression and human rights violations. These questions either have not been answered suffciently
from a causal inference perspective or have not even been answered before. In the
next four chapters, I seek to answer the following set of questions.

3
1. What are the most important factors that cause states to ratify three major
UN human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)?
2. What is the causal effect of each of these three treaties (ICCPR, CEDAW, and
CAT) and how much of their causal effect is direct on human rights outcomes
and how much is transmitted through intermediate causal mechanisms?
3. What is the causal effect of each of the four treaty monitoring procedures
under the CAT and its Optional Protocol (OPCAT), including state reporting,
inquiry, individual communication, and country visit?
4. What are the most important factors that predict and cause state repression
and human rights violations?
Investigating these questions from a causal inference perspective enables my research fndings to have an explicit causal interpretation. They also have a concrete
substantive interpretation, including, for instance, quantifying the predicted number of percentage points that human rights protection will increase on average as
a result of state membership in a human rights treaty. This is in contrast to, for
example, fnding a statistically signifcant relationship between a covariate and an
outcome as often found in the literature.
It should be emphasized that employing a causality framework is not just for
couching the research fndings in a causal language. Some substantive questions
such as how much of the causal impact of an international human rights treaty is
transmitted through its causal mechanisms can only be formally defned and quantitatively estimated within a causality framework [Pearl, 2001, 2012] even though
that same question has been raised for at least more than a decade [Goodman and
Jinks, 2004a,b]. In other words, the SCM framework makes it possible to answer
some substantive questions that were not even answerable quantitatively before.

4
My applications of the graph-based SCM framework in this dissertation also
point to broader implications for the methodological directions of human rights
research and international relations and political science research more generally.
In the vast majority of current empirical quantitative human rights research, the
traditional methodology is to establish “broad correlations [...] using statistical
methods” and then evaluate the causal processes “through case studies” [Simmons,
2012, 734]. This methodological procedure has the effect of artifcially separating
the causal logic, which is usually expressed and supported qualitatively or sometimes derived through formal models, and the empirical evidence in quantitative,
numerical format. As I demonstrate in Chapter 2, researchers may then run the
risk of proposing a qualitative causal logic and making implicit causal assumptions
that are disconnected from or even contradict the way their statistical models are
constructed.
The SCM framework helps bridge this disconnect by transparently expressing
the causal logic in the form of a causal directed acyclic graph (DAG). Causal DAGs
are highly effective because they compactly and explicitly represent the underlying
causal process as understood by the researcher as well as all the causal assumptions
he or she makes. The same causal graph then facilitates causal reasoning about the
resulting interventional or counterfactual outcomes, links the interventional/counterfactual distribution to the observational distribution (which is often known as
causal identifcation), and informs the statistical models that estimate the causal effect of interest from the observational data. This graph-based causality framework
thus provides both a principled method and powerful tools to seamlessly integrate
(a) qualitative causal logics or, equivalently, mathematical formal models and (b)
quantitative evidence and statistical models that summarize that evidence. The end
goal of this methodological approach is to make credible causal claims about social
and political reality.
The second research area from which my dissertation research draws from, albeit to a lesser extent, is the feld of machine learning. Machine learning has a long,
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decorated history [Hastie et al., 2009, James et al., 2013], but it seriously caught
the attention of statisticians after the publication of the landmark article “Statistical
Modeling: The Two Cultures” [Breiman, 2001a]. In this article, Breiman [2001a]
contrasts two distinct approaches to statistical modeling, namely, data modeling (or
statistical inference) and algorithmic modeling (or machine learning).
In the data modeling approach, the researcher collects data and assumes a
stochastic model for the data-generating process. She then fts the model to the
data and estimates the model parameters, some of which are then interpreted
as indicating the true relationships between the variables of interest. Key to this
data modeling approach is that the researcher assumes she has accurate knowledge about the data-generating process—knowledge that takes the form of correct
probability distributions of the data and correct functional forms that link together
variables in her statistical models. As an alternative, Breiman [2001a] advocates
for a black-box approach that does not pretend to know how the data were generated other than that the sample data are reasonably representative of the target
population the researcher is investigating. In this alternative modeling approach,
the researcher instead uses learning algorithms to minimize a specifed loss function
that measures the discrepancy between the predicted values and the observed values of the outcome, that is, to minimize, for example, the classifcation errors or the
sum of squares errors. The goal of this optimizing process is to arrive at a function
that most closely approximates the true, unknown data-generating mechanism.
It is worth noting that the data modeling (statistical inference) approach still
to this day has been dominant in quantitative political science research, including quantitative human rights research. A major reason could be that, except for
a small number of cases [King and Zeng, 2001, Ward et al., 2010, Gleditsch and
Ward, 2013, Hill and Jones, 2014, Bell, 2015], most political scientists and international relations scholars seek to understand and fnd empirical support for their
explanatory theories about social and political reality rather than making good predictions. A major shortcoming of the statistical inference approach, however, is that
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the assumed knowledge about the data-generating mechanism, especially in the
context of complex social and political processes, could easily turn out to be wrong
and, as a result, lead to biased inferences and invalid substantive fndings.
This major limitation of the statistical inference approach is exactly where the
machine learning approach shines because the latter does not depend as much on
accurate assumptions about the true data-generating process as does the former. Instead, machine learning tries to imitate and approximate the data-generating mechanism through a trial-and-error learning process. Its goal is also narrower, focusing
on making good predictions rather than understanding and explaining the underlying process that generates the data. One of the most important recent innovations
of modern machine learning is the ensemble method that combines a large number
of similar, comparatively weak prediction models to create an overall much more
effective model [Friedman, 2001]. This innovation leads to the powerful prediction
technique of extreme gradient boosting [Chen and He, 2015, Chen and Guestrin,
2016] that I apply in Chapter 5. Even more powerful still is an ensemble of different, highly diverse models, each of which is likely able to capture an important
aspect of the true data-generating process, to create a hybrid model that performs
as well as, and usually better than, even the best individual algorithm. This is
the motivating idea and the underlying principle of the Super Learner prediction
method [van der Laan et al., 2007] that I use in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
Effective machine learning algorithms often have superior prediction power, but
they tend to have limited interpretability. Furthermore, most do not quantify the
uncertainty of their predictions, which can be essential if one wants to do effect
estimation and inference. Finally, they are, for the most part, orthogonal to the
problem of making causal inference. However, machine learning algorithms can
be incorporated into the SCM framework to make functional form-robust causal effect estimation. A combination of machine learning and the SCM framework is the
research methodology used in this dissertation to answer substantive research questions about human rights and human rights treaties. Specifcally, a straightforward
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procedure to employ machine learning for causal inference that I execute throughout this dissertation is to, frst, set up a causal DAG to facilitate a translation from
the interventional/counterfactual distribution to the observational distribution and
identify the causal effect of interest; then employ machine learning algorithms to
make predictions about the counterfactual outcome values; and fnally, compute
the point estimate of the causal effect. To quantify the uncertainty of causal effect
estimation, I implement the bootstrap method [Efron and Tibshirani, 1994, Efron
and Hastie, 2016, 181–198] throughout the dissertation.
To summarize, my dissertation, entitled Human Rights Treaty Commitment and
Compliance: A Machine Learning-based Causal Inference Approach, presents a series
of innovative applications of machine learning and the SCM framework to answer
four sets of questions about human rights and human rights treaties. Each set of
questions is motivated by a knowledge gap or an unresolved debate in the substantive literature and built upon what we already know in the research area of
international human rights law. The answers to these questions advance our substantive understanding by making new inferences about the causes of human rights
violations and the causes, causal mechanisms, and consequences of human rights
treaties.
First, Chapter 2 examines the unresolved question as to which factors cause
governments to ratify international human rights treaties. The literature remains
divided when it comes to explaining why states commit to human rights treaties
even though they are well aware that these laws could potentially restrict their
freedom of action. Multiple theories of treaty commitment in the literature can be
categorized into three major approaches. The instrumental approach emphasizes
the economic rationale for treaty commitment, according to which states ratify international human rights treaties in exchange for material benefts such as increased
international investment, more foreign development aid, and membership in preferential trade agreements.
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The sociological approach to treaty ratifcation, in contrast, tends to focus on
international socialization and the pressure of normative conformity at both the
regional and global levels in explaining why states commit and stay committed to
international human rights regimes. Valid and reliable measures of international
socialization as well as normative conformity are hard to obtain, but many studies
in political science and sociology use the regional and global proportions of treaty
members as proxy measurements of these normative factors [Cole, 2005, Goodliffe
and Hawkins, 2006, Cole, 2009, Simmons, 2009].
Finally, some of the most popular explanations of human rights treaty commitment can be classifed as taking the institutional approach because they often identify domestic institutions as the most salient explanatory variables. According to
these theories, regime transitions, democratic institutions, de facto existence of multiple political parties, and judicial independence are some of the most commonly
identifed predictors of human rights treaty ratifcation.
Based on this ongoing debate in the literature, I recast all of these theoretically predictive variables as causal determinants of treaty ratifcation. I then estimate their causal effects on human rights treaty ratifcation. A causal effect in
this case is defned as the average change in the probability of treaty ratifcation
across the country–year population if one intervenes to alternate the values of the
causal variable from its empirically lowest value to its empirically highest value.
The estimated causal effect magnitudes are indications of which explanatory variables are truly causally important and thus suggest which theoretical approaches
best explain why states commit to human rights treaties. My causal analysis of
three major UN human rights treaties fnds empirical support for the norms-based
theories, deemphasizes the impact of some domestic institutional factors such as
regime transitions and judicial independence, and casts doubt on the causal relevance of economic variables such as economic development, offcial development
assistance, and international trade participation.
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Second, Chapter 3 revisits and investigates the question of how international
human rights law infuences state behavior. Theoretically, this is not an entirely
new problem. For more than a decade, human rights scholars have researched
and identifed several primary causal pathways of three major UN human rights
treaties, including the ICCPR, the CEDAW, and the CAT. What is still lacking in the
substantive literature, however, is a concrete quantifcation of how much of the
causal impact of a human rights treaty is transmitted through multiple causal pathways. This quantifcation is not a trivial puzzle. It rather has important implications
for preserving or, for that matter, undermining the impact and effcacy of international law on the domestic behaviors of states parties. The absence of any concrete
quantifcation in the empirical literature is not due to a lack of attention. Rather it is
because empirical researchers are not familiar with or have not utilized the notation
system, vocabulary, and tools of reasoning from the causal inference literature to
represent their substantive knowledge and make inferences about causal mediation
and causal mechanisms.
My causal analysis in this chapter builds upon the substantive literature that
identifes four major causal pathways of human rights treaties, including legislative
constraints, domestic judicial enforcement, political mobilization of civil society organizations, and international socialization. I then use causal reasoning tools from
the causal inference literature and employ machine learning methods to estimate
and decompose the causal impact of three major human rights treaties into the direct causal effect and the indirect causal effect that goes through multiple causal
mechanisms.
The causal fndings indicate that all three human rights treaties generally help
reduce government abuses and increase human rights protection although the magnitudes of their causal effects vary from one treaty to another. Surprisingly, only
CEDAW participation directly improves women’s political empowerment whereas
participating in the ICCPR and the CAT has a negative direct impact on human
rights practices. However, the good news is that all three treaties exert a positive
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indirect infuence on state behaviors and, more importantly, their indirect causal impacts that are mediated through multiple mechanisms are disproportionately more
substantial in size, ranging from three to 18 times larger than their corresponding
direct effects. Taken together, these direct and indirect causal effect estimates provide the frst concrete quantifcation in the literature of the mediated causal effects
of human rights treaties.
Third, Chapter 4 focuses on the causal impact of treaty monitoring procedures
under the CAT and the OPCAT. Human rights treaties, like other international institutions, set the standards of behavior for their member states. They also engage
in various forms of compliance monitoring. The existing quantitative literature on
international human rights law, however, rarely focuses on these monitoring mechanisms and thus tends to overlook the differences in their institutional design and
individual causal impact. I therefore unpack the monitoring practices under the
UN human rights treaty on torture into multiple monitoring procedures and differentiate their causal effects on state behaviors. My research in this chapter thus
provides the frst empirical evaluation of the relative causal importance of existing
monitoring procedures under a major human rights treaty.
The causal fndings show that only the country visit procedure signifcantly and
consistently reduces torture and improves government respect for physical integrity
rights. Other monitoring procedures, including state reporting, inquiry, and individual communication, do not. These differing causal effects, I argue, are most likely
the result of the variation in intrusiveness among the monitoring procedures. They
also indicate that not all monitoring procedures are created equal or have similar
causal impacts. Furthermore, the fndings suggest that more intensive monitoring
and extensive information-gathering by international bodies and panels of independent experts could prove more effective in protecting human rights. More broadly,
the research in this chapter offers additional insights into an important topic in
international relations regarding the relationship between institutional design and
institutional impact. Most current research on this topic is usually conducted with
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respect to international institutions in areas such as international trade and global
environmental cooperation. My research brings to bear the evidence from an international institution in the area of human rights.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents a predictive analysis and a causal analysis of the factors that may infuence state repression and human rights violations. Both the predictive approach and the causal approach adopted in this chapter diverge from the
association-based statistical inference approach often found in the literature. Existing studies mostly identify the covariates that signifcantly account for the variation
in the outcome measures by ftting parametric models of state repression and estimating the regression coeffcient of each covariate on the outcome. Regression coeffcients that cross a certain threshold of statistical signifcance are then interpreted
as indications of the signifcance of the corresponding covariates in impacting state
repression.
Over time the literature has accumulated a collection of covariates believed to
have a signifcant effect on human rights violations, ranging from demographics
to macroeconomic factors, from domestic political institutions to international law,
and from international economic variables to the robust presence of the civil society. However, in the absence of additional causal information outside the observed
data, the way these covariates are selected—via prior theoretical justifcation and
estimated regression coeffcients—does not guarantee that they are causally important in preventing state repression. Nor are they necessarily strongly predictive of
human rights violations. The predictive analysis and causal analysis in this chapter
reevaluate these variables to identify those that are truly predictive of and causally
important to state repression and human rights violations.
For that purpose, this chapter explores and estimates both the predictive power
and the causal effect of the same covariates that have been accumulatively identifed in the substantive literature. It does that by embedding these covariates in
various machine learning prediction models and use the same covariates to construct a causal model for causal effect estimation. The results of both the predictive
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analysis and the causal analysis overlap somewhat in underscoring the role of economic development and trade participation in reducing state repression and human
rights violations. The causal analysis, however, depicts a more challenging situation
for human rights defenders and anyone who wants to prevent and mitigate state
repression. It shows that preferential trade agreements or foreign direct investment
or domestic democratic institutions on their own have little substantial impact to
improve human rights protection. It also highlights, though, the importance of
an independent domestic court system as the most consistently impactful factor to
improve human rights protection across multiple causal analyses.
In terms of the big picture, this dissertation demonstrates that a combination of
the graph-based SCM framework and advanced machine learning methods could
help answer important substantive questions that have not been addressed suffciently or have not even been answered before. More broadly, this combination
has a tremendous potential to improve and even transform empirical political science research. It is useful, however, to clarify and reiterate the benefts, tradeoffs,
and implications for empirical research of two separate and relatively orthogonal
components in this approach: machine learning and the SCM framework.
First, the use of machine learning in this dissertation, in combination with the
standard nonparametric bootstrap method for inference, is solely for the purpose of
conducting robust estimation. Machine learning is not the only estimation method
for an associational or causal analysis, but its signifcant utility is its robustness
and its ability to detect complex, interactive, and non-linear relationships between
variables in the observed data. Parametric regression models, on the other hand,
may not be able to handle well many non-linear relationships in the data. As a
result, the key beneft of using machine learning is to take advantage of a more
fexible, nonparametric estimation method that does not depend as much on the
assumption of correct model specifcation.
Without lots of replication studies, it is hard to tell how much of a difference this
fexible machine learning-based estimation method would make to the substantive
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fndings in the human rights literature. However, it is not at all inconceivable that
many previous fndings in the literature may have to be revised if their validity
depends on some functional form assumptions that turn out to be incorrect. More
importantly, since machine learning methods are more robust and less assumptiondependent, that is, they allow us to make inferences from observational data even
when we do not know what the correct data model is, it is only reasonable and even
recommended that researchers should consider adopting a machine learning-based
approach as their default estimation method. If, for some reasons, the researchers
have justifable, concrete knowledge about the correct functional forms, they then
can use that knowledge to construct parametric regression models to estimate the
treatment effects in a simpler and possibly more effcient way.
The fexibility of machine learning methods can prove even more benefcial going forward when more powerful, more fexible, and less computationally expensive
machine learning techniques are developed. Still more advanced methods are being developed to apply machine learning techniques for the purpose of robust effect
estimation and making statistical and causal inference [Chernozhukov et al., 2017].
Coupled with the likelihood that political scientists will examine more variables in
their research, use bigger data, and investigate more complex relationships among
their variables of interest, machine learning should and will likely be adopted more
widely, if for no other reasons than to be able to discover more complex patterns in
high-dimensional data.
This machine learning-based estimation approach, however, does have certain
tradeoffs. The benefts of this machine learning-based approach should nonetheless be put in the proper context of serving the sole purpose of fexible and robust
effect estimation. It is obviously not a substitute for substantive knowledge and for
understanding the research problem. It is also orthogonal to the task of endowing
any effect estimates from observational data with a causal interpretation. That task
is accomplished using the SCM framework, which is the other component in my
methodological approach.
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Second, perhaps the most important part in my approach is the graph-based
SCM framework that I adopt to conduct causal analysis. Given that much empirical
research, including quantitative human rights research, can be reasonably classifed
as aiming to make causal claims from observational data, researchers should be
“explicit about the causal objective” of their studies so as to “reduce ambiguity in
the scientifc question, errors in the data analysis, and excesses in the interpretation
of the results” [Hernán, 2018, e1].
More importantly, researchers should openly embrace a coherent framework to
articulate and reason about cause and effect. The graph-based SCM framework,
combining the graphical language and counterfactual language, precisely flls this
need. It gives researchers the mathematical notations to concisely represent their
causal queries. It offers the vocabulary to defne the causal questions and the causal
quantities of interest in the interventional and/or counterfactual language rather
than in terms of probabilistic distribution and a statistical relationship between an
independent variable and an outcome. Crucially, it provides the graphical tool of
causal DAGs to effciently represent our background knowledge and prior causal
information. Finally, it supplies the tools of inference that help researchers to determine whether and under what conditions they can establish the estimability of the
causal effect of interest from observational data. These are the key benefts of this
causality framework that traditional approaches and more familiar methods either
overlook or fail to provide.
Of particular signifcance, representing the background knowledge is critical in
any causal analysis because no causal questions can be answered without prior
assumptions about the causal structure that generates the data. This is most apparent in the practice of selecting “control variables” for inclusion in a regression
model to adjust for potential confounding. However, only confounding variables
(also known as confounders, which cause both the independent variable and the
outcome) should be “controlled for.” If a covariate is a mediator (an intermediate
variable that both causally follows the independent variable and has a causal infu-
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ence on the outcome) or a collider (a variable that is directly or indirectly caused by
both the independent variable and the outcome), its inclusion in a regression model
would introduce bias in the effect estimate. The tricky thing is that all three types
of covariates—confounders, mediators, and colliders—are correlated with the outcome and the independent variable. As a result, the conventional practice of including any variables that are correlated with both the outcome and the independent
variable of interest [Hill and Jones, 2014, footnote 2] is actually a bad practice.
Instead, confounding adjustment has to rely on suffcient background knowledge
that is not available from the observed data. Only the subject matter knowledge of
the causal structure (that is, whether and how each variable in the causal model is
causally related to every other variable) can form the basis on which to determine
whether a covariate is a confounder or a mediator or a collider on which specifc
causal pathways and, as a result, which variable should be “controlled for” and
which variable should not be adjusted for. The key utility of a causal DAG is to
make explicit and transparent in a graphical form the subject matter knowledge
that leads to this assumed causal structure .
When researchers employ the graph-based SCM framework they become highly
aware of and sensitive to the fact that if the background knowledge is tenuous,
permitting different hypothetical causal structures, then different and even contradictory fndings will ensue. It is very likely that the current literature on human
rights and human rights treaties is in this kind of situation where divergent and
contradictory fndings abound partly because different researchers, and even a single researcher over different research projects, would implicitly assume different
underlying causal structures. As a result, another implication of the graph-based
SCM framework for any substantive debates in the literature is that it would focus
the attention of the scientifc community more on the subject matter and rightly so
than on specifc statistical debates and estimation techniques.
Using the graph-based SCM framework could help move scientifc research forward by highlighting, clarifying, and contributing to reconciling different assump-
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tions about the true causal structure. In addition to providing the same causal
vocabulary and language, it requires researchers to explicitly represent their causal
assumptions in a graphical form and makes any differences in causal assumptions
easily recognizable. Researchers can then communicate much more easily about
their different assumptions and have a more productive debate about the underlying causal structure, which contributes to the overall scientifc progress. At a minimum, this graph-based SCM framework will focus the attention of the researchers
on the underlying causal process and, at least in the context of social scientifc research using observational data, it underscores the tentative nature of individual
research fndings and the cumulative and collective nature of scientifc research.
It should be noted that while the graph-based SCM framework is not the only
causality framework out there, it is a very effcient and intuitive framework. It also
enables researchers to be more rigorous in executing the task of making causal inference. This is because the key methods and methodological fndings from this
framework, including, for example, the backdoor criterion for causal identifcation
and the mediation formula for estimating natural direct causal effect and natural
indirect causal effect, have been proven sound and complete [Pearl, 2014a, 2017].
These methodological results are sound in the sense that if we apply them and have
the necessary causal assumptions, we are guaranteed to get valid causal inference.
They are complete in the sense that if these methods require certain conditions
or assumptions to make valid causal inference, there are no other methods in any
framework that can do better without additional information or assumptions. As
a result, while there is no guarantee that every causal inference task can be completed using this framework or that there is no other competing framework that can
accomplish the same task, the graph-based SCM framework is perhaps the most effcient framework at this moment.
All of these benefts notwithstanding, there are certainly some barriers. It takes
some cognitive fexibility, methodological pluralism, different allocation of research
and training resources by individual researchers and the scientifc community as a
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whole, and a considerable amount of time for a novel methodological framework
to be embraced and widely adopted. Different academic disciplines will likely proceed at different paces in terms of adopting this graph-based causality framework
with the feld of epidemiology probably leading the pack [Leeder, 2016], but hopefully other felds will be able to catch up quickly so as to facilitate more scientifc
progress.
Finally, there are two methodological and substantive issues that this dissertation has not actually dealt with to any signifcant extent, including measurements
and missing data. The issue of measurements is particularly vexing in human rights
research. Essentially, the questions that every quantitative human rights researcher
has to keep in mind are whether the measurements of human rights practices such
as specifc human rights scores could capture the underlying theoretical constructs
and whether there are any signifcant measurement errors. These issues are even
more challenging because most human rights scores are actually complex indices
that aggregate many sources of raw information. Recently, international relations
scholars have started to focus more attention on the issues of measurements in
quantitative human rights data [Clark and Sikkink, 2013, Fariss, 2014, Fariss and
Dancy, 2017], but these issues remain important challenges.
In this dissertation, I also implicitly assume that all missing data are either missing completely at random or missing at random. I therefore use a standard multiple
imputation procedure to deal with the issue of missing data. To be fair, this is in
line with most other research not just in political science but in other disciplines
as well. In fact, as Little and Rubin [2002, 22] observe, “[e]ssentially all the literature on multivariate incomplete data assumes that the data are MAR [missing at
random], and much of it also assumes that the data are MCAR [missing completely
at random].” Interrogating these assumptions about missing data, investigating the
implications of these assumptions and their validity for data analyses, and incorporating plausible causal information about the missingness mechanisms into the
causal analyses are quite beyond the scope of this dissertation. It does not mean
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that they are not important. More recent advances in the methodology of dealing
with the issue of missing data from a causal inference perspective [Daniel et al.,
2012, Thoemmes and Mohan, 2015, Mohan and Pearl, 2018] are worth the efforts
to examine and apply in future research.
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2. CAUSAL INFERENCE USING MACHINE LEARNING:
AN APPLICATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY RATIFICATION
2.1

Theories of Treaty Ratifcation
International human rights law is created to protect and promote universal hu-

man rights. It does that by establishing substantive obligations for states parties and
designing procedural mechanisms to monitor the implementation of those obligations [De Schutter, 2010, Alfredsson et al., 2009, Buergenthal, 2006]. A major
global regime is the UN human rights treaty system, which includes many treaties
and their associated monitoring bodies [Keller and Ulfstein, 2012, Rodley, 2013].
A natural question arises in the literature as to why more and more countries have
ratifed and remained committed to human rights treaties that are designed precisely to limit their freedom in how to treat their own citizens. Figure 2.1 shows the
increasing number of states parties to three major human rights treaties from 1966
when the ICCPR was opened for ratifcation until 2013.
The question of treaty ratifcation is a simple, yet vexing, puzzle that scholars
have wrestled with for a long time. Many theories have been proposed, identifying
various explanatory variables, but any consensus and agreements remain elusive.
First, some scholars believe that international socialization and the pressure of normative conformity make cause state leaders to realize that treaty ratifcation is the
expected and appropriate thing to do [Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998]. Two studies
by Goodliffe and Hawkins [2006] and Hathaway [2007] fnd correlative evidence
to support this argument when they use global and regional ratifcation rates as
proxies for international socialization. A prominent study that follows, however,
casts doubt on the role of socialization as the driving force behind treaty ratifcation. Simmons [2009, 90–96] creates a series of variables (measuring regional
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normative convergence, socialization opportunities, an index for two different time
periods, and information environments) that interact with density of regional ratifcation and argues that regional ratifcation rates do not necessarily refect a normative force as much as a strategic calculation. It is not immediately clear what causal
models that Simmons [2009] assumes would generate the data and whether and
how the effect estimates of those interactive variables could be causally interpreted.
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Fig. 2.1.: Numbers of states parties to the ICCPR, the CEDAW, and the CAT from
1966 to 2013. The three treaties were opened for ratifcation in 1966, 1979, and
1984, respectively.

The second group of explanations focuses on the economic reasons that states
voluntarily commit to universal human rights standards and subject themselves to
international monitoring. According to these explanations, states use ratifcation
as a signaling device to improve their social standing, expecting to gain material
benefts in return, even if they are disingenuous about treaty compliance. The
need for social signaling could be signifcant given the pressures on lending institutions, foreign investors, and developed countries to link foreign aid [Lebovic
and Voeten, 2006, Spence, 2014], international investment [Blanton and Blanton,
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2007], and preferential trade agreements [Hafner-Burton, 2005] to human rights
issues in recipient countries. Participation in international trade in particular has
been shown to be a signifcant predictor of treaty commitment [Lupu, 2014]. The
transactional rationale of treaty ratifcation could be even more pressing for transitional and newly independent countries since they often need external economic
assistance and fnancial support [Smith-Cannoy, 2012, 64–91]. This instrumental
argument, however, turns out to have virtually no empirical support according to a
critical study by Nielsen and Simmons [2015]. The two authors fnd no correlation
between ratifcations of four major human rights regimes (under the ICCPR and the
CAT) and either the amounts of foreign aid from OECD countries or other measures
of tangible and intangible benefts.
Third, the most popular explanations of treaty ratifcation often identify domestic institutions as the key predictors. An early theory advances what is often referred
to as the “lock in” argument, according to which transitional countries or those facing potential democratic instability tend to join human rights regimes to lock in
and consolidate their democratic institutions [Moravcsik, 2000]. Although this argument fnds some empirical support in another study [Neumayer, 2007], there are
some dissenting fndings as well, indicating that neither new democracies nor unstable, volatile regimes are signifcant predictors of CAT ratifcation [Goodliffe and
Hawkins, 2006].
Researchers also focus on the interaction of domestic institutions and human
rights practices to explain ratifcations [Hathaway, 2007]. Post-ratifcation, they
argue, states that have sub-standard human rights protection will likely incur a
higher cost of policy adjustment. This cost, in turn, is more likely to actually materialize if democratic institutions are in place to constrain state leaders. As a result, a
poor human rights record predicts a low probability of ratifcation, but only among
democracies. Ratifcation cost may rise as well, depending on the types of domestic institutions, including constitutional ratifcation rules, political regimes, and
an independent court system [Simmons, 2009, 67–77]. Hill [2016a] applies the
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same logic to explain how governments selectively make reservations when they
ratify human rights treaties based on their domestic standards and legal institutions. Conversely, autocracies are just as likely to ratify human rights treaties since
their ratifcations are usually empty promises that do not bring any real cost of
behavioral change [von Stein, 2016]. The theoretical expectation is that, among
autocracies, prior human rights practices have little impact on the probability of
treaty ratifcation.
Generally, it should be noted, states are believed to be less likely to commit to
international treaties if their prior level of compliance is low. This is often known as
the selection effect argument [Downs et al., 1996, von Stein, 2005, Simmons and
Hopkins, 2005]. In the literature on international human rights law, however, this
selection effect is often treated as source of potential bias where prior measures
of human rights outcome may confound the causal relationship between human
rights treaties and contemporaneous measure of the outcome. The causal impact of
prior human rights practices on treaty ratifcation is rarely a quantity of interest to
investigate.
For the most part, democracies are also believed to be more likely than autocracies to ratify human rights treaties [Landman, 2005] because of their domestic
pressures or an incentive to export rights-respecting norms. Hafner-Burton et al.
[2015a] similarly argue that autocracies are less likely to join human rights regimes
that may expose them to a high cost of compliance. Vreeland [2008] adds an important caveat, however. He agrees that because dictators are more inclined to use
torture to retain power, they are indeed less likely to ratify the CAT so as to avoid
the cost associated with treaty violations. Yet, for dictators that co-exist with multiple political parties, they have to bear the cost of non-ratifcation in the form of
pressures from the opposition parties. It turns out, according to Vreeland [2008],
dictatorships with multiple parties are actually more likely to ratify the treaty.
Hollyer and Rosendorff [2011] concur with Vreeland [2008], but they differ
with respect to his reasoning. For repressive leaders, the two authors claim, rat-
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ifying the CAT can actually bring some signifcant signaling benefts with respect
to a particular audience: the domestic opposition. Opposition groups perceive an
authoritarian leader’s act of committing to the CAT (and then faunting treaty violations) as a credible signal of her strength. As a result, the opposition is less
likely to mount a challenge, in effect prolonging the survival of the authoritarian
leader. The implication is that autocracies are more likely to ratify costly human
rights treaties not because they concede to pressures from the opposition parties as
Vreeland [2008] argues, but rather because they actively seek ratifcation to reap its
domestic signaling benefts. For many human rights scholars, this credible commitment argument to explain treaty ratifcation among autocratic regimes “has some
plausibility problems on its face” [Simmons, 2012, 743], but it has not been disputed empirically. Even Hollyer and Rosendorff [2011] have conducted no causal
tests, pointing instead to the statistical association between CAT ratifcation and several different outcomes such as leadership survival, level of government repression,
and the extent of opposition efforts.
To summarize, exactly why states ratify human rights treaties is still unclear.
There could be many reasons and multiple theories, but fndings are all over the
map and often contradict each other or go untested from a causal inference perspective. Whether they are ideational, instrumental, or institutional, theories of treaty
ratifcation remain contested and the issue of treaty ratifcation “has not yet been
fully explored” [Hafner-Burton, 2012, 271]. As Simmons [2012, 737–744] similarly
observes, the question of why states ratify international human rights law remains
“an enduring puzzle.” This unresolved puzzle is both the substantive premise and
motivation to develop a different test of major theories of treaty ratifcation that is
based on an explicit causal inference perspective.
For that purpose, in this chapter I take a novel approach to testing theories of
treaty ratifcation and addressing the question of why countries ratify human rights
treaties. The basic idea underlying my test strategy is that, since different theoretical approaches propose different explanatory variables, one can adjudicate these
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theories by directly estimating the causal effects of these variables and compare
their causal effect magnitudes as a direct measure of their causal importance for
treaty ratifcation. Theories that propose more causally important variables will be
not only more empirically supported but also more substantively relevant.
In terms of implementation, this chapter builds upon the substantive knowledge
in the literature to set up causal models of treaty ratifcation. These causal models
would enable the identifcation of the causal effects of various factors that have been
theoretically hypothesized to cause states to ratify human rights treaties, including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT). Once causal identifcation is established, I then apply two
machine learning-based estimation methods, the targeted maximum likelihood estimator and the substitution estimator, to actually compute the causal effects from
observational data. The application of machine learning is aimed to relieve us of
our dependence on the assumption of a correct functional form specifcation for
unbiased effect estimation and make our estimates more robust.
While this chapter does not propose a new theory as to why states ratify human
rights treaties, it nonetheless makes both substantive and methodological contributions to the human rights literature. First, it subjects multiple theories of treaty
ratifcation to a different kind of empirical testing that does not rely on detecting a
statistically signifcant relationship between treaty ratifcation and other covariates.
Rather, the strength and substantive relevance of a theory will be based on how
much the explanatory variables that the theory proposes actually cause states to
ratify human rights treaties. My analysis thus provides insights into the causal determinants of treaty ratifcation by identifying the variables that are most causally
relevant to be intervened upon if the goal is to promote universal ratifcation of
human rights treaties.
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Second, methodologically my causal analysis constructs causal models that are
more transparent in their causal assumptions and uses machine learning-based estimation methods that are less dependent on correct functional forms assumption.
These two features of identifcation transparency and estimation robustness are
missing in many current empirical inquiries. Previous research has analyzed predictors of state commitment to universal treaties [Lupu, 2014]. Others have applied
the machine learning technique of random forest to examine the predictive associations between various covariates and state repression [Hill and Jones, 2014]. My
investigation improves upon the former by using machine learning in lieu of parametric linear regression models and upon the latter by endowing the fndings with
a causal interpretation.
Fundamentally, my causal analysis follows Judea Pearl’s philosophy of “defne
frst, identify second, estimate last” [van der Laan and Rose, 2011]. I start by
examining the literature, describing the research gaps, and formulating a new form
of direct theory-testing from a causal inference perspective. I then employ Pearl’s
causal inference method [Pearl, 2009a] to identify the causal effects of interest
and use an ensemble machine learning technique called Super Learner [Polley and
van der Laan, 2010] to produce more robust effect estimates. Finally, I interpret
the causal fndings in the substantive context of adjudicating competing theories of
treaty ratifcation.

2.2 Empirics of Treaty Ratifcation
My causal analysis offers a solution to the puzzle of treaty ratifcation by evaluating and comparing the causal effects of many theoretically identifed predictors of
treaty ratifcation across three major human rights treaties. The novelty of this test
strategy is to apply a machine learning-based causal inference approach to address
two major limitations in existing empirical inquiries. First, existing studies almost
always use parametric regression models that rely on the statistical signifcance of
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ratifcation predictors. These models have to make restrictive assumptions such as
linearity, normality, and additivity in order to characterize the shape of the relationships between treaty ratifcation and its predictors. Usually no justifcations are
provided as to why a linear functional form, for example, or additivity of covariate
effects is appropriate or accurate instead of exponential, U-shaped, higher-order,
threshold effects or any of an infnite number of other forms. Since we usually do
not know a priori the underlying data-generating process and it is often virtually
impossible to know the correct functional form when it comes to modeling complex
political phenomena, a conveniently specifed statistical model is likely a misspecifed one, which will then produce unreliable and biased effect estimates.
By using fexible machine learning methods, we are essentially relieving ourselves of the burden of having to correctly specifying our parametric models. In
other words, machine learning helps make up for the lack of accurate prior information about the functional form of the data-generating process. The trade-off,
however, is that machine learning methods often add a certain amount of complexity to our estimation while also accruing higher computational costs. Depending
on the background knowledge and the specifcities of a research analysis, different trade-offs can be made. If it is reasonable to assume a linear regression model
happens to accurately refect the underlying data-generating process, it is probably more effcient to use a parametric model. That kind of assumption, however,
is typically untenable outside randomized controlled trials and especially in the
context of high-dimensional joint probability distribution, that is, when we have a
large number of covariates. The more covariates we have, the more likely there
will be complex interactions and relationships among them and the less likely our
parametric models can capture these relationships.
The second limitation is that virtually every study implies a causal query about
the determinants of treaty ratifcation. Yet, none has openly embraced a causal language and framework within which to formulate the causal quantities of interest
that correspond to the research questions and link these quantities to the observa-
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tional data that are sampled from an observational population. This is the essence of
what is often called causal identifcation. Causal identifcation is diffcult because
of one key problem, which is that the same probability distribution, from which
our observational data are sampled from, can be generated by different underlying
causal processes [Peters et al., 2017, 10] or, one may say, different causal stories.
The task of identifcation is therefore completely separate from and prior to the
task of estimation. Estimation is computing the numerical values of our quantities
of interest from the observational data. Identifcation is establishing that there is
a unique, one-to-one mapping between the observational data and the underlying
causal story in the form of causal assumptions. Estimation thus provides an answer
to our causal question. Identifcation determines whether our causal question is
even answerable in the frst place.
It should be noted that one uses different methods to complete different tasks.
We use statistical methods for estimation and “extra-statistical methods [...] to
express and interpret causal assumptions” [Pearl et al., 2016, 5]. The causal framework that Pearl [2009a] and others have developed provide these “extra-statistical
methods”. Not using these causal framework and methods leads to unfortunate
implications for empirical research. For example, endogeneity, an identifcation issue, is often viewed as a statistical problem because “there is no agreement on the
most appropriate statistical approach” [von Stein, 2016, 661]. However, the reason
there is no agreement on the most appropriate statistical approach is because “there
is no statistical method that can determine the causal story from the data alone”
[Pearl et al., 2016, 5]. Without clearly separating and distinguishing between the
task of identifcation and that of estimation, researchers often mistake estimation
techniques such as propensity score matching for an identifcation strategy [Pearl,
2009a, 349]. Similarly, they fail to employ highly useful causal identifcation tools
such as the backdoor criterion [Pearl et al., 2016, 61–64], a simple and intuitive test
to see if our causal story is suffcient to allow a computation of causal effects from
observational data, to subsequently guide their covariate selection and inform their

28
statistical modeling. Instead, researchers resort to statistical “fxes” such as country
fxed effects and time trends that could prove arbitrary or even counterproductive
[Chaudoin et al., 2016] and, in any case, skirt around the crux of the problem,
which is to explicitly link the causal story to the observed data.
The following two examples underscore the benefts of embracing a transparent
causal inference framework. In a prominent study of treaty commitment, the researcher fts multiple regression models and successively regresses ratifcations of
human rights treaties and optional protocols and provisions on several predictors
that are measured contemporaneously, including democracy, human rights violations, and their interaction term. The regression coeffcient for democracy is then
interpreted as indication that “for each point increase in the measure of Democracy,
states with no human rights violations have between 10 and 54 percent increased
chance of ratifying human rights treaties than nondemocratic ones” [Hathaway,
2007, 609].
This modeling procedure and interpretation are appropriate for a causal model
represented in Figure 2.2a where X denotes democracy, Y stands for human rights
violations, and A is ratifcation. The majority of the literature, however, suggests
that it is at least as likely that democracy contemporaneously infuences the extent
of human rights violations rather than the other way around even if it is possible
that state repression may impede democratization or undermine democracy in the
next time period. A different causal model in Figure 2.2b could be deemed just as,
if not more, plausible, in which conditioning on human rights violations Y would
induce a post-treatment bias in estimating the causal effect of democracy X on
ratifcation A. The broader point is that whether the causal effect of interest can
be identifed and estimated without bias depends intimately on the topology of the
causal model and it is unnecessarily diffcult, if not impossible, to fairly evaluate
the causal model’s substantive plausibility in the absence of an explicit, preferably
graphical, representation of the causal model.
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Fig. 2.2.: (a) Simplifed causal model inferred from Hathaway [2007] of the effect
of X (democracy) on A (treaty ratifcation), which is confounded by Y (torture
practice); (b) Modifed causal model adapted from Hathaway [2007] of the effect
of X (democracy) on A (treaty ratifcation) both directly and indirectly through Y ,
suggesting a potential post-treatment bias in the simplifed model.

For a more complicated example, the study by Vreeland [2008] raises the possibility of omitted variable bias in explaining the positive correlation between CAT
ratifcation and torture practices in dictatorships. The situation is represented in
Figure 2.3 where the vertices X, Y , and A respectively denote multiple parties, torture, and CAT ratifcation. Failing to condition on X in this case would confound the
potential (non)relationship between Y and A and explain why “the more a dictatorship practices torture, the more likely it is to sign and ratify the CAT” [Vreeland,
2008, 68].
X
Y

A

Fig. 2.3.: Simplifed causal model inferred from Vreeland [2008] of the effect of X
(multiple parties) on both Y (torture) and A (CAT ratifcation).

Assuming the goal of Vreeland [2008] is to make causal inference, we can infer
from his statistical models various causal models that the author implicitly assumes.
Table 1 in Vreeland [2008, 83] presents multiple regression models that estimate
the instantaneous effect of multiple political parties on torture among dictatorships.
These models are represented in Figure 2.4a where X denotes multiple parties, Y
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denotes torture, and W1 is a set of control variables (gross domestic product per
capita, population, trade/GDP, civil war, and communist regime). I add the node S
in double circle to indicate the sample selection of only dictatorships.1
W1

X

W2

Y

S
(a)

A

X

Y

S
(b)

Fig. 2.4.: (a) Causal model inferred from Vreeland [2008, 83] of the effect of X
(multiple parties) on Y (torture) among S (dictatorships) with control variables
W1 ; (b) Causal model inferred from Vreeland [2008, 90] of the effect of X (multiple parties) on A (CAT ratifcation) among S (dictatorships) with control variables
W2 . Arrows of opposite directions between X and Y across the two causal models
suggest incoherent assumptions about the causal process.

Vreeland [2008] then proceeds to estimate the instantaneous effect of multiple
parties (X) on CAT ratifcation (A) among dictatorships (S). His regression models
in Table 3 [Vreeland, 2008, 90] assume the causal model in Figure 2.4b where W2
is a different set of control variables (communist regime, lagged regional score of
CAT ratifcation, the number of countries that have ratifed the CAT, the percentage
1

The original study does not discuss sample selection and its consequences for identifcation. Here I
assume that sample selection S, which is based on regime type, is dependent on the control variables
W1 and W2 . This is not unreasonable since democracy arguably depends on economic development,
the presence or absence of civil war, trade, among others. This assumption is also convenient because
we can then remove from consideration the consequences of sample selection in order to focus on
the causal relationships between multiple parties and, respectively, torture and treaty ratifcation.
In other cases, though, as Bareinboim et al. [2014] demonstrate, sample selection could potentially
render the causal effect of X on Y in Figure 2.4a non-identifable from the sample data. For example,
insofar as legally organized political parties (treatment X) and torture (outcome Y ) both infuence
sample selection S, that is, the use of torture may suppress and undermine democracy (Y → S)
while mobilization by opposition parties promotes democratization (X → S), we will end up with a
collider bias X → S ← Y and the causal effect of X on Y will not be recoverable from the sample
data.
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of the population that are Muslims, GDP per capita, population, and the trade/GDP
proportion). Vreeland [2008, 89] also controls for “the log of the Hathaway torture scale.” This is a curious modeling decision, however, since it implies that Y
is a confounding variable that affects both X and A. Thus, it can be seen that between the causal model in Figure 2.4a (where X → Y ) and the causal model in
Figure 2.4b (where Y → X), some incoherent assumptions are made with respect
to the contemporaneous causal relationship between multiple parties and torture.
If multiple parties only affect torture as assumed in Figure 2.4a but not the other
way around, then controlling for torture as Vreeland [2008, 90] does would introduce a post-treatment bias. It might be that X and Y mutually cause each other
instantaneously, but then it would not be possible to identify the causal effect of X
(multiple parties) on either A (CAT ratifcation) or Y (torture).
It should be emphasized that I remain agnostic at this point as to whether these
causal models accurately depict the true underlying causal process or which specifc
statistical methods are used to estimate the causal quantities of interest from observational data. Nevertheless, the two examples illustrate the critical importance of
graphically representing our causal models. A graphical model would make explicit
our assumptions, consistent or otherwise, about the underlying data-generating
process and reveal potential identifcation problems that may arise.

2.3 Causal Variable Importance Analysis of Treaty Ratifcation
2.3.1 Notation and causal model formulation
Traditional variable importance analyses use parametric models to estimate the
association between input variables and an outcome, using a variety of metrics such
as regression coeffcients and p-values, model ft, or predictive accuracy. Taking a
causal inference approach, rather than an associational one, I instead formulate
variable importance in terms of their average causal effects. Informally, the causal
effect of a variable is defned as the effect of an intervention to artifcially fx, as

32
opposed to just naturally observe, the values of that variable. For a binary variable,
the treatment and control values are intuitively clear. For a continuous variable, I
use its observed maximum and minimum values.
In an observational setting, the frst step in identifying and estimating causal
effects is to build a non-parametric structural causal model as a set of equations
to describe, to the best of our knowledge, the underlying data-generating process.
In my following model, W is a set of time-invariant covariates; X1 and X2 are
either binary or continuous time-varying predictors; Y is human rights outcome;
and A is treaty ratifcation.2 The subscript t indicates the time periods during which
the variables are measured. Together these equations form a generative system
from which n country–year observations On are sampled and the joint probability
distribution of the observed data is On = (W, X1t , X2t , At , Yt ) ∼ PO .
W = fW (UW )
X1t = fX1 (W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 , UX1 )
X2t = fX2 (W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 , UX2 )

(2.1)

At = fA (W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X1t , X2t , UA )
Yt = fY (W, Yt−1 , At , X1t , X2t , UY )
A structural causal model is best represented in the form of an acyclic directed
graph (DAG). A causal DAG [Darwiche, 2009, Elwert, 2013, Pearl, 2009a] comprises a set of nodes/vertices denoting random variables. An edge/arrow denotes
one variable’s (the parent node) direct causal infuence on another node (the child
node). A path in a causal DAG is an arrow or a sequence of arrows, regardless
2

Quantitative research on international human rights law mostly focuses on the infuence of human
rights treaties on state practices. It therefore often considers treaty ratifcation as the treatment, the
impact of which is to be evaluated. In the epidemiology and biomedical literature, from which I
derive a lot of methodological insights, the treatment is usually denoted A and the outcome Y . To
be consistent with the larger research program on international human rights law, throughout the
chapter I use A to denote treaty ratifcation, which is the outcome in this study. The treatments in
my causal variable importance analysis are ratifcation predictors denoted X such as {X1, X2}. As
annotated and explained later in my graphical causal model, human rights practice, denoted Y , is
actually a potential confounder.
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of their directions, that connects one node to another. A causal (or directed) path
have all arrows on its path point to the same direction. Otherwise, it is a non-causal
path.
My causal DAG in Figure 2.5 has a dynamic structure that refects a temporal
order with past nodes in the left shaded block and future nodes in the right shaded
block. Each block represents a single time period. There are no arrows or sequence
of arrows going from the block on the right to the block on the left, meaning that
no variable in the future should have a causal infuence on any variable in the past.
The DAG is also acyclic in the sense that, within the same temporal block, there
are no loops or directed paths going from a node to itself. I make no assumptions
about any of the functional forms f = {fW , fX1 , fX2 , fA , fY }, which is consistent
with the recognition that usually we do not have enough knowledge to specify the
exact functional forms that characterize the relationships between variables. For
the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, I construct a causal model with
only two time-varying predictors X1 and X2 over two time periods from t − 1 to
t. A larger number of predictors over a longer time span can be represented in a
similar fashion.
As in any causal analyses, we have to make a few assumptions about the underlying causal process. Similar to Dı́az et al. [2015, 6], I assume ratifcation predictors
do not instantaneously affect each other although they may infuence every other
predictor of the next time period. That means, for example, the amount of offcial
development assistance (ODA) and economic development are conditionally independent from each other in the same time period. ODA at time t − 1, however,
could certainly affect economic development at time t (notationally, X1t−1 → X2t ).
From an identifcation standpoint, this assumption is necessary because if the predictors are allowed to mutually cause each other instantaneously, it would render
the causal model cyclical and make it impossible to identify their causal effects.
I further assume the exogenous variables U = {UW , UX1 , UX2 , UA , UY } are jointly
independent. As a result, the values of any node is strictly a function of its parent
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X1t−1

At−1

Yt−1

X2t−1

X1t

At

Yt

X2t

Fig. 2.5.: A dynamic graphical causal model with shaded blocks indicating two temporal periods. Time-invariant covariates W , which precede and potentially affect
all other variables, are not represented. The suffcient adjustment sets to identify the causal effects of X1t → At and X2t → At are {W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X2t } and
{W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X1t }, respectively.

nodes and some exogenous factors. This implies that observing a variable’s parent nodes will render that variable independent from other covariates except for
its descendants. For example, treaty ratifcation At has as its parent nodes timeinvariant covariates W , predictors Xt , human rights practice in the immediate past
Yt−1 , and prior ratifcation status At−1 . If we observe the set {W, Yt−1 , At−1 , Xt },
then At is conditionally independent from other nodes, including all Xt−1 , except
for the descendants of At such as Yt and At+1 .
It should be emphasized that, short of a randomization of the treatment as in an
experimental design, any observational studies that aim to make causal inference
have to make this exogeneity assumption and the only way to justify it is to rely
on the domain knowledge in the literature (Table 2.1). In other words, since one
cannot know if a model accurately represents the causal process based on a scrutiny
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of the observed data alone, it is important that the body of knowledge in the literature should guide and justify the construction of my causal model as follows. First,
the causal dependence Yt−1 → At is informed by the selection effect argument that
a state may make a commitment decision based in part on its prior level of compliance because they will signifcantly determine its ratifcation cost [Downs et al.,
1996, von Stein, 2005].
Second, I allow for the causal dependencies Xt−1 → Xt and Yt−1 → Yt . This
is a routine assumption in the context of time-series cross-section data structure.
Substantively, this assumption also permits the possibility that human rights violations may have some inherent dynamic that goes beyond contextual factors such
as poverty, dictatorship, involvement in conficts, and so forth. As Hill and Jones
[2014, 674] observe, this argument means that “the governments can become habituated to the use of violence to resolve political confict.” I include this causal
relationship, bearing in mind that, in a graphical causal model, an arrow between
variables indicates a possible, but not necessarily an actual causal link. A missing
arrow, on the other hand, is equivalent to ruling out any direct causality.
Third, an argument can also be made that human rights practices affect some
ratifcation predictors in the next time period. An obvious example is that the use
of torture and other extrajudicial measures by the government could intimidate its
critics, suppress movements for democratization, and undermine democracy. The
inclusion of the directed arrows Yt−1 → X1t and Yt−1 → X2t in my causal model is
informed by this argument.
Fourth, I similarly speculate a direct causal dependence At−1 → At based on
the observation that once governments ratify an international human rights treaty,
they are unlikely to withdraw from that treaty. It should be noted that in many
cases withdrawal is entirely legally possible. Many human rights treaties and their
optional protocols have denunciation provisions that allow states to exit from these
institutions, including Article 31 of the CAT, Article 12 of the First Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR, and Article 19 of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. This is not the
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case with the ICCPR and the CEDAW, which do not have a denunciation clause
or provision. That, however, has not prevented some states from denouncing and
attempting to withdraw from the ICCPR [Tyagi, 2009]. I therefore code treaty
membership as an implicit annual ratifcation as opposed to a terminal event. This
is similar to many other studies in the literature [Cole, 2005, Lupu, 2013a, HafnerBurton et al., 2015a]. Importantly, it is also consistent with the prevailing modeling
practices in almost every single study that estimates the impact of human rights
treaty ratifcation as a time-varying treatment.
Finally, the causal dependencies At−1 → X1t and At−1 → X2t suggest that we
leave open the possibility that a human rights treaty, once ratifed, could infuence
state behavior in the next time period through a variety of mediators such as public opinion and electoral accountability in democracies [Dai, 2005, Wallace, 2013],
legislative constraints of the executive by the opposition parties [Lupu, 2015], and
judicial effectiveness of the domestic court system [Crabtree and Fariss, 2015, Powell and Staton, 2009].
Table 2.1 lists the model variables and data sources for their measurements. It
also refers to studies in the literature that similarly classify or assume these variables
as time-invariant covariates, confounders, and ratifcation predictors. For example,
if a study that investigates the impact of a human rights treaty on state practice includes democracy and independent judiciary as time-varying control variables in its
statistical models, we can infer that study views these two covariates as ratifcation
predictors. Appendix A.1 provides more detailed variable descriptions, coding, and
data sources.
Given the causal model and its encoded assumptions, I formulate the causal
importance of a predictor in terms of its contemporaneous average causal effect,
that is, the difference in the average probability of ratifying a treaty if that predictor has one value as opposed to a different value across all country–year ob



servations. It is denoted by τ = E At |do(X1t = 1) − E At |do(X1t = 0) where
the do-operator is notation for an active intervention to fx the value of X1. In
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Table 2.1.: Ratifcation model variables
Sets

Variables and references

W

Ratifcation rules [Simmons, 2009] measured by Simmons [2009].
Domestic legal traditions [Mitchell et al., 2013]
measured by La Porta et al. [2008].

X

ICCPR proportion of ratifcation globally [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006, Hathaway, 2007]
measured by Offce of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
CEDAW proportion of ratifcation globally [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006, Hathaway, 2007]
measured by OHCHR.
CAT proportion of ratifcation globally [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006, Hathaway, 2007]
measured by OHCHR.
ICCPR proportion of ratifcation regionally [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006, Hathaway, 2007]
measured by OHCHR.
CEDAW proportion of ratifcation regionally [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006, Hathaway, 2007]
measured by OHCHR.
CAT proportion of ratifcation regionally [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006, Hathaway, 2007]
measured by OHCHR.
Democracy/dictatorship classifcation
[Hathaway, 2007, Chapman and Chaudoin, 2013, Neumayer, 2007]
measured by Cheibub et al. [2010].
Multiple parties [Vreeland, 2008, Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011]
measured by Cheibub et al. [2010].
Transition to/from democracy [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006, Moravcsik, 2000]
measured by Cheibub et al. [2010].
Involvement in militarized interstate dispute [Chapman and Chaudoin, 2013]
measured by Melander et al. [2016] and Gleditsch et al. [2002].
Judicial independence [Powell and Staton, 2009] measured by
Linzer and Staton [2015].
Population size [Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita [Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Participation in international trade [Hafner-Burton, 2013]
measured as trade volume/GDP by the World Bank Indicators.
Net offcial development assistance [Nielsen and Simmons, 2015]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.

Y

CIRI torture index [Cingranelli et al., 2013].
CIRI women’s political rights index [Cingranelli et al., 2013].
Human rights dynamic latent score [Fariss, 2014].

A

ICCPR ratifcation measured by OHCHR.
CEDAW ratifcation measured by OHCHR.
CAT ratifcation measured by OHCHR.

the interventional framework of causal inference [Pearl, 2009a], that means we
would intervene on the generative system (Equation set 2.1) to fx the equation
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X1t = fX1 (W, At−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 , UX1 ) reiteratively at X1t = {0, 1}. From the
two resulting modifed generative systems At = fA (W, At−1 , Yt−1 , x, X2t , UA ) for
x = {0, 1}, we then compute the difference between the two mean values of treaty
ratifcation, which will be a consistent estimate of the causal effect of X1 as long as
causal identifcation is established.

2.3.2 Causal identifcation
Causal identifcation involves establishing the conditions under which a property


of an interventional distribution such as the expectation E A|do(X = x) can be
computed without bias from an observational probability distribution. My causal
identifcation strategy is to identify a valid adjustment set of observed variables
that makes the interventional distribution of the outcome A (treaty ratifcation)
essentially equivalent to its observed conditional distribution.
Any causal identifcation in the setting of observational data ultimately depends
on the underlying causal structure, which is best represented by a causal DAG. DAGs
are thus an effective tool to make all causal assumptions transparent and facilitate
a clear and easy determination of suffcient adjustment sets using the backdoor
criterion. To illustrate identifcation of the causal effect of X1t on At , for example, I apply the following backdoor criterion [Pearl et al., 2016, 61–66] to fnd an
adjustment set of variables such that conditioning on that set will:
(a) block any (non-causal) paths from X1t to At that have an arrow coming into
X1t ;
(b) leave open all causal paths from X1t to At ; and
(c) not condition on a collider (a node that lies on any paths between X1t and
At and has two arrows coming into it) or a descendant of a collider (a node
connected to a collider through a directed path emanating from the collider).
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When we condition on an adjustment set that satisfes the backdoor criterion,
we essentially remove all non-causal pathways from X1t to At and render these
two variables conditionally independent or d-separated and, as a result, the interventional distribution of the outcome A when X1 is intervened upon is essentially
equivalent to its observational distribution. More generally, when all non-causal
paths between a predictor and the outcome are closed off, any remaining signifcant correlation between them is evidence of a causal relationship.
From the graphical causal model in Figure 2.5, I derive a suffcient set of covariates for adjustment Z1 = {W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X2t } that satisfes the backdoor requirement to identify the causal effect of X1t on At . Specifcally, conditioning on Yt−1
will, according to rule (a), block fve non-causal paths from X1t to At , including
(i) X1t ← At−1 → Yt−1 → At ; (ii) X1t ← X1t−1 → At−1 → Yt−1 → At ; (iii)
X1t ← Yt−1 → At ; (iv) X1t ← Yt−1 → X2t → At ; and (v) X1t ← X2t−1 →
Yt−1 → At . Similarly, conditioning on At−1 will, by the same rule, block two
other non-causal paths from X1t to At , including (i) X1t ← At−1 → At and (ii)
X1t ← At−1 → X2t → At .
However, Yt−1 is also a collider on the path X1t ← X1t−1 → Yt−1 ← X2t−1 →
X2t → At . Conditioning on Yt−1 will therefore open that non-causal path and
violate rule (b) of the backdoor requirement. I therefore further condition on X2t to
block this non-causal path. For the same reason that I have accidentally opened the
non-causal path X1t ← X1t−1 → At−1 ← X2t−1 → X2t → At when conditioning
on the collider At−1 , I block this path by conditioning on X2t . Conditioning on
X2t also happens to block three other non-causal paths that traverse through X2t ,
including (i) X1t ← X2t−1 → X2t → At ; (ii) X1t ← At−1 → X2t → At ; and (iii)
X1t ← X2t−1 → At−1 → X2t → At . The latter two of these three non-causal paths
run through At−1 as well and therefore are already blocked when we condition on
At−1 .
We should not condition on contemporaneous measure of human rights practice
Yt when estimating the causal effect of X1t , however. Since it is a collider on the
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path X1t → Yt ← At , conditioning on Yt would violate rule (c) of the backdoor
criterion, introducing a non-causal association between X1t and At and biasing
the causal effect estimate of X1t . For identifcation of the causal effect of X2t on
At , I apply the same rules and similarly derive a suffcient adjustment set Z2 =
{W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X1t }. In summary, to identify the contemporaneous causal effect of
a ratifcation predictor, I condition on time-invariant covariates, immediately prior
ratifcation status and level of compliance, and other contemporary time-varying
covariates.
In addition to a causal variable importance analysis, I use the same graphical
causal model to develop a causal test of many theories of CAT ratifcation. First, I
test the argument by Hathaway [2007] that democracy (X1t ) and torture practices
(Yt ) interact to lower the probability of CAT ratifcation (At ). Based on the causal
DAG in Figure 2.5, one should not condition on Yt or, for that matter, use an interaction term of Yt and X1t while estimating the effect of X1t on At . Since Yt is
a collider on two different paths X1t → Yt ← At and X1t → Yt ← Yt−1 → At ,
conditioning on Yt will induce a collider bias. I instead causally test this interactive effect argument by estimating the Yt−1 -specifc effect of X1t on At , using the
adjustment set Z = {W, At−1 , X2t } that satisfes the backdoor requirement within
each subset of observations based on the values of Yt−1 [Pearl et al., 2016, 71–72].
The test results will provide evidence as to whether there is any effect modifcation
by past torture practice, that is, whether the effect of democracy on treaty ratifcation varies across levels of compliance in the previous year. The conventional
expectation is that the positive causal effect of democracy on treaty ratifcation will
diminish and eventually reverse its direction as the level of torture in the prior year
increases. Note that we cannot identify the X1t -specifc causal effect of Yt−1 on At
because of potential post-treatment bias since X1t could be a descendant of Yt−1
along the path Yt−1 → X1t → At if the use of torture possibly undermines democratic institutions.
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Second, I test Vreeland’s omitted variable bias argument by directly estimating
the causal effect of multiple political parties (X2) on CAT ratifcation (A) among
dictatorships (X1 = 0). The quantity of interest corresponding to the test is formulated as the X1t -specifc causal effect of X2t on At , that is, the causal effect of multiple parties on treaty ratifcation among observations with the value X1t = 0. The
suffcient adjustment set for identifcation is Z = {W, At−1 , Yt−1 , X1t }. As Vreeland
[2008, 79] predicts, “the effect of the multiparty institution is to make a dictatorship more likely to enter into the CAT,” implying a positive causal effect of multiple
parties.
Third, I estimate the average causal effect of prior torture practice on CAT ratifcation (Yt−1 → At ) in a causal test of the selection effect argument. This argument
is often made but has rarely been empirically quantifed within a causal inference
framework. The theoretical expectation is a negative causal effect of Yt−1 , suggesting that higher level of torture in the previous year is expected to cause state leaders
to be less likely to ratify the CAT in the following year. A suffcient adjustment set I
derive for identifcation is Z = {W, At−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 }.
Finally, I also test the argument with respect to the signaling benefts of CAT
ratifcation for dictators [Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011] by estimating the causal
effect of torture on CAT ratifcation among autocracies, that is, the X1t−1 -specifc
causal effect of Yt−1 on At . The theoretical expectation is that “authoritarian governments that torture heavily are more likely to sign the treaty than those that torture
less” [Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011, 276], which implies a positive effect of Yt−1
among observations that have the value X1t−1 = 0. A suffcient set that satisfes the
backdoor criterion for causal effect identifcation is Z = {W, At−1 , X2t−1 }.

2.3.3 Machine learning-based estimation
Once we have determined the suffcient adjustment sets Z that satisfy the backdoor requirement for identifcation of various causal effects, I adopt two machine
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learning-based methods for causal effect estimation: substitution estimation and
targeted maximum likelihood estimation (TMLE). My estimation methods are analogous to the OLS estimator if the underlying causal system in Equation set 2.1 is
assumed to be linear and all covariate effects are additive and all the noise terms U
are Gaussian. The use of machine learning is aimed to relax this assumption.
For each of the continuous predictors of treaty ratifcation (including, global
proportion of ratifcation, regional proportions of ratifcation, population size, GDP
per capita, trade/GDP proportion, net amount of ODA, and judicial independence)
the substitution estimator [Robins, 1986, Robins et al., 1999] computes the aver



age causal effect of the predictor τ = E A|do(X = 1) − E A|do(X = 0) , using

P 
the estimate τ̂ = n1 ni=1 Qn (1, Z) − Qn (0, Z) . Specifcally, I ft a prediction model


Q̄n (X, Z) = E A|X, Z of treaty ratifcation A using X and the corresponding suffcient adjustment set Z. I then reiteratively substitute the predictor values with
X = 1 (empirically maximum value) and X = 0 (empirically minimum value) for
each observation, use the ftted prediction model to generate the counterfactual
outcomes, and compute the mean difference.
For variance estimation, I use the nonparametric bootstrap method. In the presence of missing data, my procedure is similar to Daniel et al. [2011, 491] and
suggested by Tsiatis [2007, 362–371]. I combine bootstrap with single stochastic
imputation rather than multiple imputation in order to make effcient and still valid
inference. In addition to its greater effciency, another beneft of combining nonparametric bootstrap and single (improper) imputation is that we do not have to
rely on the normality assumption as required by the Rubin’s approach [Little and
Rubin, 2014] when pooling variances across imputed datasets. Instead, I create
distribution-free confdence intervals, using the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the
bootstrap distribution to obtain the desired coverage.
The key to obtaining consistent effect estimates with a substitution estimator
¯ n that approximates the (unknown)
is to ft a correctly specifed outcome model Q
data generating mechanism. The standard practice is to assume a binomial dis-
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tribution for the binary outcome of treaty ratifcation and then model a property
of the outcome distribution as a linear, additive function of a set of covariates,
sometimes with an interaction term included. If these distributional and functional
form assumptions are wrong, which they likely are for probably non-linear, highly
complex political phenomena, the results will be misspecifed models, biased effect
estimates, invalid inference, and misleading conclusions. The ensemble machine
learning technique Super Learner [van der Laan et al., 2007, Sinisi et al., 2007]
offers a powerful solution to this problem of correct functional forms.
Super Learner has been used in economic research [Kreif et al., 2015], political
science [Samii et al., 2016], and epidemiology [Neugebauer et al., 2013, Pirracchio et al., 2015]. It stacks a user-selected library of predictive algorithms and uses
cross-validation to evaluate the performance of each algorithm in minimizing a
specifed loss function. For the binary outcome of treaty ratifcation, an appropriate
h
�
1−A i
A
loss function is the negative log-likelihood −log Q(X, Z) 1−Q(X, Z)
, which
measures the degree of misft with the observed data. User-selected predictive algorithms can include simple main-term linear regression model, semi-parametric
generalized additive model [Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990], regularized regression
models [Tibshirani, 1996], and non-parametric tree-based ensemble methods such
as boosting [Friedman, 2001] and random forest [Breiman, 2001b]. Table 2.2 lists
the algorithms I use for my machine learning-based substitution estimation given
the constraints in terms of computational resources.
Table 2.2.: Algorithms used in Super Learning-based Substitution Estimation
Algorithm

Description

GLMnet
GAM
(Tuned) XGBoost

P
Regularized logistic regression with lasso penalty pj=1 |βj |.
Generalized additive model.
Extreme gradient boosting (eta = 0.01, depth = 4, ntree = 500).

The use of cross-validation is crucial for the algorithms to generalize well in
terms of predicting unknown outcome values and avoiding overftting. Super Learner
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then creates a linear combination of these algorithms, each of which is weighted by
its average predictive accuracy, to build a hybrid prediction function that performs
approximately as well as and usually better than the best algorithm in the library.
The ability of Super Learner to assemble a rich, diverse set of algorithms makes
it particularly effective and much more likely to approximate the underlying data
generating process [Polley and van der Laan, 2010].
One state-of-the-art algorithm is extreme gradient boosting [Chen and He, 2015,
Chen and Guestrin, 2016], a faster implementation of the popular and effective machine learning technique of gradient boosting machine [Friedman, 2001, Schapire
and Freund, 2012, Natekin and Knoll, 2013]. Extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost)
is non-parametric and able to capture non-linear, interactive dynamics among a
large number of predictors. Furthermore, unlike other tree-based methods such as
random forest and gradient boosting machine, XGBoost has greater computational
effciency, which makes it particularly suitable to use in the context of nonparametric bootstrap for inference.
The performance of XGBoost could be sensitive to different hyper-parameter
settings. I employ a combination of 5-fold cross-validation and grid search in Figure
2.6 to select the best among a large number of confgurations (comprising varying
learning rates, tree depths, and numbers of trees) that are tuned specifcally to each
of the three singly imputed ICCPR, CEDAW, and CAT datasets. Each confguration of
XGBoost hyper-parameters is iteratively trained on a random sample of four-ffths
of the country–year observations and then used to predict the probability of treaty
ratifcation, using the last ffth of the data. For each confguration, its minimum,
maximum, and average mean-squared-prediction-errors across fve folds are plotted
on the graph in descending order. The most effective confguration is the one on
the top with the smallest average mean-squared-prediction-error. This data-driven
selection process will help us decide which confguration of the XGBoost algorithm
is most effective in predicting treaty ratifcation for each human rights treaty and
thus, presumably, most accurately captures the underlying data-generating process.
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XGBoost configurations by (mean, min, and max) cross−validated MSE in predicting ICCPR ratification

XGBoost configurations by (mean, min, and max) cross−validated MSE in predicting CEDAW ratification
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Fig. 2.6.: Cross-validated risk of XGBoost algorithms in predicting (a) ICCPR ratifcation, (b) CEDAW ratifcation, and (c) CAT ratifcation.

To estimate the causal effect of the binary predictors (democracy, multiple political parties, democratic transition, and involvement in militarized interstate disputes), I use the targeted maximum likelihood estimation (TMLE) method [van der
Laan and Rose, 2011]. Similar to the substitution estimator, TMLE also starts by
ftting an initial predictive outcome model of treaty ratifcation Q0n = E(A|X, Z).
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It then modifes the initial model Q0n (X, Z) into an updated model Q1n (X, Z), using
the modifying equation logit(Q1n ) = logit(Q0n ) + n Hn where the “clever covarih
i
I(X=0)
ate” Hn (X, Z) = gnI(X=1)
−
is a function of the treatment mechanism
(X=1|Z)
gn (X=0|Z)
gn = E(X|Z) and the coeffcient n is obtained via a separate regression model
logit(A) = logit(Q0n ) + n Hn . In the third and fnal step, TMLE similarly substitutes
two distinct values of a binary predictor, plugs them into the updated outcome
model Q1n (X, Z) to generate the counterfactual outcomes for each observation, and
computes the average causal effect as the mean difference of the counterfactual
outcome values.
TMLE is essentially the substitution estimator but with an additional updating
step in between to incorporate information about treatment assignment. This updating step is at the heart of the TMLE methodology. It makes the estimator doubly
robust by reducing any remaining bias in the initial outcome model, producing unbiased estimates if either the initial outcome model Q0n or the treatment assignment
model gn is consistent. It is maximally effcient asymptotically if both Q0n and gn are
consistent. Note that both Q0n and gn are already more robust to misspecifcation,
and thus more likely to be consistent than standard parametric statistical models,
because I have incorporated machine learning in my estimation.
In short, the TMLE methodology computes causal effect estimates of binary
treatment variables that are more robust than both parametric regression models and propensity score-based estimators. Machine learning-based TMLE is even
more robust and less computationally expensive than the machine learning-based
substitution estimator with bootstrapped samples thanks to its effcient infuence
function-based approach to variance estimation [van der Laan and Rose, 2011, 94–
97]. Because of TMLE’s greater computational effciency, I am able to employ a
more diverse and richer set of learning algorithms in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3.: Algorithms used in Super Learner-based Targeted Maximum Likelihood
Estimation
Algorithm

Description

GLMnet
GAM
polymars
randomForest
XGBoost

P
Regularized logistic regression with lasso penalty pj=1 |βj |.
Generalized additive model (degree of polynomials = 2).
Polynomial multivariate adaptive regression with splines.
Random Forest (ntree = 1,000).
Extreme gradient boosting (eta = 0.01, depth = 4, ntree = 500).

To handle the missing data, I conduct multiple imputation, using the Amelia
II program [Honaker et al., 2011], and combine estimates across m = 5 imputed
data sets. Appendix A.1 provides the summary statistics of the observed data and
Appendix A.3 summarizes the imputation process. The ICCPR, the CEDAW, and
the CAT were opened for ratifcation at different times. I thus create three separate
datasets (and, correspondingly, 15 imputed datasets) that have different temporal
coverage periods, including 1967–2013 for the ICCPR (opened for ratifcation in 16
December 1966), 1982–2013 for the CEDAW (adopted and opened for ratifcation
in 18 December 1979, but the CIRI measure of women’s political rights only begin in 1981), and 1985–2013 for the CAT (opened for ratifcation in 10 December
1984). For algorithmic learning stability and ease of interpretation, I standardize
all continuous covariates into a bounded range between zero and one.

2.3.4

Results and interpretation

Table 2.4 reports the estimates of the contemporaneous average causal effects
of the ratifcation predictors. Despite some differences, their causal effect estimates
are relatively consistent across three human rights treaties. First, the results underscore the importance of regional socialization and norm diffusion in causing states
to ratify human rights treaties. Going from the observed lowest proportion to the
observed highest proportion of regional ratifcations will increase a country’s probability of becoming and remaining a state party by somewhere between 7.2 and
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9.5 percentage points, depending on the treaties. Similar to a fnding by Simmons
[2009], density of regional ratifcation is, in fact, the single most causally consistent and the second most causally important predictor of treaty ratifcation across
all three human rights treaties.
Table 2.4.: Causal effect point estimates and 95% CI of predictors on treaty ratifcation
Predictors

ICCPR

CEDAW

CAT

Super Learner-based Targeted Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Infuence function-based CI with multiple imputation
Democracy
Multiple parties
Democratic transition
Involvement in militarized
interstate disputes

0.237
[0.121, 0.353]
0.153
[−0.063, 0.370]
0.186
[−0.080, 0.451]
−0.004
[−0.015, 0.007]

0.116
[0.064, 0.168]
0.197
[−0.114, 0.508]
0.091
[−0.046, 0.227]
−0.002
[−0.017, 0.013]

0.093
[−0.065, 0.251]
0.192
[0.040, 0.344]
−0.013
[−0.144, 0.118]
−0.010
[−0.023, 0.004]

Super Learner-based Substitution Estimator
Bootstrap (B = 500) quantile-based CI with single stochastic imputation
Global proportion of ratifcation
Regional proportions of ratifcation
Population size
GDP per capita
Trade/GDP
Net offcial development assistance
Judicial independence

Number of countries
Number of years
Number of observations

−0.011
[−0.032, 0.000]
0.095
[0.039, 0.190]
0.009
[−0.004, 0.027]
−0.003
[−0.020, 0.011]
−0.002
[−0.015 , 0.011]
0.014
[−0.010, 0.043]
−0.005
[−0.031, 0.014]

−0.011
[−0.025, 0.000]
0.072
[0.034, 0.155]
0.025
[0.001, 0.087]
−0.017
[−0.043, −0.001]
0.007
[−0.010, 0.032]
0.003
[−0.025, 0.019]
0.029
[0.004, 0.094]

−0.019
[−0.042, 0.002]
0.094
[0.033, 0.241]
0.028
[0.005, 0.056]
0.037
[−0.007, 0.121]
0.003
[−0.014, 0.016]
0.004
[−0.027, 0.025]
0.024
[−0.008, 0.108]

192
47
7,870

192
32
5,823

192
29
5,354
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Second, also similar to other studies in the literature [Landman, 2005], my fndings further confrm that democracy is a signifcant predictor of treaty ratifcation.
In fact, I fnd that democracy is the most causally important variable for the ratifcation of the ICCPR and the CEDAW. Being a democracy causes the probability
of being a state party to these two treaties to go up by 23.7 and 11.6 percentage
points, respectively. Democracy is being defned here as having direct election of
the executive, election of the legislature, and an alternation of power, among other
criteria [Cheibub et al., 2010]. The coding criteria for democracy, in other words,
are unlikely to overlap conceptually with various measures of human rights outcomes [Hill, 2016b, von Stein, 2016]. By implications, my fndings suggest that the
best way to push a state to ratify and remain committed to human rights treaties
is to support its domestic democratic institutions and promote ratifcations by its
regional neighbors. In the case of CAT ratifcation, it should be cautioned, it is not
democracy per se that has a signifcant causal impact. Rather, it is the existence
of de facto multiple political parties that increases the probability of ratifcation by
19.2 percentage points.
Third, as to other predictors, their causal importance is either very limited or
inconsistent. Like Goodliffe and Hawkins [2006], I fnd that democratic transition
does not signifcantly affect ratifcation of any treaties, indicating a lack of empirical support for the “lock in” argument. Involving in militarized interstate disputes
is not causally important, either. My fndings also corroborate the skepticism by
Nielsen and Simmons [2015] with respect to many economic variables such as economic development, the amount of ODA received, and participation in international
trade. These variables do not seem to matter causally for human rights treaty ratifcation. Population size tends to have a signifcantly positive, but substantively
very small, causal impact, averaging about two percentage points across all three
treaties. Independence of the judiciary makes states slightly more likely to ratify
the CEDAW, but otherwise has no impact on the ratifcation of the ICCPR and the
CAT.
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I employ the same template of causal analysis, including graphical identifcation
and machine learning-based TMLE estimation, to test many theories of CAT ratifcation. The results reported in Table 2.5 offer several interesting fndings. First,
I fnd scant evidence to support the commonly accepted argument regarding the
interactive effect of democratic institutions and human rights practice on CAT ratifcation [Hathaway, 2007]. Instead, my fndings suggest that, irrespective of a state’s
torture practice in the year prior, changing the regime type from a dictatorship to a
democracy does not lower the probability of its CAT ratifcation status. If anything,
being a democracy causes an increase, not a decrease, by 8.2 percentage points in
the chance of becoming and remaining a state party to the CAT even at the highest
level of torture practice during the previous year, although this estimate is certainly
not statistically signifcant.
Table 2.5.: CAT ratifcation theories and causal effect point estimates and 95% CI
Theory tested
Interactive effect argument
Democracy w/ No Torture
Democracy w/ Occasion Torture
Democracy w/ Freq. Torture
Omitted variable bias argument
Multiple parties in Dictatorships
Selection effect argument
Torture in All
Torture in Democracies
Credible commitment argument
Torture in Dictatorships

Notation

Mean

SE

Lower

Upper

X1t → At at Yt−1 = 2
X1t → At at Yt−1 = 1
X1t → At at Yt−1 = 0

0.140
0.056
0.082

0.075
0.047
0.071

−0.007
−0.037
−0.056

0.287
0.148
0.221

X2t → At at X1t = 0

0.050

0.043

−0.034

0.134

Yt−1 → At
Yt−1 → At at X1t−1 = 1

0.116
−0.018

0.044
0.012

0.029
−0.042

0.202
0.005

Yt−1 → At at X1t−1 = 0

0.201

0.125

−0.043

0.445

One speculative reason could be that the executives in non-compliant democracies do want to ratify and comply because torture practices in the past were more
of a legacy of abusive government agencies. Such executives, perhaps under the
pressures of the democratic public, could have an incentive to ratify the CAT and
even use treaty obligations as a way to constrain domestic abusive forces. In any
event, these causal tests partially challenge the conventional wisdom that poorly
performing democracies are reluctant to become a treaty member because their
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democratic institutions will make subsequent compliance very costly. Nevertheless,
there is some evidence, though not extremely solid, that being a democracy does increase the probability of becoming a state party to the CAT by 14 percentage points
among those countries that did not practice torture at all—a signifcantly greater
effect than among those that engaged in torture in the immediate past.
Second, as indicated previously, the kind of domestic institutions that signifcantly improve the probability of a country being a CAT member is not democracy
in general, but rather the presence of de facto multiple political parties. However,
contrary to Vreeland [2008], among the subset of authoritarian regimes, the existence of multiple political parties does not seem to have a highly signifcant causal
impact on treaty ratifcation. This presents an interesting fnding: the causal effect
of multiple political parties on CAT ratifcation can vary signifcantly, depending on
the regime types. It also suggests for further inquiries into the potentially heterogeneous causal effects of different components within the defnition of democracy on
treaty ratifcation.
Third, I rescale and dichotomize the CIRI torture index (with zero indicating
no torture and one indicating occasional or frequent torture) and test the selection
effect argument by directly estimating the causal impact of torture practices on
CAT ratifcation in the following time period. States that engage in occasional or
even frequent torture practices are actually 11.4 percentage points more likely than
those engaging in no torture at all to be a state party to the CAT in the following
year. In other words, this is evidence of an adverse selection effect. Governments
whose prior human rights practices do not conform to international standards tend
to self-select into, not away from, the CAT.
For a closer look at this surprising fnding about the adverse selection effect,
I further disaggregate the sample observations into democracies and dictatorships
based on their regime classifcation during the time period when their human rights
practices are recorded so as not to introduce a post-treatment bias. It turns out that
among democracies, engaging in torture practices would cause only a small 1.8
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percentage points decrease in their chance of being a CAT member the following
year. This comports with my previous fndings that democracy and rights practices
do not signifcantly interact to determine CAT ratifcation.
Among dictatorships, though, the estimates are highly variable and uncertain.
The point estimate suggests that authoritarian regimes that practice torture are,
on average, 20 percentage points more likely to ratify the CAT the following year,
which seems to support a claim in the literature that “[t]he empirical record has
shown fairly consistently that among non-democracies, the less compliant are as
likely (and in some cases even more likely) to ratify” [von Stein, 2016, 661]. However, the high variability of causal effect estimates mean that we do not fnd solid
empirical support for the counterintuitive claim by Hollyer and Rosendorff [2011]
that authoritarian leaders may be signaling their strength to opposition groups by
way of a CAT ratifcation. In short, my causal effect estimation indicates that prior
torture practices do not signifcantly make CAT ratifcation more likely even though
it points to a potential existence of an adverse selection effect. This, by implication,
reiterates the need to take into account prior rights practices if one wants to single
out and estimate the causal impact of CAT ratifcation on human rights practices.
Otherwise, the causal effect of the CAT would be biased downward towards zero or
even negative and CAT ratifcation would likely appear to exacerbate human rights
violations.
In short, part of this study also speaks to and contends with a substantial segment of the literature surrounding the CAT. To summarize, I fnd that although
only two main factors—regional socialization and the existence of multiple political
parties—that drive CAT ratifcation, few other variables that causally prevent states
from joining the CAT. This is refected in the steady increase in the number ratifers
over the last three decades, going from zero in 1985 to more than 150 in 2013.
Neither democracy nor previous human rights abuses represents a causal barrier
to CAT ratifcation. Nor is any combination of these two factors. This is relatively
consistent with some of the fndings by Goodliffe and Hawkins [2006] despite sig-
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nifcant differences in terms of inferential approaches, modeling choices, and even
measurements. In other words, the CAT as an international human rights institution
seems to be very inclusive although not perversely so by only attracting bad state
actors with abusive records. Still, it presents a challenge down the road when one
examines how much of a causal impact that CAT ratifcation has on state behavior.

2.4

Conclusion
Machine learning in many respects has outpaced statistical theory in terms of

modeling reality [Efron and Hastie, 2016]. Empirical scientists could leverage these
powerful prediction methods to make robust causal inference about political behavior and institutions. One area of application is to conduct a causal variable importance analysis [Dı́az et al., 2015, Hubbard et al., 2013, Pirracchio et al., 2016, Ahern
et al., 2016], in which one replaces traditional measures of variable importance by
a more substantively relevant measure: the causal effects of predictor variables. In
this chapter, I use causal variable importance as a new test of major theories of
treaty ratifcation. This is the methodological motivation of this research.
The substantive motivation is to use this novel test to help settle or at least
provide new insights into the ongoing debate as to why states ratify international
human rights treaties. There are three major theoretical approaches to treaty ratifcation in the literature, proposing different sets of explanatory variables, ranging
from economic covariates to normative factors to domestic institutional variables.
The best and most substantively relevant theories should be able to identify the
most causally important variables for treaty ratifcation. With that reasoning, my
analysis, by estimating the causal effect of each explanatory variable, offers a empirical basis to adjudicate and contribute to the debate about human rights treaty
ratifcation in the quantitative human rights literature.
Based on its causal fndings, my research in this chapter casts doubt on the
instrumental explanations of human rights treaty ratifcation. It fnds little to no
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causal impact by economic variables such as economic development, foreign aid,
and international trade participation. There is no evidence that human rights treaty
ratifcation is driven by economic concerns or fnancial interests. The analysis also
fnds some mixed support for institutional models of treaty ratifcation. On the
one hand, it questions some of the popular institutional theories that explain treaty
ratifcation as an interactive function of compliance cost and regime types or as a
function of democratic transitions or domestic judicial independence. On the other
hand, however, it does fnd that democracy has a signifcant causal effect on the
ratifcation of the ICCPR and the CEDAW whereas de facto existence of multiple
political parties is causally important for the CAT ratifcation. Finally, my causal
analysis fnds more support for the norms-based theories of human rights treaty
ratifcation that highlight the role of regional socialization, normative conformity,
or at least an emulation of the ratifcation behavior of neighboring countries.
In summary, my theory testing from a causal inference perspective confrms a
number of previous fndings in the literature while challenging some commonly accepted conventional wisdom. Some of these new fndings indicate that democracy
and state practices do not interact to determine ratifcation decisions as often expected in the literature and that states do not self-select into human rights treaty
regimes based on their prior compliance. Importantly, my fndings have a causal,
rather than an associational, interpretation. This causal interpretation is made possible by framing the research questions as causal queries, formulating the corresponding causal quantities of interests within a structural causal model, explicitly
representing the underlying causal structure in a graphical form, and linking the
interventional distribution of the outcome to the observational distribution of the
data via an application of the backdoor criterion.
It should be reiterated that key to this study, as is in any other causal analyses,
is an assumption about the causal structure that generates the observed data. In an
observational study like this, this assumption has to be justifed based on suffcient
background knowledge gleaned from the current literature and any causal fndings
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will depend on the validity of this assumption. Other than that causal structure assumption, the data-adaptive, machine learning-based estimation methods that I use
are much less dependent upon distributional and functional form assumptions than
other traditional statistical models. This is one of the places where my approach
improves upon existing studies by increasing the ability of my machine learning
models to accommodate potentially complex relationships among the covariates
that may not be captured by standard parametric statistical models.
Methodologically, despite the great promises of machine learning and the structural causal model framework, the dearth of applied research that combines these
two methods suggests that there is a gap to bridge between methodological advances in causal inference and machine learning on the one hand and substantive
applications in political science research on the other hand. One obvious solution
is more collaboration between domain experts and methodologists who are able to
apply fexible machine learning methods to different domains. Moreover, in the absence of collaborative research, given that any causal analysis requires a suffcient
understanding of the empirical literature, applied researchers who have a frm grasp
of the substantive background knowledge are probably better positioned to bridge
this gap by adopting machine learning methods in their own research.
Finally, there is a critical need to openly embrace the structural causal model
framework in political science given that a lot of research questions in the discipline are explicitly causal queries. This framework has been developed signifcantly
in the last decade or so [Pearl, 2014a] and has been adopted very successfully in
sociology, epidemiology, and biomedical research. My application of this framework
to the issue of human rights treaty ratifcation shows that it can help researchers
clarify confusion about the assumed underlying causal process, identify incoherence in causal assumptions, and modify our causal models to increase their substantive plausibility. Employing this structural causal inference framework could be
extremely benefcial to applied political science research going forward.
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3. A MACHINE LEARNING-BASED CAUSAL MEDIATION ANALYSIS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
3.1

Introduction
Over the last decade, an expansive body of research has not only investigated

the average causal effect of human rights treaties but also attempted to peer into
their metaphorical black box of causal mechanisms. Major causal mechanisms are
believed to involve institutional and legislative constraints on the executive [Simmons, 2009, Lupu, 2015], domestic judicial litigation and enforcement [Simmons,
2009, Dancy and Sikkink, 2012, Abouharb et al., 2013], political mobilization of
non-governmental organizations [Simmons, 2009, Smith-Cannoy, 2012], and international emulation and socialization [Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Goodman and Jinks,
2013, Clark, 2013]. Unfortunately, existing studies in the literature have yet to investigate causal quantities such as natural direct effect, natural indirect effect, and
controlled direct effect that are specifcally conceived and designed for analyzing
causal mechanisms, leaving the task of examining the theorized causal pathways of
human rights treaties mostly to case study research.
The substantive motivation of this chapter is a lack of quantitative understanding that remains in the literature regarding the mechanistic operation of human
rights treaties. I thus conduct a causal mediation analysis of human rights treaties,
using graphical causal models and machine learning methods to empirically investigate the causal pathways of three major United Nations (UN) human rights
treaties—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT). These three treaties are selected as the object of study because
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they are the human rights treaties that are most commonly examined in the literature and, as a result, we tend to have better background knowledge about them
than is the case with other UN treaties. My goal is to estimate the causal effect
of each treaty and, more importantly, to determine how much of their total causal
effect is transmitted through the causal mechanisms that have been suggested in
the literature.
It should be noted that, despite an abundance of theories about the causal
mechanisms of human rights treaties, the lack of any concrete quantifcation of
these mechanisms remains mostly due to the fact that no empirical research in the
substantive literature has employed a causal inference framework to inquire about
causal pathways. Traditional approaches such as path analysis are often used to
quantify the proportion of a treatment effect that goes through a mediating variable.
Specifcally, they rely on decomposing the regression coeffcients of linear models
into direct and indirect effect estimates [Judd and Kenny, 1981, Baron and Kenny,
1986]. However, these approaches do not generalize to nonlinear data-generating
processes or allow a causal interpretation of their fndings either [Shpitser, 2013,
1013–1017]. Recent studies of causal mediation analysis in areas other than human rights research overcome these limitations [Imai and Yamamoto, 2013], but
they still require certain some functional form assumptions that could be relaxed
further to make more robust causal effect estimates.
The substantive fndings of the causal mediation analysis in this chapter have important implications. Estimating the natural direct effect and natural indirect effect
of human rights treaties gives us more granular details about the impact of major international human rights institutions. It not only provides an estimate of the treaty
effect, but also evaluates how much the UN treaties directly and indirectly infuence
government respect for human rights. The results, as a whole, improve our mechanistic understanding of human rights treaties and provide a policy-making basis for
enhancing treaty effects and reducing human rights violations. If the direct effect
of human rights treaties is substantial, for example, that would strengthen the case
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for universal ratifcation of human rights treaties regardless of what causal mechanisms that may be needed to transmit treaty effects. If most of the treaty effect is
mediated through intermediate mechanisms, the policy implications would be different. Human rights activism and the political mobilization of non-governmental
organizations would be critical if a treaty ratifcation would have any effect at all
on state behaviors. Moreover, if much of the causal effect of a human rights treaty
is mediated through legislative constraints and the domestic courts, then human
rights defenders and international actors should apply special scrutiny and be vigilant against government efforts to undermine the judicial system and the legislative
institutions that can check and balance the executive power. Otherwise, international human right treaties, even if ratifed, would be rendered ineffective.
Methodologically, my causal analysis also makes three innovative contributions.
First, the causal mediation analysis in this chapter is conducted in the setting of
panel data structure with repeated measures of the outcome. This kind of data
structure is not commonly seen in the literature on mediation analysis.
Second, my causal analysis demonstrates the powerful advantage of causal graphs
in assisting identifcation through multi-step adjustment. Instead of conditioning
on a single set of covariates, this divide-and-conquer strategy, also referred to as
piecemeal deconfounding [Pearl, 2014b], conditions on separate sets of variables
to identify different components of the counterfactual distribution (the distribution
of potential outcomes) on a sequential basis. This strategy helps increase identifcation power, especially given that in this case using a single adjustment set would
fail the backdoor requirement for identifcation [Pearl, 2014b].
Finally, my causal mediation analysis demonstrates how recent advances in machine learning and complex predictive modeling can be leveraged and incorporated
into a causal inference framework to produce effect estimates that are not only
causally interpretable but also more robust than those generated by standard regression models in social sciences [Hofman et al., 2017]. It should be cautioned,
however, that the substantive payoffs of this machine learning-based causal infer-

59
ence approach to mediation analysis is contingent on the observed data we have.
The issues of missing data and measurement errors are beyond the scope of this
analysis. Ultimately, the quality of the data imposes unavoidable constraints upon
any data analyses.
In terms of the structure of this chapter, I begin by reviewing the literature
and summarizing the background knowledge upon which I construct a structural
causal model of the underlying causal process. This causal model encodes the causal
assumptions and provides the framework within which I can defne and formulate
my causal queries about the mediation process [Pearl, 2009a, 2012].
I then represent the structural causal model in the form of a causal directed
acyclic graph (DAG) to aid causal effect identifcation. I investigate a coterie of
causal effects, including (a) the total causal effect, (b) the natural direct effect and
the natural indirect effect in the context of multiple causally connected mediators,
and (c) the controlled direct effect. This variety of causal quantities refect the
inherent trade-off between causal assumption plausibility and causal effect identifability. Some causal quantities such as the natural direct effect and the natural indirect effect could be of greater substantive interest, but they tend to require stronger,
more restrictive causal assumptions for identifcation. Other causal quantities such
as the total effect and the controlled direct effect are estimable under relatively
weaker assumptions, but they are only indirectly related to our substantive queries.
Finally, once we have established identifcation of these causal effects, I use two
machine learning-based estimators, the weighting estimator and the substitution
estimator, to compute robust causal effect estimates from observational data. In
combination, these estimates provide a more comprehensive picture of the mechanistic operation of human rights treaties.
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3.2

Theory
The causal pathways through which human rights treaties infuence state behav-

ior are often referred to in the human rights literature as mechanisms of infuence.
The existing literature has identifed four major mechanisms involving institutional
and legislative constraints, domestic judicial enforcement, mass mobilization, and
international socialization. First, ratifed human rights treaties could change the
domestic agendas of participating countries. Treaty obligations modify the set of
politically feasible policy options and even alter the domestic settings and institutional constraints within treaty member countries. The direction of this causal
relationship is rather unambiguous. UN human rights treaties “are exogenous to
most individual countries’ policy agendas” [Simmons, 2009, 127]. They invariably
require member states to enact administrative and legislative changes to implement
treaty obligations. States parties to the Optional Protocol to the CAT (OPCAT), for
example, are legally obligated to create a new institution in the form of a National
Preventive Mechanism within three years of ratifcation. The treaty monitoring
body of the OPCAT—the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture—encourages all
national preventive mechanisms to operate as an independent national institution
that monitors government compliance and involves in government policy-making.
Obligations under human rights treaties also create a rallying point in the legislature to potentially constrain abuses by the executive. As Lupu [2015, 6] explains,
legislative veto players, potentially including the opposition parties in the national
legislature, can exploit information gathered from treaty monitoring activities “in
conjunction with the activities of NGOs and the media”. Legislative veto players
can then take advantage of their legislative agenda-setting power and budget control power to expose and constrain repressive behaviors of the executive as are
the case in the Knesset in Israel and the parliament of Zimbabwe Lupu [2015, 6].
Legislative constraints thus raise the cost of repression, thereby reducing violations
and improving human rights practices of the government. In this causal mecha-
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nism, human rights treaties, together with their associated monitoring procedures,
could facilitate and enhance institutional and legislative constraints only when the
veto players have divergent rights preferences from those of the executive as well
as a suffcient amount of veto power to begin with.
Second, the infuence and impact of a human rights treaty could also be felt in
domestic judicial litigation [Simmons, 2009] and human rights prosecutions [Dancy
and Sikkink, 2012]. A 2004 report by the International Law Association Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice found that domestic courts in
many countries such as Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Japan, and Nigeria,
among others, have referred to fndings by the treaty bodies of the ICCPR and the
CAT when they issued decisions on domestic human rights cases [Scheinin, 2004].
Treaty obligations can provide and reinforce the legal basis of judicial litigation, enhance the effectiveness of domestic courts in constraining state abuses, and thereby
improve human rights practices of member states. In other words, the causal effect of human rights treaties could be mediated by the effectiveness of the domestic
judicial system [Powell and Staton, 2009, Crabtree and Fariss, 2015].
Third, in a prominent study of human rights treaties, Simmons [2009] argues
that the most important causal mechanism of human rights treaties is through the
social and political mobilization of ordinary citizens. Treaty ratifcations inform
and heighten people’s awareness of their rights, increase the receptivity of governments to rights demands, and galvanize the population into social movements
for rights protection. Rights mobilization around state obligations under international treaties often occurs through the action and advocacy of human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups, particularly through
their tactics of naming and shaming governments into compliance [Murdie and
Davis, 2012]. Smith-Cannoy [2012], for example, offers case study evidence of how
human rights NGOs in Hungary and Slovakia took advantage of the complaints procedure under two UN human rights treaties—the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Elimination of
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All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)—to mobilize citizens to push for change
in the government’s human rights policies.
Finally, in addition to the causal mechanisms that operate within the domestic
politics of treaty members, international emulation and socialization also represent
a major causal pathway from a global treaty to the domestic behavior of participating states. After ratifcation, member states are subject to scrutiny by treaty
monitoring bodies, among others. These are panels of independent experts whose
job is to monitor state practices and hold regular dialogues with government offcials to advise, persuade, and challenge them to better their governments’ human
rights records. While interacting with representatives of states parties on a regular
basis, members of the treaty bodies use their legal expertise and human rights information to pressure abusive states to emulate rights-respective practices of other
countries. Members of the treaty monitoring bodies may even change the hearts
and minds of government offcials about human rights norms by “contribut[ing] to
community expectations of appropriate state behaviour under human rights treaty
obligations” [Rodley, 2013, 639]. When norms and standards are internalized, they
constitute new understandings of state interest and, as a result, change the behavior of state agents. A similar process also occurs at other international venues such
as the UN’s special procedures under the auspices of the Human Rights Council
[Clark, 2013]. The essence of this causal pathway is that treaty ratifcation opens
up new opportunities and increases incentives for member states to deepen their repeated interactions at the international level through which emulation [Goodman
and Jinks, 2013] and persuasion [Keck and Sikkink, 1998] occur.
In summary, the existing literature has proposed at least four major causal pathways from treaty ratifcation to human rights outcome [Risse and Sikkink, 2013].
Systematic studies are still lacking, however, in terms of investigating and systematically quantifying the effcacy of these causal mechanisms. A causal mediation
analysis could tell us if these mechanisms are dominant in terms of transmitting
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the causal impact of human rights treaties or whether the direct effect is the most
important part of an international human rights institution.

3.3

Empirical Analysis
This section estimates a variety of theoretical causal quantities that combine to

illuminate the mechanistic operation of three major UN human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the CEDAW, and the CAT. I begin by formulating a structural
causal model of the data-generating process, which is a set of equations that formalize our background knowledge and causal assumptions [Pearl et al., 2016, 26].
Counterfactual expressions derived from this structural causal model are then used
to defne the causal effects of interest. Additionally, a graphical representation of
the structural causal model in the form of a causal directed acyclic graph (DAG)
will assist identifcation of these causal effects.
At the outset, however, a set of practical considerations relating to functional
form assumptions, data structure, and causal assumptions critically inform our analysis. First, out of a concern about correct functional forms, I decided against using
parametric statistical models and instead apply fexible machine learning methods for estimation. As standard practice, researchers regularly make parametric
assumptions when modeling an outcome of interest. A linearity assumption, for example, is especially helpful for both identifcation and estimation in a causal mediation analysis [Daniel et al., 2011, VanderWeele, 2015]. In substantive terms, what
a linearity assumption implies is that causal mediators such as political constraints,
judicial effectiveness, and international socialization are a linear function of treaty
ratifcation status and other covariates. Similarly, government respect for physical
integrity rights or women’s political empowerment is assumed to change linearly
as a function of treaty membership, causal mediators, and potential confounding
variables. Even if the linearity assumption could be relaxed in recent proposed estimators to allow for more fexibility [Imai et al., 2010, Imai and Yamamoto, 2013],
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restrictive assumptions of no interactions and additivity of covariate effects are still
required.
In human rights research, however, I am skeptical that the literature has accumulated enough concrete knowledge to specify a linear or any exact functional
forms that characterize the true relationships between human rights treaties, their
mediators, potential confounders, and human rights outcomes. No studies even attempts to justify the plausibility and accuracy of their functional form assumptions,
except for occasional inclusion of an interaction term. If modeling assumptions such
as linearity of parameters and additivity of covariate effects are inaccurate, effect
estimates are mostly likely biased and the obtained inferences are easily invalid.
Second, I aim to make causal inference in the context of observational data
with repeated measurements. Variables in this research are not measured in a single point in time as in a cross-sectional study. Rather, the treatments, mediators,
outcomes, and confounders may vary over time. It should be noted that, by conventional measurement practice, we view treaty ratifcation status as a recurring
yearly commitment even though once a country ratifes a human rights treaty, it
is very unlikely to withdraw from the treaty. In the case of the CAT, the substantive rationale for viewing treaty ratifcation as a time-varying treatment variable is
that Article 31 of the CAT provides a denunciation provision that allows states to
exit the treaty. Legally speaking, therefore, any country members can exit from the
treaty after one year of depositing their withdrawal notifcations. While the ICCPR
and the CEDAW do not have any similar denunciation clauses or provisions, that
did not prevent some states from unsuccessfully attempting to withdraw from the
ICCPR before [Tyagi, 2009]. As a result, I generally conceive treaty membership as
an implicit annual ratifcation as opposed to a terminal event. While it is not clear
how one estimates the causal effects of human rights treaties if treaty ratifcation is
conceived as a terminal event since it has never been done before in the literature,
identifcation and estimation would look very different and most likely would be
potentially more complicated as well.
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The panel data structure also differs from another more common data structure
in mediation analysis where only the treatment regimens and mediators are timedependent and repeatedly measured, but the target causal quantity involves the
outcome measured in the fnal time period only. Using the causal inference framework and methods developed for this data structure [Blackwell, 2013, Bacak and
Kennedy, 2015, VanderWeele and Tchetgen Tchetgen, 2017] would not only lose information about the outcome but also ignore the time-varying outcome’s impact on
subsequent measures of the treatment and the mediators and possibly undermine
identifcation of the causal effects.
Third, until recently methods for identifcation and estimation in causal mediation analysis were mostly applicable in the context of a single mediator. In realworld politics, however, rarely does a causal process take place through a single
causal mechanism. Recent methodological advances enable us to partially overcome this constraint of single mediator [VanderWeele and Vansteelandt, 2013].
The complex reality of multiple mediators, however, gives rise to a different identifcation problem—the treatment-induced mediator-outcome confounding. This
problem, as later explained, could seriously complicate and even invalidate mediation analysis by rendering some of our causal effects non-identifable [Pearl, 2014b,
Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2014, VanderWeele et al., 2014].
In summary, this set of considerations fundamentally shapes my analysis and
determines how much we can learn about the underlying causal process through
which human rights treaties infuence state behavior. In an observational setting,
the same probability distribution could be generated by different structural causal
models [Peters et al., 2017, 10], which implies that one can never infer causality from observed data alone. Instead, to learn about the effect of interventions,
I have to frst specify a causal model with certain causal and usually untestable
assumptions. I then defne my causal quantities in terms of the properties of this
structural causal model and establish their estimability. Finally, I propose a procedure for estimating these quantities using fexible machine learning techniques. In
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more general terms, the methodological contribution of this chapter is to integrate a
causal model-based approach that can represent and reason about a causal process
(the structural causal model framework) and a function-based approach that can
approximate a potentially complex function (machine learning) to estimate causal
quantities that closely correspond to substantive theories.

3.3.1 Causal model formulation and effect defnition
To formalize our background knowledge about the underlying causal process,
I construct a causal model that describes how human rights outcome Yt causally
depends on contemporaneous treaty ratifcation status At both directly (At → Yt )
and indirectly through the mediators (At → Mt → Yt ). I specify four mediators as
suggested in the literature, including institutional and legislative constraints M 1,
judicial litigation M 2, mass mobilization M 3, and international socialization M 4.
I further include in my causal model time-invariant confounders X (legal origins,
constitutional treaty ratifcation rules, and the types of electoral systems) and timevarying confounders W (population size, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,
levels of participation in international trade, democracy, the presence or absence of
de facto multiple parties, regime durability, and involvement in militarized interstate
disputes).
The variation of the four causal mediators—legislative constraints, judicial effectiveness, NGOs mobilization, and international socialization—are respectively measured by (a) a political constraints index, which measures the feasibility of policy
change based on the veto power and alignment among government branches and
degrees of preference heterogeneity within the legislative branch [Henisz, 2002];
(b) a judicial independence index measuring the independent power of the judiciary
to constrain choices of the government [Linzer and Staton, 2015]; (c) a naming and
shaming index, a composite measurement of reporting on human rights abuses by
major media outlets, Amnesty International, and the UN Human Rights Council
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(formerly the UN Commission on Human Rights) [Cole, 2015, 423]; and (d) the
treaty commitment preference frst coordinate based on state ratifcations of 280
universal treaties across a large number of policy areas [Lupu, 2016], which is a
good indicator of the extent to which countries participate, interact, and socialize
internationally.
It should be reiterated and will be justifed in more details later that specifcation of which variables to include and which variable set these variables belong to
is entirely informed by existing studies of human rights treaties in the literature.
Ultimately, one cannot empirically validate this causal structure specifcation without untestable assumptions because, as previously mentioned, the same probability
distribution can be generated by different underlying causal structures. This causal
structure specifcation, it is worth emphasizing, is separate from functional forms
specifcation, the latter of which we are able to empirically address using machine
learning.
The functional relationships between treaty ratifcation, intermediate variables,
human rights outcome, and confounders are represented by a non-parametric structural causal model in Equation set 3.1. From this generative model, we observe a
random sample of n country–year observations On = (X, Wt , At , M 1t , . . . , M 4t , Yt ) ∼
PO where PO is the joint probability distribution. Table 3.1 lists the model variables
and refers to studies in the literature that examine similar relationships between
these variables. I make no assumptions about the functional forms f ’s and thus
my structural causal model is non-parametric. In other words, time-invariant confounders X, time-varying confounders W , treaty ratifcation status A, intermediate
variables M , and human rights outcome Y are causally connected according to the
functions f ’s, but we are agnostic as to the forms of these functions.
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X = fX (UX )
Wt = fW (X, Wt−1 , UW )
At = fA (X, At−1 , M 1t−1 , M 2t−1 , Yt−1 , Wt , UA )
M 1t = fM 1 (X, M 1t−1 , Yt−1 , Wt , At , UM 1 )

(3.1)

M 2t = fM 2 (X, M 2t−1 , Yt−1 , Wt , At , UM 2 )
M 3t = fM 3 (X, M 3t−1 , Yt−1 , Wt , At , UM 3 )
M 4t = fM 4 (X, M 4t−1 , Yt−1 , Wt , At , UM 4 )
Yt = fY (X, Yt−1 , Wt , At , M 1t , M 2t , M 3t , M 4t , UY )
I do not assume any knowledge about the distribution of exogenous variables
U ’s. However, all U = {UX , UW , UA , UM 1 , UM 2 , UM 3 , UM 4 , UY } are assumed to be
jointly independent, suggesting that there are no hidden variables outside our
model. It means, for example, no other variables will likely confound the relationship between treaty ratifcation and human rights outcome. This admittedly
strong assumption is nonetheless critical and generally unavoidable for any observational studies that aim to make causal inference. While causal graphs make this
causal assumption transparent, the only justifcation one can have in an observational setting is to rely on the literature and hope it has suffciently identifed the
relevant variables.
Structural causal models are most effectively communicated in the form of causal
DAGs. More importantly, based on the topology of a causal DAG, we can use identifcation methods, including the backdoor criterion [Pearl, 2009a] and the causal
mediation formula [Pearl, 2012], to determine non-parametrically the estimability
of the causal effects of interest. In a nutshell, a causal DAG [Koller and Friedman,
2009, Pearl, 2009a, Elwert, 2013, Drton and Maathuis, 2017] contains nodes denoting random variables and directed edges denoting one variable’s direct causal
infuence on another. A path in a causal DAG is a sequence of directed arrows that
connect one node to another regardless of the directions of the arrows. Any paths
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Table 3.1.: Causal mediation model variables
Sets

Time frame

Variables, References, and Data sources

A

1976–2015
1981–2015
1987–2015

ICCPR ratifcation status (OHCHR).
CEDAW ratifcation status (OHCHR).
CAT ratifcation status (OHCHR).

M

1800–2016

M 1: Institutional and legislative constraints [Lupu, 2015]
measured by the political constraints index (Polcon iii) [Henisz, 2002].
M 2: Judiciary effectiveness [Powell and Staton, 2009, Conrad, 2013]
measured by the judicial independence index [Linzer and Staton, 2015]
M 3: Political mobilization [Murdie and Davis, 2012, Simmons, 2009]
measured by the naming and shaming index [Cole, 2015].
M 4: International socialization [Clark, 2013, Goodman and Jinks, 2013]
measured by the treaty commitment preference coordinate [Lupu, 2016].

1948–2012
1981–2007
1950–2008
Y

1976–2015
1900–2015
1981–2011

W

1966–2015
1966–2015
1960–2014
1946–2008
1946–2008
1946–2008
1966–2013

X

Y 1: Political Terror Scale [Gibney et al., 2016].
Y 2: Women’s political empowerment index
[Sundström et al., 2017].
Y 3: CIRI torture index [Cingranelli et al., 2013].
Population size [Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita [Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Participation in international trade [Hafner-Burton, 2013]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Regime type [Hathaway, 2007, Chapman and Chaudoin, 2013, Neumayer, 2007]
measured by Cheibub et al. [2010].
De facto multiple parties [Vreeland, 2008, Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011]
measured by Cheibub et al. [2010]
Regime durability [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006]
measured by age in current regime [Cheibub et al., 2010].
Involvement in militarized interstate disputes [Chapman and Chaudoin, 2013].
measured by MID dataset [Themnér, 2014].
Legal origin [Mitchell et al., 2013]
measured by the legal origins data
[La Porta et al., 2008].
Treaty ratifcation rule [Simmons, 2009]
measured by the ratifcation rules dataset [Simmons, 2009].
Electoral system [Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010]
measured by the database of political institutions
[Cruz and Scartascini, 2016].

between two nodes that consist of arrows all pointing to the same direction are directed or causal paths. Otherwise, they are non-causal paths. A DAG is also acyclic
in the sense that there are no directed paths that connect a node to itself.
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Figure 3.1 depicts a causal DAG that compactly represents our structural causal
model in Equation set 3.1. It is assumed to exhibit the Markov property with respect
to the causal graph in the sense that the causal graph encodes all the independences
in the probability distribution [Peters et al., 2017, 101–102]. The implication is
that, according to the causal graph, the values of a child node are strictly a function
of only its parent nodes, which are nodes that emanate arrows into the child node,
and the exogenous variables. Our causal DAG also has a dynamic structure with
different time periods being represented by separate shaded blocks. This topology
indicates a temporal order, according to which there are no directed arrows going
from the future (the block on the right) back to the past (the block on the left). For
clarity of presentation, I only represent two time periods with two causal mediators
M 1 and M 2. A graphical model with all four mediators over a longer time span
could be represented in a similar fashion.
As previously stated, any causal analysis to learn about the effect of intervention
from observational data is crucially dependent upon the way a causal model is
constructed. Therefore, the topology of a graphical causal model should encode
our causal assumptions and suffcient background knowledge about the underlying
data-generating process. First, I make the routine assumption in the context of
repeated measures of time-varying variables that the immediate past infuences the
present. In notation, I include the set of directed arrows Wt−1 → Wt , At−1 → At ,
Mt−1 → Mt , and Yt−1 → Yt .
Second, I encode what is known in the literature as the selection effect argument, which is that state decisions to ratify and remain a party to an international
treaty are based in part on their prior compliance records [Downs et al., 1996, von
Stein, 2005]. I graphically represent this selection effects argument using the causal
arrow Yt−1 → At . Note that this is unrelated and orthogonal to any statistical arguments in connection to the estimation effciency of using the lagged dependent
variable.
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At−1

Wt−1

Wt

M 1t−1

M 1t

M 2t−1

M 2t

Yt−1

At

Yt

Fig. 3.1.: A DAG that represents the causal process involving time-varying confounders W , treaty ratifcation status A, two intermediate variables M 1 and M 2,
and human rights outcome Y . Two color blocks denote two successive time periods. Time-invariant confounders X, which precede and potentially affect all other
variables, are not represented. Exogenous variables U are assumed to be jointly
independent and are not represented in the causal graph.

Third, the arrows Yt−1 → M 1t and Yt−1 → M 2t indicate the possibility that human rights outcome could affect the values of the intermediate variables in the following time period. Substantively, it means that torture, violations of civil liberties,
and other repressive measures by the government may have the effect of weakening legislative constraints, undermining the court system, suppressing political
mobilization, and provoking condemnations and social pressures by the domestic
and international media, human rights NGOs, and the UN treaty bodies.
Fourth, I specify the directed arrows from the mediators to the treatment in the
next time period M 1t−1 → At and M 2t−1 → At . This allows for the possibility
that intermediate variables could affect treaty ratifcation status in the following
year. Substantively, the arrows suggest the scenarios where the executive ratifes
and remains committed to human rights treaties in order to satisfy the demands of
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the opposition parties [Vreeland, 2008], intimidate domestic opposition [Hollyer
and Rosendorff, 2011], relieve pressures from social movements [Simmons, 2009],
or engage in international emulation and respond to socialization [Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998]. Similarly, the number of legislative veto players and effective domestic judiciary might affect treaty ratifcation decisions as well [Conrad, 2013,
Hill, 2016a].
Finally, other potential confounding factors, either time-invariant or time-varying,
could infuence both ratifcation decisions and human rights outcome. These potential confounding is represented by the directed arrows Wt → At and Wt → Yt . It
should be noted that in a graphical causal model, a directed arrow indicates a possible, but not necessarily an actual, causal link. A missing arrow, on the other hand,
is equivalent to ruling out any direct causality.
Given the graphical causal model with its encoded assumptions, we now translate mediation queries into various causal effects that are defned and expressed in
terms of counterfactual quantities. They include the total effect, the natural direct
effect, the natural indirect effect, and the controlled direct effect. First, the total
effect (TE), often known as average causal effect, measures the average change in
human rights outcome Y if we fx treaty ratifcation status A uniformly across all


country–year observations. This average change, denoted by T E = E Y1,M1 −Y0,M0 ,
is the average difference between Y1 and Y0 where the subscript a = {1, 0} denotes
an intervention to fx treaty ratifcation status A at ratifed (a = 1) and non-ratifed
(a = 0) and the average is taken over the entire sample of observations. In this
formulation, the values of the mediators {M 1, M 2, M 3, M 4} naturally change in
response to treaty ratifcation status. Accordingly, the subscripted mediator M1 denotes the value that a mediator will naturally obtain if we fx the treatment at a = 1
and M0 similarly denotes the mediator value if the treatment value is set at a = 0.


Computing the quantity T E = E Y1,M1 − Y0,M0 helps answer our query about the
average causal effect of ratifying a human rights treaty.
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Second, the natural direct effect, denoted by N DE = E Y1,M0 −Y0,M0 , measures
the average change in human rights outcome Y as a result of treaty ratifcation
status when the values of all the mediators are set at M0 , that is, the values the
mediators would obtain if the treaty was not ratifed. The NDE quantity represents
the portion of the total effect that is transmitted directly to the outcome without
any of the four causal mechanisms we previously described. By estimating the
NDE, we could learn how much a human rights treaty can change state behavior in
the absence of the specifed mechanisms of infuence.


Third, the natural indirect effect, denoted by N IE = E Y1,M1 − Y1,M0 , measures
the average change in human rights outcome Y when the treaty ratifcation status is
fxed at a = 1 (ratifed) across the board, but the mediators now alternate between
the values they would obtain for each observation under a = 1 (ratifed) and a = 0
(non-ratifed). The NIE therefore quantifes only the portion of treaty effect that is
transmitted through the mechanism under inquiry, which is said to best “capture
our notion of mediation” [VanderWeele et al., 2014, 301]. Substantively, estimates
of the NIE quantify the impact of incorporating a human rights treaty into domestic
judicial litigation, the ability of legislative veto players to use treaty obligations to
constrain human rights violations, and the capacity of human rights NGOs and international actors to use treaty obligations and information about state compliance
to pressure and ultimately change a government’s human rights practice.
The TE could be unpacked into a sum of the NDE and the NIE according to
Equation 3.2. Equivalently, causal queries involving the TE, the NDE, and the NIE

 

could be expressed in terms of three counterfactual quantities: E Y1,M1 , E Y1,M0 ,


and E Y0,M0 .1


TE = E Y1,M1 − Y0,M0




(3.2)
= E Y1,M1 − Y1,M0 + E Y1,M0 − Y0,M0
= NIE + NDE
1



The causal quantity E Y0,M1 − Y0,M0 also corresponds to similar substantive queries about natural
indirect effect. However, it is less elegant since we will be unable to neatly unpack the total effect
into a sum of direct and indirect effects.
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It is worth noting that when we compute the counterfactual outcome value
Y1,M0 , we are nesting the mediator value that corresponds to one treatment intervention (M0 is the value of the mediator when the treatment is fxed at A = 0)
under a different treatment intervention (when the treatment is fxed at A = 1).
Since Y1 and M0 only occur under different worlds in which the treatment values
differ, the quantity Y1,M0 is often referred to as a cross-world counterfactual and is
generally unobservable even under experimental conditions.
Fourth, another causal effect, though not directly central to our mediation analysis but could nonetheless offer additional insights into the mechanistic operation
of human rights treaties, is the controlled direct effect. It is denoted by CDE(m) =
E[Y1,m − Y0,m ]. The CDE measures the average change in human rights outcome
Y when countries become states parties to a human rights treaty but the values of
the mediator such as judicial independence and legislative constraints are fxed at
a specifc value M = m across the entire population. CDE estimates can certainly
vary across different fxed mediator values. The NDE can also be summarized as
the weighted average of the CDE [Pearl et al., 2016, 123] with the weighting proportional to the distribution of the mediators under non-ratifcation [Petersen and
van der Laan, 2008, 24]. In my estimation using the demediation function [Acharya
et al., 2016], all mediator values are set at their empirically lowest value M = 0.
This is different from M = M0 , which is the mediator value under treaty nonratifcation. In substantive terms, the CDE quantifes the direct impact of human
rights treaties under rather unfavorable conditions when a mediator is set at its
observed lowest value.

3.3.2 Causal identifcation
Total effect
In a non-experimental setting, the question of causal identifcation arises when
we want to know whether and under which conditions a causal effect can be
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uniquely computed from the joint probability distribution of the observed variables,
which is assumed to be compatible with a graphical causal model. For the causal
model in Figure 3.1, identifcation of the total effect of At on Yt via adjustment requires a conditioning set ZT E that satisfes the following backdoor criterion [Pearl
et al., 2016, 61–64]:
(a) ZT E leaves open all directed paths from At to Yt ;
(b) ZT E blocks all backdoor paths from At to Yt , that is, all paths that have an
arrow entering At ; and
(c) ZT E does not open any spurious paths by including a collider (a node on
a path from At to Yt and has two arrows entering it) or a descendant of a
collider (a node connected to a collider through a directed path).
The adjustment set ZT E = {X, At−1 , M 1t−1 , M 2t−1 , Yt−1 , Wt } in Figure 3.1 is suffcient to identify the total effect of At on Yt . It permits the transition from the dooperator in Equations 3.3 and 3.4 below, which denotes an intervention to fx treaty
ratifcation status at At = 1 (ratifed) and At = 0 (non-ratifed), to a function of the
observed probabilities. Once I derive and condition on the suffcient adjustment
set ZT E , I effectively break the non-causal paths between the treatment At and the
outcome Yt and render these two nodes conditionally independent from each other
[Pearl et al., 2016, 46–48]. Any remaining association between them will be evi



dence of a causal relationship. To compute T E = E Y1,M1 − E Y0,M0 , it should be
noted, we do not condition on any of the intermediate variables {M 1, M 2, M 3, M 4}
in violation of rule (a) of the backdoor criterion. Nor should we concern with any
possible interactions among them.




E Y1,M1 = E Yt |do(At = 1)


= EZT E Yt |At = 1, ZT E = z P (ZT E = z)

(3.3)
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E Y0,M0 = E Yt |do(At = 0)


= EZT E Yt |At = 0, ZT E = z P (ZT E = z)

(3.4)

Natural direct effect and natural indirect effect
Estimating the natural direct and indirect effects requires computing the cross



world counterfactual quantity E Y1,M0 in addition to the counterfactuals E Y1,M1


and E Y0,M0 that form the computation of the total effect. Natural effects identifcation via adjustment has to satisfy the following set of conditions [Pearl et al.,
2016, 122]:
(d) The frst adjustment set ZN E1 = {X, Yt−1 , Wt } does not include any descendants of At ;
(e) The adjustment set ZN E1 blocks all backdoor paths from Mt to Yt after removing the arrows At → Mt and At → Yt ;
(f) Conditioning on the frst adjustment set ZN E1 , the effect of At on Mt is identifable through the second adjustment set ZN E2 = {At−1 , Mt−1 } that blocks all
backdoor paths from At to Mt ; and
(g) Conditioning on the frst adjustment set ZN E1 , the joint effect of {At , Mt } on
Yt is identifable, which requires any confounders of the effect of Mt on Yt not
be affected by At .
Assuming the observed data are sample observations randomly drawn from the
causal process in Figure 3.1, a combination of two separate adjustment sets ZN E1
and ZN E2 will be able to identify the natural effects. This is an example of the
divide-and-conquer strategy of using two different adjustment sets on a piecemeal
basis, as opposed to a single set, to satisfy the deconfounding requirements for identifcation. It highlights the greater facility of causal graphs than algebraic expressions and manipulations in the potential outcomes framework in terms of assisting
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identifcation [Pearl, 2014b]. Equation 3.5, which relies on the mediation formula


that Pearl [2012] develops, shows us how to compute the counterfactual E Y1,M0
as a function of the observational conditional probability.

 XX 

E Y1,M0 =
E Y |A = 1, M = m, ZN E1 = z P (ZN E1 = z)
M ZN E1

X

P (M = m|A = 0, ZN E2 = z)P (ZN E2 = z)

ZN E2

(3.5)

Treatment-induced mediator-outcome confounding
A complication arises, however, with respect to criterion (g) for identifcation
of the natural effects. This criterion implies conditional independence among the
mediators, which we would have to reject based on the domain knowledge. In substantive terms, one could argue that human rights NGOs and the civil society not
only galvanize and mobilize citizens against government abuses (M 3). They also
advocate for and bring lawsuits involving internationally protected human rights
before domestic courts. This scenario is denoted by the additional causal arrow
M 3 → M 2. Non-governmental and civil society organizations may also pressure
legislators to enact domestic laws and policies in conformity with treaty obligations and to constrain government repression by the executive. This implies the
causal arrow M 3 → M 1. Finally, independent and legal experts on treaty bodies
routinely employ evidence and information about government abuses that human
rights NGOs have gathered on the ground and in the feld to confront and persuade government offcials at the UN and other international forums. This suggests another causal link M 3 → M 4. In other words, NGOs mobilization, which
is infuenced by treaty ratifcation status A, may very well confound the causal
relationships between each of the other three mediators and the outcome. This
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treatment-induced (At → M 2t ) mediator-outcome confounding is represented by
the fork M 1t ← M 2t → Yt in the causal graph in Figure 3.2.

At−1

Wt−1

Wt

M 1t−1

M 1t

M 2t−1

M 2t

Yt−1

At

Yt

Fig. 3.2.: A causal DAG that represents the causal process with treatment-induced
(At → M 2t ) mediator-outcome confounding (M 1t ← M 2t → Yt ). The DAG includes time-varying confounders W , human rights treaty ratifcation status A, two
mediators M 1 and M 2, and human rights outcome Y with two shaded blocks indicating two successive time periods. Time-invariant confounders X, which precede
and potentially affect all other variables, are not represented. All exogenous variables U ’s are assumed to be jointly independent and are not represented in the
causal graph.

One might be prompted to then include M 2t in the adjustment set ZN E1 to satisfy rule (e) of the backdoor requirement that ZN E1 should block all backdoor paths
from M 1t to Yt . Including M 2t in the adjustment set ZN E1 , however, would violate
rule (d) that M 2t not be conditioned on because it is a descendant of the treatment
At . As a result, when we take into account the more realistic treatment-induced
direct causal dependence among the mediators, the NDE and the NIE generally become non-identifable without strong parametric assumptions [Pearl, 2014b, 471–
472].
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The natural effects could still be identifed under some special conditions, including (a) linear functional forms that characterize the relationships among the
variables [Imai and Yamamoto, 2013]; (b) monotonicity of treatment effect At on a
binary confounding mediator M 2t [Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2014, 285–286]; or
(c) no additive interaction of the effects of multiple mediators on the outcome [Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2014, 286–287]. Nevertheless, these conditions are still
exceedingly restrictive. They assume concrete knowledge about functional forms
that is usually unavailable or highly suspect. They also are not applicable in this
case because all four mediators are measured as continuous variables.
A more realistic solution that I adopt here to circumvent the problem of direct
causal infuence among the mediators is to jointly consider all mediators as though
they were a single intermediate variable. The resulting NDE estimate will be the
portion of treaty effect that is transmitted through none of the intermediate variables whereas the NIE is the portion transmitted through any or all of the mediators
[VanderWeele et al., 2014, 302–303]. The downside of this solution is that I cannot tease out the exact portion of treaty effect that is transmitted through each
individual mediator. Fundamentally, this situation concretely illustrates an inherent trade-off in any causal analysis between causal effect identifability on the one
hand and causal assumption plausibility on the other hand. Identifability is easier
to establish if one is willing to make stronger and less plausible assumptions about
the absence of certain causal links among variables. Conversely, the cold hard truth
is that the more likely that more variables are causally connected, the less likely we
are able to identify and estimate their independent causal effects.

Controlled direct effect
While the natural effects generally are not identifable without overly restrictive
assumptions, we could nevertheless estimate the CDE. The upside is that the CDE
is estimable under weaker assumptions than the natural effects. All we need is
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two adjustment sets that could respectively (a) block all backdoor paths from each
mediator Mt to the outcome Yt and (b) block all backdoor paths from the treatment
At to the outcome Yt after removing all arrows entering the one mediator Mt that
is under consideration [Pearl et al., 2016, 77].
Note that the two adjustment sets for CDE identifcation in this case do not
have to coincide. The causal graph in Figure 3.2 reveals that the frst set ZCDE1 =
{X, Yt−1 , Wt , At , M 2t } blocks all backdoor paths from M 1t to Yt while the second
set ZCDE2 = {X, Yt−1 , M 2t−1 , Wt } blocks all backdoor paths from At to Yt after
removing all arrows entering M 1t . The ability to use two separate adjustment sets
for identifcation of a single causal effect makes it possible to use the sequential
g-estimator to estimate the CDE of each confounded mediators. It is worth noting
that a single adjustment set that encompasses both ZCDE1 and ZCDE2 would fail
the backdoor requirement because of its inclusion of M 2t . This again highlights
the benefts of causal graphs and the greater fexibility of a divide-and-conquer
adjustment strategy for identifcation.
The downside in estimating the CDE is that this causal quantity does not exactly
answer our original query about the portion of treaty effect that each mediator
transmits. However, as Acharya et al. [2016, 6] observe, a signifcantly non-zero
CDE estimate implies that some of the treaty effect is not due to the involved causal
mechanism. That means a CDE estimate that signifcantly differs from zero indicates that a non-negligible portion of the treaty effects traverses through other
causal pathways apart from the controlled mediator. To be fair, though, CDE estimation probably only provides confrmation rather than novel insights into human
rights treaty effects given that it is highly likely that treaty effects are always partially transmitted through our theoretically identifed mediators.
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3.3.3 Machine learning-based estimation
To compute various causal effects of human rights treaties as described above,
we use a separate dataset for each of the three treaties. The datasets for estimating
the causal quantities relating to the ICCPR and the CEDAW have the same temporal coverage from 1981 to 2008. The dataset for estimating the causal quantities
relating to the CAT has the temporal coverage from 1987 when the CAT went into
effect until 2008. Since the adjustment sets for identifcation tend to include more
variables to reasonably satisfy more demanding conditions for natural effects identifcation, these relatively short time frames are selected to avoid a high, unsustainable level of missing data. Appendix B.1 gives a more detailed description of how
variables are measured as well as the data sources. Appendix B.2 provides the summary statistics. To handle missing data, I implement imputation using the Amelia
II program [Honaker et al., 2011]. Information about the imputation process is
provided in Appendix B.3.
Since I do not know the true functions f ’s in my structural causal model (Equation set 3.1), I learn these functions inductively rather than adopt a priori a specifc functional form. This is where my analysis differs from previous approaches
in the causal mediation literature [VanderWeele, 2009, Vansteelandt, 2009, Imai
et al., 2011, Imai and Yamamoto, 2013, VanderWeele, 2015, Acharya et al., 2016].
Specifcally, I use machine learning to work out the functional forms that minimize the empirical risks (the loss function). To demonstrate the applicability and
advantage of this machine learning-based approach to our specifc domain, I conduct a predictive analysis by ftting multiple algorithms to predict three different
human rights outcomes Yt measured by the Political Terror Scale, the Women’s Political Empowerment Index, and the CIRI Torture Index. The goal is to compare the
performance of these models in terms of learning the three underlying generative
functions Yt = fY (·) in Equation set 3.1. The performance metrics is to minimize the
empirical risk, that is, the average cross-validated mean-squared error (MSE). The
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lower the cross-validated MSE, the better the algorithms in approximating the true
generative functions. It should be emphasized, however, that for my subsequent
machine learning-based causal effect estimation, feature selection is based on the
identifability results, that is, relevant predictors are selected based on whether they
are included in the adjustment sets I previously derived.
Cross-validation helps make sure the models generalize well in terms of predicting unknown outcome values. Four-fold cross-validated MSE are computed for
each algorithm that predicts human rights outcome Yt as a function of the set of covariates {X, Yt−1 , Wt , At , M 1t , M 2t , M 3t , M 4t }, which includes time-invariant confounders X, the lagged outcome value Yt−1 , time-varying confounders Wt , treaty
ratifcation status At , and all four intermediate variables Mt . According to the causal
model in Figure 3.2, this set of predictors are assumed to exert direct causal infu
2
ence on the outcome Yt . The empirical risk function to minimize is E Yt − Q(·)
and the true generative functions are Yt = Q(X, Yt−1 , Wt , At , M 1t , M 2t , M 3t , M 4t ).
Table 3.2 describes the algorithms I use in this predictive analysis with all continuous variables standardized into a bounded 0–1 range for learning stability. Other
data transformations are specifed in the Appendix B.1. The list of algorithms covers
a diverse array of algorithms that make different tradeoffs between interpretability and fexibility and between bias and variance [James et al., 2013]. They range
from ordinary least squares regression and regularized linear regression [Tibshirani, 1996] to generalized additive models [Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990] and ensemble trees-based non-linear algorithms such as random forest [Breiman, 2001b]
and boosting [Friedman, 2001].
A particularly powerful algorithm on the high-end of the fexibility spectrum is
extreme gradient boosting [Chen and He, 2015, Chen and Guestrin, 2016], which
is a faster implementation of gradient boosting machine [Friedman, 2001, Natekin
and Knoll, 2013]. Extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost) is a non-parametric ensemble method and its tree-based nature allows it to capture non-linear, interactive
dynamics among a large number of predictors. To enhance the performance of
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XGBoost, I use a combination of cross-validation and grid search to fne-tune its
hyper-parameters to each of the three datasets in Figure 3.3 and select the best
confgurations of varying learning rates, tree depths, and numbers of trees.
Table 3.2.: Algorithms used in Super Learner-based predictive analysis
Algorithm

Description

glm
glmnet
gam
polymars
randomForest
xgboost (default)
xgboost (tuned)

Main-term linear model
P
Cross-validated penalized linear regression with lasso penalty pj=1 |βj |
Generalized additive model (degree of polynomials = 2)
Multivariate adaptive polynomial spline regression
Random forest (ntree = 1,000)
Extreme gradient boosting (default hyper-parameters)
Extreme gradient boosting (fne-tuned hyper-parameters)

Figure 3.4 reports the cross-validated MSEs of all predictive algorithms, including the top XGBoost algorithm, for each of the three datasets. This predictive analysis casts doubt on the suffciency of OLS linear regression models given that they
yield a meager performance in predicting human rights outcomes. More fexible
models tend to yield a better performance. In all three cases, the fne-tuned XGBoost algorithm consistently scores the best predictive performance.
This predictive analysis also underscores the advantage of incorporating the Super Learner ensemble technique for robust effect estimation [van der Laan et al.,
2007, Polley and van der Laan, 2010]. Super Learner employs a user-selected library of algorithms, each of which is weighted by its relative cross-validated predictive performance. A weighted combination of these algorithms is then used to
produce a hybrid prediction function that performs as well as, and usually even
better than, the best algorithm in the library. I select linear regression, regularized
linear regression with lasso, generalized additive model, and XGBoost to create the
Super Learner-based variants of both (a) the weighting estimator that VanderWeele
and Vansteelandt [2013] propose for total effect and natural effects estimation and
(b) the g-estimator that Vansteelandt [2009] and Acharya et al. [2016] propose
for controlled direct effect estimation. These four parametric, semi-parametric, and
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Fig. 3.3.: Minimum, maximum, and average values of 4-fold cross-validated MSE of
XGBoost algorithms in predicting (a) Political Terror Scale score, (b) Women’s Political Empowerment score, and (c) CIRI Torture score. Cross-validation helps prevent
overftting and provides a more accurate assessment of the abilities of these different XGBoost confgurations in predicting the outcomes. The smaller the average
MSE, the better that XGBoost confguration is presumably able to approximate the
data-generating function that generates the human rights outcome values.

non-parametric algorithms have different degrees of complexity and make different
bias-variance tradeoffs. Note that if the true generative functions happen to be lin-
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ear, Super Learner will be able to recover that as well and we therefore do not have
to decide and justify whether a linear functional form assumption is appropriate or
not.
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Fig. 3.4.: Minimum, maximum, and mean values of 4-fold cross-validated MSE of
algorithms in predicting (a) Political Terror Scale score, (b) Women’s Political Empowerment score, and (c) CIRI Torture score. All three measures are rescaled into
a bounded 0–1 range. Rescaling the outcome measurements changes the absolute
values of the MSE, but does not affect the relative rankings of the algorithms in
terms of predictive performance.
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The g-estimator or substitution estimator [Robins, 1986, Robins et al., 1999]




computes the causal effect of a treatment τ = E Y |do(A = 1) − E Y |do(A = 0)

P 
by using the estimate τ̂ = n1 ni=1 Qn (1, Z) − Qn (0, Z) where Qn is the predictive
outcome model and Z is a suffcient adjustment set. For the g-estimator, the key to
obtaining consistent effect estimates is to ft a correctly specifed outcome model Qn
that approximates the (unknown) data generating mechanism. The inverse probability of treatment-weighted (IPTW) estimator (the weighting estimator) for natural effects estimation has the crucial beneft of not having to model the conditional
density of multiple continuous mediators. However, its consistency depends on (i)
the ability of a treatment model (that computes the inverse probability of treatment
weights) to approximate the true treatment mechanism and (ii) a correctly specifed
outcome model.
Both the g-estimator and the weighting estimator require correctly specifed
models of various different generating functions. The ensemble machine learning
technique Super Learner offers an effective solution to meet this requirement [Kreif
et al., 2015, Pirracchio et al., 2015, Samii et al., 2016]. Uncertainties around point
estimates are quantifed using the nonparametric bootstrap method [Efron and Tibshirani, 1994] with B = 500. Similar to Daniel et al. [2011, 491] and suggested by
Tsiatis [2007, 362–371], I combine nonparametric bootstrap with single stochastic
imputation to make effcient and valid inference, obtaining distribution-free confdence intervals from the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the bootstrap distribution.
For each dataset that includes a different human rights treaty and its corresponding outcome measure (the ICCPR and the Political Terror Scale score, the CEDAW
and the Women’s Political Empowerment index, and the CAT and the CIRI Torture
index), I implement the following machine learning-based estimation procedure.
1. Total effect estimation


(a) Fit Super Learner treatment prediction model g(ZT E ) = E At |ZT E where
the predictors are the adjustment set ZT E = {X, At−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , Wt }.
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(b) Use the treatment prediction model g(ZT E ) to generate inverse-probabilityof-treatment weights ipw0 = 1/P (At = 0|ZT E ) for observations with
observed treatment value A = 0 and ipw1 = 1/P (At = 1|ZT E ) for observations with observed treatment value A = 1. One could bound the
predicted probabilities above the threshold of 0.01 to constrain excessive
variability of the estimates if necessary [Cole and Hernán, 2008].



(c) Compute the counterfactuals E Y1,M1 = E Y ∗ ipw1 A = 1] as the
weighted outcome mean among observations with observed treatment




value A = 1 and E Y0,M0 = E Y ∗ ipw0 |A = 0 as the weighted outcome
mean among observations with observed treatment value A = 0.




(d) Compute the total effect T E = E Y1,M1 − E Y0,M0 .
2. Natural effects estimation with all mediators considered jointly


(a) Fit Super Learner outcome prediction model QN E1 = E Yt |At , Mt , ZN E1
with the adjustment set ZN E1 = {X, Yt−1 , Wt }.
(b) Subset the full sample and use only observations with observed treatment
value A = 0. This will obviate the more diffcult task of modeling the
joint density of multiple continuous mediators under A = 0. Substitute
A = 1 into QN E1 and use the observed values of all four mediators Mt and
variables in the set ZN E1 from the subsetted sample to generate predicted
outcome values Ybt .




(c) Compute E Y1,M0 = E Ybt ∗ ipw0 as the weighted mean of predicted
outcome values Ybt . Note that I use two adjustment sets sequentially to
identify the joint natural effects: (1) ZN E1 = {X, Yt−1 , Wt } in the outcome model QN E1 blocks all backdoor paths from all four mediators
Mt (jointly considered) to Yt ; and (2) conditioning on ZN E1 , the set
ZN E2 = {At−1 , Mt−1 } in computing the weights ipw0 in step (1b) above
blocks the backdoor paths from At to Yt and from At to all Mt .
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(d) Compute causal effect estimates N DEjoint = E Y1,M0 − E Y0,M0 and




N IEjoint = E Y1,M1 − E Y1,M0 .
3. Controlled direct effect estimation
(a) For each of the three confounded mediators M 1 (political constraints,
judicial independence, and international socialization):


i. Fit Super Learner demediation model DM 1 = E Yt |M 1t , ZCDE1 where
the set ZCDE1 = {X, Yt−1 , Wt , At , M 2t } blocks all backdoor paths
from M 1t to Yt .
ii. Substitute M 1t = 1 and M 1t = 0, which have been already standardized into a bounded 0–1 range, into DM 1 to compute the max

imum effect of M 1t on Yt , using D(m1) = E Yt |M 1t = 1, ZCDE1 −


E Yt |M 1t = 0, ZCDE1 .
iii. Compute the demediated outcome values Yet = Yt − D(m1) ∗ M 1t ,
that is, subtracting the effect of the confounded mediator M 1t from
the outcome Yt .
iv. Fit Super Learner prediction model of the demediated outcome


e t , ZCDE2 ) = E Yet |At , ZCDE2 where ZCDE2 = {X, Yt−1 , M 2t−1 , Wt }
Q(A
blocks all backdoor paths from At to Yt after removing all arrows entering M 1t . Sequential adjustment using separate sets ZCDE1 and
ZCDE2 satisfes the backdoor requirement for CDE effect identifcation.
e(At , ZCDE2 )
v. Substitute A = 1 and A = 0 into the demediated model Q



to compute CDE(m1t = 0) = E Yet |A = 1, ZCDE2 − E Yet |A =

0, ZCDE2 .
(b) For the confounding mediator M 2t (mass mobilization), repeat step 3(a)
but use two sequential adjustment sets ZCDE1M 2 = {X, Yt−1 , M 2t−1 , Wt , At }
and ZCDE2M 2 = {X, Yt−1 , M 1t−1 , Wt }.
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3.3.4 Results and interpretation
Estimates of various causal quantities relating to the three UN human rights
treaties are reported in Table 3.3 together with their nonparametric bootstrap-based
95% confdence intervals. They provide answers to several of our causal inquiries.
First, do human rights treaties reduce government abuses and protect and promote
individual human rights? In contrast to many previous fndings in the literature,
my answer is affrmative across all three human rights treaties although the causal
effect magnitudes vary. Participating in the ICCPR reduces state violations of physical integrity rights by 13.6 percentage points or, equivalently, about 0.54 points in
the 5-level Political Terror Scale. Participating in the CAT leads to a more modest
decrease of government’s torture practice by about 7.7 percentage points—roughly
0.23 points in the 3-level scale of the CIRI Torture Index. For the CEDAW, the
average causal effect is signifcantly more substantial, raising women’s political empowerment by 22 percentage points measured by an aggregate index of women’s
civil liberties and political participation.
Second, how much do human rights treaties infuence state behavior directly
and indirectly through causal mediators? In the case of the ICCPR and the CAT,
there is something concerning about their direct causal effects. Participating in
these two treaties leads to more torture and violations of physical integrity rights. If
all four mediators do not change their values in response to treaty ratifcation, being
a member of these treaties exacerbates human rights practices by 0.8 and 3.4 percentage points, respectively. However, both the ICCPR and the CAT exert a positive
indirect causal infuence on state behavior that is both statistically signifcant and
substantively larger, averaging about 14.4 and 11 percentage points, respectively.
In other words, their indirect effects are in the opposite direction and about 18
times and 3.2 times larger than their respective direct effects. The case for ratifying
the CEDAW is much more clear-cut and stronger. CEDAW participation improves
women’s empowerment both directly and indirectly through its causal mediators,
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but the indirect causal impact is nine times larger than the direct effect. In fact, the
four causal mechanisms I have examined are jointly responsible for transmitting
roughly 90% of the CEDAW effect. Overall, these fndings underscore the importance of causal mediators and suggest that the effcacy of human rights treaties is
mostly about causal mechanisms—both domestic institutions and social movements
and international socialization.
Table 3.3.: Total effect (TE), joint natural direct effect (CDE), joint natural indirect effect (NIE), and controlled direct effect (CDE) estimates of the ICCPR, the
CEDAW, and the CAT. Super Learner-based point estimates and bootstrap (B = 500)
quantile-based 95% CI with single stochastic imputation. All measures of human
rights outcomes are rescaled into a bounded 0–1 range.



TE = E Y1,M1 − Y0,M0


NDEjoint = E Y1,M0 − Y0,M0


NIEjoint = E Y1,M1 − Y1,M0

CDE (political constraints = 0)
CDE (judicial independence = 0)
CDE (international socialization = 0)
CDE (mass mobilization = 0)

N. of countries
N. of years
N. of observations

ICCPR
(PTS score)

CEDAW
(WPE index)

CAT
(CIRI index)

0.136
[0.093, 0.196]
−0.008
[−0.018, −0.001]
0.144
[0.098, 0.202]

0.220
[0.197, 0.250]
0.022
[0.016, 0.027 ]
0.199
[0.177, 0.228 ]

0.077
[0.028, 0.123]
−0.034
[−0.054, −0.013]
0.110
[0.063, 0.157 ]

−0.004
[−0.013, 0.000]
−0.004
[ −0.012, 0.000]
−0.004
[−0.015, 0.000]
−0.004
[−0.013, 0.000]

0.021
[0.015, 0.028 ]
0.028
[0.021, 0.035]
0.021
[0.014, 0.027]
0.022
[0.015, 0.028]

−0.032
[−0.049, −0.015]
−0.036
[−0.052, −0.018]
−0.022
[−0.040, −0.004]
−0.029
[−0.046 , −0.013]

192
28 [1981–2008]
5,268

192
28 [1981–2008]
5,268

192
22 [1987–2008]
4,290

It is worth noting that the literature remains divided when it comes to quantifying the consequences of participating in the CAT for human rights protection. While
many research has indicated either a negative [Hathaway, 2002, Hill, 2010] or a
positive effect [Simmons, 2009, Fariss, 2014], most have found an ambiguous or
context-specifc treaty effect [Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007, Conrad and Ritter,
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2013, Lupu, 2013a, Conrad, 2013, Clark, 2013]. My analysis moves this ongoing
debate forward by showing that it is the direct causal effect that worsens human
rights practices whereas the indirect effect is substantially more positive. This fnding is only possible once we conceptualize, identify, and then estimate the natural
direct and indirect effects, using the framework that Pearl [2001] proposed in 2001.
Further research could bring a deeper understanding as to why the treaty’s direct
effect is not in the direction we expected and whether the CAT might serve as a
cover for participating states to ramp up their repression and abuses.
The importance of causal mediators is further supported by my CDE estimates.
Once we have demediated the outcome and removed the effect of each individual
intermediate variable, the positive causal effect of CEDAW ratifcation diminishes
signifcantly, ranging from 2.1 to 2.8 percentage points, depending on the mediators. For the ICCPR, all CDE estimates are essentially zero. In other words, setting
each of the causal mediators at its empirically lowest value and the causal effects
of the ICCPR and the CEDAW will decrease so much as to be no longer very meaningful. I therefore conclude that all four causal mechanisms—political constraints,
domestic judicial enforcement, mass mobilization, and international socialization—
have a critical role to play in transmitting the treaty effects. Without them, human
rights treaties will lose most of their causal impact.
Causal mediators are especially important for the CAT. The CDE estimates of
the CAT suggest that crippling domestic institutions and blocking international socialization will effectively open the way for member states to potentially use treaty
ratifcation as a cover to increase torture by somewhere between 2.2 to 3.2 percentage points. A note of caution is that the CIRI torture index that I use to measure
the outcome might have a biased tendency against recorded improvements in human rights practices and thus potentially understate the positive impact of the CAT
[Clark and Sikkink, 2013, Fariss, 2014].
Finally, an interesting fnding is that individual CDE estimates are relatively similar to each other across all four causal mediators and to the overall NDE, suggesting

92
that the mediators are highly closely related. This could be interpreted as indicating
an interplay and entanglement among the causal mechanisms, supporting my previous assumption about direct causal dependence among the mediators. Were the
intermediate variables causally independent from each other, we would probably
have seen a much greater variation among CDE estimates. Suppose, for example, domestic judicial enforcement was irrelevant while international socialization
was a highly causally important mechanism and both of them were conditionally
independent, their CDE estimates would diverge in both magnitude and statistical
signifcance. The fnding also implies that any causal analysis to untangle the causal
importance of individual causal mechanisms would be very diffcult and that these
mediators should be included together in future research on human rights treaties.

3.4

Conclusion
Conducting causal mediation analysis to learn about causal mechanisms has be-

come increasingly popular in many felds, including political science [Imai et al.,
2011, Imai and Yamamoto, 2013]. A research area where causal mediation analysis
could offer much needed insights is relating to the causal impact of human rights
treaties. Multiple theories in the literature have articulated various causal pathways
along which the effect of human rights treaties could be transmitted. Yet, besides a
number of qualitative research that uses case study methods to illustrate the causal
logics and examine the causal process, there is no quantitative inquiries in the existing literature that empirically investigate these causal pathways on a systematic
basis.
This research gap is the substantive motivation that has led me to leverage recent advances in both machine learning and the causal inference literature to defne, identify, and estimate the total effect, the natural direct effect, the natural
indirect effect, and the controlled direct effect of three major UN human rights
treaties, including the ICCPR, the CEDAW, and the CAT. These effect estimates help

93
decompose the causal effect of human rights treaties, indicate how much of the
treaty effect is mediated through the causal mechanisms, and quantify the importance of causal mediators in preserving the effectiveness of international human
rights institutions. Overall, the causal mediation analysis in this chapter advances
our collective understanding of the ways in which human rights treaties constrain
and infuence state behaviors.
The results indicate that an overwhelming portion of human rights treaty effect is mediated through four causal mechanisms. As a limitation of my analysis,
I am not able to tease out the exact portion of treaty effect that each intermediate variable mediates. This limitation is due to empirically valid concerns about
the plausibility of assuming that all four causal mechanisms are causally independent from each other. The causal analysis nonetheless indicates that the four causal
mechanisms, including legislative constraints, domestic judicial litigation and enforcement, human rights NGOs advocacy and mobilization, and international socialization, are all critical. Furthermore, it is highly likely that these four causal
mechanisms are intertwined with each other.
The broad implications are clear that these four causal mediators are extremely
critical to the success and effcacy of the UN human rights treaties. Without them,
all three human rights treaties under examination here would lose most, if not all,
of their positive causal impact and, in the case of the ICCPR and the CAT, might even
become a negative infuence on human rights protection. As a result, advocating for
universal ratifcation of human rights treaties is not even nearly enough. To protect
and defend the effcacy and the causal impact of international human rights treaties
requires domestic and international efforts to guard against government attempts
to control the legislature, undermine the rule of law, and restrict the space for NGOs
and the civil society to operate.
In addition to the substantive contributions, my machine learning-based causal
mediation analysis demonstrates several aspects of an innovative application. First,
I apply the graph-based structural causal model framework to a new setting of panel
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data with repeated outcome measures. This data structure is very common in many
areas of international relations and political science research, but causal inference
research has mostly been done using cross-sectional data. My application is an
attempt to apply this causality framework to this new kind of data structure.
Second, to perform the causal analysis in this chapter, I exploit the facility of
causal graphs to assist identifcation via separate adjustment sets of covariates. My
analysis demonstrates an application of this piecemeal, independent adjustment
approach to identifcation in a real-world research. It exemplifes the great benefts
of the divide-and-conquer strategy for causal effect identifcation that Pearl [2014b]
has proposed. More broadly, independent adjustment has the potential to increase
the number of scenarios under which various causal effects can be identifed and
estimated.
Third, my causal mediation analysis also illustrates an inherent trade-off between causal assumption plausibility and causal effect estimability, which is rarely
found or mentioned in empirical research for causal inference. In the case of multiple causally connected mediators that are examined here, this trade-off is made
particularly apparent. The approach that I adopted to deal with this tradeoff is to
avoid making unrealistic causal assumptions while striving to produce causal fndings about the mechanisms of human rights treaties that are at least as substantively
useful and relevant as possible.
Finally, in this analysis I employ machine learning for robust causal effect estimation. Unless there are compelling reasons to believe that a specifc model specifcation truly refects the unknown underlying data-generating process, it is often
preferable to use fexible and powerful machine learning methods so that the consistency of our estimates and the validity of our inferences are not dependent upon
the accuracy of restrictive functional form assumptions.
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4. UNPACKING TREATY IMPACT: THE DIFFERING CAUSAL
EFFECTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING PROCEDURES
4.1

Introduction
For many decades, the United Nations (UN) human rights treaty system has

been a crucial endeavor to protect human rights across the world. An expansive
body of research, including an ongoing research project by a network of independent researchers [Kolb, 2016], has examined the impact of individual human rights
treaties on state practices [Hathaway, 2002, Landman, 2005, Neumayer, 2005,
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007, Simmons, 2009, Hill, 2010, Lupu, 2013b, Clark,
2013]. Yet, few have evaluated the comparative effectiveness of monitoring procedures under these treaties. Two following anecdotal examples highlight the impact
of a treaty monitoring procedure under two different UN human rights treaties—the
inclusion of an individual communication mechanism—in addressing human rights
abuses and potentially changing state behaviors. In both cases, the states, when
ratifying the human rights treaties, opted to recognize the competence of the treaty
monitoring bodies to receive and consider complaints of human rights violations by
individuals against these states and to issue their fndings and decisions.
On July 29, 1997, the Human Rights Committee, the treaty body under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in the case of Arhuaco
v. Colombia (Communication No. 612/1995) found the Colombian government
responsible for the torture and arbitrary detention of Jose Vicente, Amado Villafane Chaparro, and others. Following the Human Rights Committee’s decision,
the Colombian government, under its own Law 288/96, issued an opinion in favor
of compliance with the decision and later let the case proceed in national courts
[Ulfstein and Keller, 2012, 365]. This adjudication, called Views by the Human
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Rights Committee, was adopted under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, to
which Colombia was a party, that establishes the individual communication mechanism.
Similarly, on May 11, 2001, the Committee against Torture, the treaty body under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), issued its decision in Ristic v. Yugoslavia (Communication No. 113/1998), concluding that the government had violated its obligations under the CAT and recommending remedial measures by the state party. Even
though the Committee’s decision was not legally binding, the country’s Supreme
Court later endorsed the decision and ordered reparations for the victims [Ulfstein
and Keller, 2012, 369–370]. The Committee’s decision was made under Art. 22
of the CAT, according to which the Committee has the competence to receive and
consider communications from or on behalf of the victims and the Yugoslavia had
accepted this competence.
Going beyond anecdotal evidence like these two examples, this chapter focuses
on treaty compliance monitoring procedures and examines their causal impact on
a more systematic basis, yielding more insights into the empirical effectiveness of
the UN human rights treaties in more granular details. Human rights treaties not
only set the standards of behavior for states parties; they also engage in compliance monitoring using a variety of monitoring procedures. The motivating idea of
this research is to unpack treaty monitoring practices into monitoring procedures
and estimate the causal effect of each procedure on human rights outcome, thereby
providing a more detailed picture about the causal impact of international human
rights treaties. Overall, there are fve types of treaty monitoring procedures, including state reporting, inquiry, state communication, individual communication, and
country visit. I exclude the state communication procedure from my investigation
because this procedure has never been used in practice before.
State reporting refers to the procedure according to which a state party submits
periodic self-reports on the measures it has taken and the progress it has made to
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fulfll its treaty obligations. State reporting is also the only mandatory procedure
under all UN human rights treaties. Participating in other monitoring procedures is
optional, which allows treaty members to opt out by way of making a reservation
(the inquiry procedure) or requires them to opt in through a unilateral declaration
(the state communication procedure and the individual communication procedure)
or specifcally demands a separate formal ratifcation (the country visit procedure
under the Optional Protocol to the CAT).
Under the state communication procedure, the treaty body—a committee of independent experts—hears complaints that one participating state may bring against
another participating state. The individual communication procedure such as the
one under Art. 20 of the CAT allows the treaty body to receive and adjudicate complaints brought against a state party by individuals within that state’s jurisdiction.
In the absence of a declaration to opt out the inquiry procedure, treaty members
have to answer questions and inquiries that the treaty body may have regarding
allegations of systematic violations. The treaty body may also conduct an inquiring
visit under the inquiry procedure to investigate allegations of treaty violations.
The only operative country visit procedure in the UN human rights treaty system
as of this writing is the one under the Optional Protocol to the CAT (OPCAT).1 It permits a separate monitoring body—the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT)—to visit, investigate, report, and even publish its fndings on the torture practices of a member
state. Table 4.1 summarizes the monitoring procedures under the CAT [Egan, 2011,
Keller and Ulfstein, 2012, Rodley, 2013, Bassiouni and Schabas, 2011]. Appendix
C.1 provides similar information for all nine UN core human rights treaties as well
as a detailed list of these treaties and their current status of ratifcation. Figure
4.1 then shows the number of states that participate in each of the four monitoring
1

Under the UN Charter-based human rights bodies system, including the UN Human Rights Council
and its subsidiaries such as the Special Procedures, country visits do take place [Kothari, 2013].
However, they are beyond the scope of examination in this study, which focuses on the UN treatybased human rights system.
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procedures under the CAT and the OPCAT from 1984 when the CAT was open for
ratifcation until 2015.
Table 4.1.: Monitoring procedures under the Convention against Torture (CAT)
Procedure

State
reporting

Inquiry

State
communication

Individual
communication

Country
visit

Provision

Art. 19

Art. 20

Art. 21

Art. 22

Optional Protocol

Mandatory

Opt-out allowed

Opt-in required

Opt-in required

Ratifcation required

Participation

Procedure Art19 Art20 Art22 OPCAT
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140
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Fig. 4.1.: The number of states that participate in each of the four monitoring procedures under the CAT from 1984–2015, including the state reporting procedure
under under Art. 19, the inquiry procedure under Art. 20, the individual communication procedure under Art. 22, and the country visit procedure under the
OPCAT. Since the state reporting procedure under Art. 19 is mandatory, the number of states participating in this procedure is also the number of CAT ratifers. The
CAT was open for ratifcation in December 1984 and went into effect in 1987. The
OPCAT was open for ratifcation in December 2002 and entered into force in 2006.

I investigate the causal effects of the monitoring procedures under the CAT and
the OPCAT for several reasons. First, the CAT is one of the most important in-
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ternational treaties that protects a universal and non-derogable human right—the
right not to be subject to torture. Second, the CAT, together with the OPCAT, is the
only UN human rights treaty currently in effect that has all fve monitoring procedures. Especially important among them is the country visit system under the
OPCAT, which is designed and operated by a separate monitoring body with clearly
designated authority. As a result, among all the UN human rights treaties, the CAT
provides the only case study where we can evaluate and compare the causal effects
of all treaty monitoring procedures. Finally, it is worth noting that the CAT aims
to address a single type of human rights violations (torture) and protect a highly
specifc human right (the right not to be subject to torture). This treaty is different
from other UN human rights treaties that address a wide range of rights such as civil
and political rights, women’s rights, and children’s rights. We can therefore more
easily and properly compare the causal effects of monitoring procedures under the
CAT since they operate in the same specifc area of human rights.
Substantively, my causal analysis indicates that only the country visit procedure
signifcantly and consistently reduces torture and improves government respect for
physical integrity rights. Other procedures demonstrate no such causal impact. In
fact, the state reporting procedure tends to have a negative, though not always
signifcant, impact on human rights protection. These differing causal effects, I
argue, are most likely the result of the variation in intrusiveness among the monitoring procedures. Future research should explore the causal effects of monitoring
procedures under other human rights treaties in order to draw a more defnitive
conclusion as to whether intrusive monitoring procedures with stronger external
oversight lead to greater improvements in relevant human rights outcomes. More
broadly, a similar systematic relationship could be detected with respect to monitoring mechanisms in other domains of international relations such as weapons
inspection and nonproliferation.
Methodologically, this study also presents an innovative application of the graphbased structural causal model framework and machine learning-based estimation to
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a substantive research question in political science. A combination of a transparent causal inference framework and fexible machine learning methods has great
potential to advance political science research much further in the future.

4.2

Theoretical Proposition
I develop a proposition to explain why intrusive monitoring procedures may

have a greater causal impact on human rights outcome than less intrusive ones.
It starts with the empirical observation that monitoring procedures vary in their
intrusiveness to state sovereignty. This intrusiveness has two implications. The
frst one is that participating in an intrusive procedure sends a credible signal to
international audiences about a state’s intent to protect human rights. Second,
an intrusive monitoring procedure is likely to generate more information about
the actual behavior of participating states. By providing more credible signals ex
ante and more information ex post, intrusive procedures improve state practices by
raising both the cost of treaty violations as well as the probability of getting caught
violating treaty obligations.
Where my argument differs from, and contributes to, the literature is mainly
with respect to the key independent variable of interest. Unlike the existing literature that mainly focuses on treaty ratifcation, I instead (1) disaggregate treaty
ratifcation into separate state decisions to participate in different treaty monitoring procedures; (2) classify these procedures by their intrusiveness; (3) explain the
signaling value and the informative power of monitoring procedures as a function
of their intrusiveness; and (4) empirically estimate the causal effects of treaty monitoring procedures. A stylized illustration of the causal process according to this
theoretical proposition is presented in Figure 4.2.

101

Intrusiveness
of Procedures

Signals and
Information

Human Rights
Outcome

Fig. 4.2.: Causal model of monitoring procedures

4.2.1

Intrusiveness of monitoring procedures

A key mandate of human rights treaty bodies involves monitoring treaty compliance by member states, using a variety of procedures that can vary in their intrusiveness. One way to classify the intrusiveness of monitoring procedures is to
use the three criteria under the legalization framework, including obligation, precision, and delegation, all of which are defned “in terms of key characteristics of
rules and procedures, not in terms of effects” [Abbott et al., 2000, 402]. Obligation
concerns whether a particular rule imposed upon states parties is legally binding.
Precision refers to the degree to which obligations are unambiguously and clearly
specifed. Delegation measures “the extent to which states and other actors delegate
authority to designated third parties [. . . ] to implement agreements” [Abbott et al.,
2000, 415]. Hafner-Burton et al. [2015b, 11] apply this three-criterion framework
to develop a ten-indicator measure of the sovereignty costs of a large number of
human rights institutions. In the case of monitoring procedures under the CAT, I
adapt these criteria to develop a more targeted and descriptive ranking based on
the treaty language as well as the actual implementation of each procedure.
First, obligations range from being explicitly non-binding to merely hortatory
to unconditionally binding. In a state reporting system, states voluntarily submit
self-reports for review by the treaty bodies. Many treaty members, however, either
substantially delay their initial and periodic submissions or simply ignore this obligation altogether. According to a 2012 report by the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, around 20% of the states parties to the CAT have never submitted
any reports at all [Pillay, 2012, 22]. When participating in other monitoring pro-
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cedures, however, states do not get to choose whether and when they are subject
to scrutiny by the treaty monitoring bodies. Under the inquiry procedure, for example, the treaty bodies can actively initiate inquiries into allegations of systematic
violations without having to wait for any state reports.
Obligation is more demanding under the individual communication procedure.
Monitoring no longer depends on a state’s periodic submission of self-reports. Rather,
it is in response to submitted individual complaints. Unlike their reviews and comments on state reports under the reporting system, adjudication by the treaty bodies under the individual communication procedures also carries a “great weight”—
a status that has gained wide consensus among international legal scholars and
treaty bodies and is also acknowledged and affrmed by the International Court of
Justice [Ulfstein and Keller, 2012, 92–94]. An indication that participating states
take a treaty body’s adjudicating decisions seriously is that many of them choose to
respond and defend themselves against allegations. States accused of treaty violations regularly argue in front of the treaty bodies not only against the merits but
also against the admissibility of submitted complaints and the standing of alleged
victims.
The country visit procedure that the SPT operates under the OPCAT likely imposes the most onerous and binding obligations. This procedure takes the form of
regular and unannounced visits to places of detention, broadly defned, within any
territories under the jurisdiction of OPCAT members (Art. 4). According to its First
Annual Report (p. 25), for example, the SPT visited not only police facilities and
prisons, but also juvenile and shelter centers, children’s homes, and drug rehabilitation centers. Its Fifth Annual Report (p. 13) also states that the SPT tried “to
increase its activities in relation to non-traditional places of detention during 2011,
including immigration facilities and medical rehabilitation centres.” As an indication of the unrestricted nature of the SPT’s visits, OPCAT members are obligated to
grant the SPT access to any visit sites even in the case of a state emergency (Art.
14). The SPT is able to request any relevant information and interview in private
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any persons it believes can supply relevant information (Art. 14 and Art. 15).
States parties are usually notifed and consulted about an upcoming visit, but the
purpose is “to facilitate the visit, not to prevent it from occurring” and, in fact, “no
State has objected to a visit proposed by the SPT” [Steinerte et al., 2011, 98]. By
its own account, over the last ten years since the SPT started its work in February
2007, it has conducted visits to 50 member states [SPT, 2018]. In addition to the
SPT, Articles 17–23 of the OPCAT also require participating states to establish or
designate a national preventive mechanism, preferably in the form of an independent national human rights institution, as both a liaison and an oversight body that
has similar mandate and authority as the SPT. Finally, states parties are not able to
make reservations to any of the provisions in the OPCAT (Art. 30).
The second criterion is precision. The basic idea is that precise and specifc rules
make it easier for monitoring bodies to determine whether alleged violations are
factual and accurate and which reparations are merited. Monitoring procedures
that operate according to more precise rules are therefore more likely to make concrete determination about state compliance. The individual communication procedure fare best according to this evaluative criterion. Under this procedure, the
competence to adjudicate submitted complaints, the composition, and the rules of
operation of the treaty bodies are highly precise and are even deemed comparable
to those of international courts [Ulfstein and Keller, 2012, 98]. Decisions by the
treaty bodies with respect to individual complaints also have the effect of clarifying
the legal content and contributing to more precise interpretation of international
rules for national governments and domestic courts. This semi-judicial role of the
treaty bodies under the individual communication procedure, while not producing
legally binding and directly enforceable decisions, could nonetheless prove highly
intrusive to the domestic governance of states parties, especially compared to the
state reporting procedure. As a former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has observed, the individual communication procedure “is the most court-like function
of the treaty bodies” whereas “[the state reporting system] is a mode of reviewing
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compliance with the treaties’ obligations in minimally intrusive manner” [Rodley,
2013, 634].
The third criterion concerns delegation. In the context of human rights treaty
monitoring procedures, it refers to the amount of authority that treaty members
delegate to the treaty bodies to carry out monitoring compliance and promote implementation of treaty obligations. One way to assess the amounts of delegated
authority across multiple monitoring procedures is to examine the rules that treaty
bodies have developed on their own to carry out their different mandates. Delegated authority is minimal under the state reporting procedure because under that
system the treaty bodies are in a passive position to receive and make comments
on the self-reports that states parties care enough to submit. The inquiry procedure
under Art. 20 of the CAT grants more authority to the treaty body, including the
ability to initiate inquiries into allegations of systematic violations. However, Art.
20(5) requires the treaty body to seek cooperation from the state under inquiry
“at all stages of the proceedings,” placing a signifcant limitation in terms of their
delegated authority.
Under the individual communication procedure, there is more delegated authority since treaty bodies could receive and deliver judgments on complaints by
alleged victims or those acting on their behalf. States parties cannot halt or delay
the process even if they refuse to participate in arguments or respond to allegations.
Similarly, treaty bodies can also reach a judgment on the admissibility and merits of
submitted complaints with or without the inputs and defense put up by the accused
governments. The SPT, the treaty body under the OPCAT, arguably has the greatest
amount of delegated authority to implement the country visit procedure. According
to the OPCAT, the SPT could randomly select a member state in which to conduct
an investigative visit without having to secure any authorization. In fact, according to its First Annual Report, the SPT selected its frst batch of country visits by
random. Selected states are obligated to grant the SPT access to any places within
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their jurisdiction and the SPT could later publish its fndings by a simple majority
decision in the CAT Committee, the treaty monitoring body of the CAT.
When aggregating over these three criteria, I approximately classify monitoring
procedures under the CAT and the OPCAT by their intrusiveness. The country visit
system under the OPCAT ranks frst by the two criteria of obligation and delegation
whereas the individual communication procedure ranks frst by the precision criterion. Similar to Hafner-Burton et al. [2015b], I assume that obligation, precision,
and delegation contribute roughly equally to the overall metrics of intrusiveness
and therefore classify the country visit procedure as more intrusive than the individual communication and inquiry procedures and the state reporting procedure is
the minimally intrusive procedure among them.

4.2.2

Signal about intent and information about compliance

Two logical implications follow the variation in intrusiveness among treaty monitoring procedures. First, ratifying an intrusive monitoring procedure will credibly
reveal a state’s intent to comply with treaty obligations [Farber, 2002]. The logic is
straightforward. Intrusive monitoring procedures impose a high sovereignty cost,
defned as constraints on a state’s freedom of action, that only a state genuine about
compliance could ratify and maintain its ratifcation status without having to withdraw by Art. 31 of the CAT and Art. 33 of the OPCAT. According to this logic, by
subjecting itself to the country visit procedure, for instance, a state sends a credible signal about its intent to comply than is the case if it merely participates in the
state reporting system.2 The reason is that hosting unannounced and unrestricted
2

Hollyer and Rosendorff [2011] offer a different signaling logic. According to their argument, dictators sign the CAT to signal their strength rather than their intent to comply. Domestic opposition
groups perceive a dictator’s treaty commitment and subsequent ostentatious treaty violations as
credibly signaling her strength. As a result, they are less likely to mount a challenge, in effect prolonging the survival of the authoritarian regime. Although this argument “has some plausibility
problems on its face” [Simmons, 2012, 743], it has not been contested empirically. I note three key
differences between my analysis and Hollyer and Rosendorff [2011]. First, my target population
for inference is all countries, not just the subset of dictatorships. Second, my independent variable
of interest is participation in monitoring procedures under the CAT, not just a commitment to the
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visits by international independent experts, and therefore running the risk of having state violations and abuses exposed, is signifcantly more costly than submitting
self-reports at the discretion of the government. Even if fulflling the state reporting
obligation might not be entirely costless [Goodman and Jinks, 2003, Cole, 2009,
Hafner-Burton et al., 2015b], the cost of participating in an intrusive procedure
could be signifcantly higher. It is this higher cost that makes the intent to comply
more credible.
The history of the OPCAT is instructive of how concerns about sovereignty costs
could delay or even stymie the adoption of a comparatively more intrusive monitoring procedure. The formulation of the OPCAT was modeled after a proposal by the
Swiss Committee against Torture, which was later renamed as the Association for
the Prevention against Torture, during the negotiation for the CAT in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. At that time, this proposal, known as the “Swiss model,” was
considered so intrusive to state sovereignty, especially compared to the “Swedish
model” that the CAT eventually adopted, that the “Swiss model” had to be rejected
[Clark, 2009, Evans, 2011]. It took almost 15 years after the adoption of the CAT for
the “Swiss model” to be revived, modifed, and adopted as the OPCAT on December
18, 2002. In other words, both the CAT and the OPCAT used to be considered at
the same time, but they were eventually adopted almost two decades apart because
they differ signifcantly in terms of their intrusiveness. As a result, their ratifcation
sends signals of different levels of credibility.
The second implication is that intrusive monitoring is likely to generate more information about state compliance. The SPT’s visit to Paraguay in 2009, for example,
produced a 313-paragraph report on that country’s torture practice alone. This is
because, compared to the CAT Committee, the SPT is under fewer restrictions when
treaty and its mandatory state reporting system. Third, the hypothetical policy intervention (or the
treatment) in my analysis is ratifcation as opposed to signature as in the analysis by Hollyer and
Rosendorff [2011]. The third point is critical because, under international law, signing a human
rights treaty does not activate any treaty monitoring activities. Nor does it create any treaty obligations for the signatories, except for the legally vague obligation “not to defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty prior to its entry into force” according to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties [Jonas and Saunders, 2010].
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monitoring and exposing government abuses. The SPT also has more clout because
of its ability to publish a state’s substandard record. Conversely, governments with
a good record, by Art. 16(2) of the OPCAT, could ask the SPT to publish its positive
assessment. According to the Fourth Annual Report of the SPT, for instance, fve
visit reports have been published following requests by Honduras, Maldives, Mexico, Paraguay, and Sweden. This design enhances the ability of OPCAT participation
to effectively separate compliant states from violating countries, thus reducing the
risk of OPCAT ratifcation being used merely as a cover for human rights abuses.
The individual communication procedure is also likely to generate more compliance information because individual complaints provide more detailed information
about state abuses and the treaty body’s decisions in response will likely remove
remaining ambiguity about state compliance.
In summary, a state’s voluntary decision to subject itself to an intrusive monitoring procedure credibly signals its intent to comply. That procedure is also likely
to produce more information about a state’s actual compliance. This ex ante signal
and ex post information decrease government repression through a couple of mechanisms. First, ratifying an intrusive procedure that imposes a signifcant sovereignty
cost will establish a higher baseline expectation by international audiences. Other
countries, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) perceive a strong and credible signal from the ratifying state. A greater
public expectation results in a higher reputational cost for treaty violations [Brewster, 2013]. In other words, by raising the reputational stake, participation in an
intrusive monitoring procedure raises the cost of violations and thereby reduces the
incentive to commit treaty violations in the frst place.
Second, intrusive monitoring is also more likely to detect non-compliant behaviors, increasing the probability that a member state gets caught violating its treaty
obligations. This is especially important in the case of serious state torture, which
tends to occur in countries for whom protective domestic institutions are already
weak or ineffective. Furthermore, as Lupu [2013b, 477-481] points out, even inde-
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pendent domestic courts could encounter enormous diffculties when enforcing international commitments to protect physical integrity rights. A major reason is that
repressive governments have a considerable capacity to interfere with witnesses,
hide the victims, and destroy evidence, thereby raising the cost of producing legally
admissible evidence. The informative power of intrusive monitoring could be especially useful under such diffcult circumstances and can provide evidence that is
hard to obtain otherwise.
The unannounced and unrestricted nature of the SPT’s visits also produces the
kind of evidential information that could be instrumental for legislative opposition
parties [Lupu, 2015], social movements, and civil society pressure [Simmons, 2009]
to constrain and hold abusive state offcials accountable. The SPT’s Second Annual
Report, for example, mentions that the SPT has “carried out unannounced visits
to places of detention [and] had interviews in private with persons deprived of
their liberty” (p. 8). Its Third Annual Report reiterates that “confdential face-toface interviews with persons deprived of liberty are the chief means of verifying
information and establishing the risk of torture” (p. 9). The same report also raises
concern that many detainees whom the SPT spoke with may become a target of
reprisal afterward (p. 11). The risk that detainees have taken in talking to the SPT
suggests that the kind of information the SPT gathers is highly unlikely to obtain in
voluntary state reports and constructive dialogues that states parties occasionally
have with treaty body experts under the state reporting procedure.
To summarize, in addition to raising the reputational cost of human rights
abuses, intrusive monitoring procedures also increase the probability of detecting
violations in participating states by producing compliance information that is usually not available under less intrusive procedures. This information factors into domestic institutions such as the legislature, domestic courts, and social movements
that exert a constraining effect on state behavior. Here I make no assumption as
to which causal pathway—international reputation or domestic institutions or social movements—is more effective. They may operate more or less independently
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or, more likely, there could be a complex interplay between them. Regardless, it
should not prevent us from estimating the causal effects of treaty monitoring procedures. If a relationship truly exists between the intrusive design of treaty monitoring procedures and their causal effects, we expect more intrusive procedures
such as individual communication and especially country visit will have a larger,
more consistent causal effect than do less intrusive ones such as state reporting.
It is noteworthy that the variation in intrusiveness among monitoring procedures
does not only exist; it is by design. In fact, it is probably not a coincidence that
more intrusive monitoring procedures are almost always presented in an optional
protocol or an optional provision of a human rights treaty.

4.3

Empirical Analysis
This section estimates the causal effects of participating in the state reporting

procedure under Art. 19 of the CAT, the inquiry procedure under Art. 20, the individual communication procedure under Art. 22, and the country visit procedure
under the OPCAT. I use observational data on 192 countries from 1987 when the
CAT went into effect until 2015. Adopting the causal inference framework that
Pearl [2000, 2009a] develops, I begin by formulating a structural causal model
that formalizes the background knowledge about the data generating process. I
then use a causal graph to represent this structural model, encoding the necessary
causal assumptions, and establishing the estimability of the causal effects of interest. Establishing estimability, known as causal identifcation, is essential because it
specifes the conditions for translating an interventional distribution of the outcome
when we intervene to fx the treatment values into the observational distribution of
the outcome that we observe. It permits, assuming identifcation conditions are satisfed, an estimation of the causal effect using observational data. Finally, I employ
the machine learning-based targeted maximum likelihood estimator to compute effect estimates that are more robust than those obtained via standard parametric
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statistical models. I conclude with our interpretation of the effect estimates by
mapping them back into my substantive research question.

4.3.1

Causal model formulation

To make causal inference in a non-experimental setting, one has to start by
assuming that the observed data come from a data-generating system that is compatible with a structural causal model. A structural causal model is simply a set of
equations that make explicit our notion about “how nature assigns values to variables of interest” [Pearl et al., 2016, 27]. Our structural model in Equation set 4.1
describes the functional relationships between human rights outcome Y , a set of
four treatments A = {A1, A2, A3, A4}, mediators M , and a set of time-invariant
confounders X and time-varying confounders W . The subscript t indicates the time
period during which the observed variables are measured.
The treatments, whose causal effects are our target of estimation, include A1
(the state reporting procedure), A2 (the inquiry procedure), A3 (the individual
communication procedure), and A4 (the country visit procedure). To measure the
treatment variables, I use a state’s formal ratifcation of the CAT, the presence or
absence of a reservation to Art. 20, a declaration of intent to be bound by Art.
22, and formal ratifcation of the OPCAT. Since the state reporting procedure is
mandatory under the CAT, a measure of participation in this procedure completely
overlaps with ratifcation of the CAT. I do not measure how participating states actually engage with the periodic review process under state reporting system [Creamer
and Simmons, 2015] or with other procedures. Measurements of actual monitoring
activities, while seemingly more intuitive, may miss the signaling value of formal
ratifcation. Equally important, the lack of data would present an insurmountable
challenge.
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X = fX (UX )
Wt = fW (X, Wt−1 , UW )
A1t = fA1 (X, A1t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , Wt , UA1 )
A2t = fA2 (X, A2t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt , UA2 )

(4.1)

A3t = fA3 (X, A3t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt , UA3 )
A4t = fA4 (X, A4t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt , UA4 )
Mt = fM (X, Mt−1 , A1t , A2t , A3t , A4t , Wt , UM )
Yt = fY (X, Yt−1 , A1t , A2t , A3t , A4t , Mt , Wt , UY )
Informed by the existing literature about the causal mechanisms through which
a human rights treaty could infuence state behavior, I specify four potential causal
mediators, including institutional and legislative constraints [Lupu, 2015], domestic judicial enforcement [Powell and Staton, 2009, Conrad, 2013], civil society
mobilization [Simmons, 2009], and international socialization [Keck and Sikkink,
1998, Clark, 2013, Goodman and Jinks, 2013]. They are believed to be transmitting and mediating the causal effects of human rights treaties. The mediators
are respectively measured by (a) a political constraints index, which measures the
feasibility of policy change based on the veto power and alignment among government branches and degrees of preference heterogeneity within the legislative
branch [Henisz, 2002]; (b) latent judicial independence estimates, which measure the independent power of the judiciary to constrain choices of the government
[Linzer and Staton, 2015]; (c) a naming and shaming index, an aggregation of reporting on human rights abuses by major media outlets, Amnesty International, and
the UN Commission on Human Rights, [Cole, 2015, 423] which refects the work
of a civil society, particularly domestic NGOs, in calling out for attention to state
abuses; and (d) treaty commitment preference coordinates based on state ratifcations of 280 universal treaties across a large number of policy areas [Lupu, 2016],
which is a good indicator of the extent to which countries interact and socialize in-
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ternationally, particularly when it comes to transmitting and adopting human rights
norms [Greenhill, 2016].
To investigate the robustness of my causal effect estimation, I also use three
different measures of human rights outcome, including the Political Terror Scale
[Gibney et al., 2016], human rights protection scores [Fariss, 2014], and the CIRI
torture index [Cingranelli et al., 2013]. Each of these datasets has a different measurement timeframe. I therefore right-censor my analysis accordingly. Finally, I
include a number of time-invariant covariates (legal origin, treaty ratifcation rule,
and electoral system) and time-varying covariates (population size, gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita, participation in international trade, regime type, regime
durability, and involvement in international conficts). As indicated in the literature, these covariates are the usual suspects that may confound the relationship
between treaties and human rights practices. Table 4.2 lists the observed variables,
indicates the timeframe of measurement for each variable, refers to studies in the
literature that similarly examine these variables, and identifes the data sources.
Appendix C.2 provides a more detailed description of data sources, variable measurements as well as the recoding, preprocessing, and transformation of variables
for data analysis.
From the model of the generative system in Equation set 4.1, we observe a sample of n country–year observations On = (X, Wt , At , Mt , Yt ) ∼ PO where PO is the
joint probability distribution of the observed variables. In estimating the contemporaneous causal effect of each treatment, I compute the average change in human
rights outcome Yt as if we could physically intervene to alternate the ratifcation/participation status of a monitoring procedure for all country–year observations.
The effects of these interventions are expressed in terms of the mean of the inter



ventional outcome distribution: EPO Y |do(A = 1) and EPO Y |do(A = 0) . The
do-operator indicates an active intervention to fx the treatment value at A = 1
(ratifed) and A = 0 (non-ratifed) and the expectations are taken over the entire
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Table 4.2.: Causal model variables
Sets

Timeframe

Variables, References, and Data Sources

A

1986–2015
1986–2015
1986–2015
1986–2015

A1:
A2:
A3:
A4:

M

1986–2016

M 1: Institutional and legislative constraints [Lupu, 2015]
measured by political constraints index (Polcon iii) [Henisz, 2002].
M 2: Judiciary effectiveness [Powell and Staton, 2009, Conrad, 2013]
measured by judicial independence index [Linzer and Staton, 2015].
M 3: Political mobilization [Murdie and Davis, 2012, Simmons, 2009]
measured by naming and shaming index [Cole, 2015].
M 4: International socialization [Clark, 2013, Goodman and Jinks, 2013]
measured by treaty commitment preferences [Lupu, 2016].

1986–2012
1986–2007
1986–2008

Art. 19 ratifcation status (OHCHR).
Art. 20 reservation status (OHCHR).
Art. 22 declaration status (OHCHR).
OPCAT ratifcation status (OHCHR).

Y

1986–2011
1986–2013
1986–2015

Y 1: CIRI torture index [Cingranelli et al., 2013].
Y 2: Human rights protection scores [Fariss, 2014].
Y 3: Political Terror Scale [Gibney et al., 2016].

W

1986–2015

Population size [Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita [Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Participation in international trade [Hafner-Burton, 2013]
measured by the World Bank Indicators.
Regime types
[Hathaway, 2007, Chapman and Chaudoin, 2013, Neumayer, 2007]
measured by Polity scores [Marshall Monty et al., 2016].
Regime durability [Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006]
measured by age in current regime [Cheibub et al., 2010].
Involvement in militarized interstate disputes
[Chapman and Chaudoin, 2013]
measured by MID dataset [Themnér, 2014].

1986–2015
1986–2015
1986–2015

1986–2015
1986–2015

X

Legal origin [Mitchell et al., 2013]
measured by legal origins data [La Porta et al., 2008].
Treaty ratifcation rule [Simmons, 2009]
measured by ratifcation rules dataset [Simmons, 2009].
Electoral system [Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010]
measured by database of political institutions
[Cruz and Scartascini, 2016].

population. The difference of the two expected values is the average causal effect of




participating in a monitoring procedure τ = EPO Y |do(A = 1) −EPO Y |do(A = 0) .
In summary, to compute the average causal effect of a monitoring procedure,
we would not simply observe the treatment values that nature generates. Rather,
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we would need to intervene to disable the treatment assignment mechanism, in
my structural causal model, for instance, the treatment mechanism that generates the ratifcation status for the state reporting procedure is the equation A1t =
fA1 (X, A1t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , Wt , UA1 ), fx the treatment values at A1 = a for a = {0, 1},
and then predict the outcome values under these two different interventions to
compute the average causal effect.

4.3.2 Causal identifcation
The question of causal identifcation arises when we want to establish the conditions under which we can translate and compute an interventional query from
an observational probability distribution. This translation is made on a transparent
basis using a graphical causal model in the form of a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
The DAG in Figure 4.3 is a graphical representation of the structural causal model in
Equation set 4.1. A directed acyclic graph [Pearl, 2000, Koller and Friedman, 2009]
comprises of nodes/vertices denoting random variables and edges/arrows denoting
one variable’s direct causal infuence on another variable. A path in a DAG is an
arrow or a sequence of directed arrows, regardless of their directions, that connects
one node to another. A path between two nodes that consists of arrows of the same
direction is a causal path. Otherwise, it is a non-causal path. An acyclic graph
contains no cycle or feedback loop, meaning that no node in the graph can have a
causal path leading to itself.
Identifcation of causal effects is dependent upon the causal structure, which is
represented by the topology of a causal graph. Thus, any causal model should be
justifed on the basis of the background knowledge to maximize the chance that it
accurately captures the true data-generating process. In other words, we build on
the existing literature to satisfy the assumption that the structural and graphical
causal model have a one-to-one relationship and consistency with the underlying
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probability distribution. The causal model in Figure 4.3 is constructed based on the
following justifcation.

Wt−1

A1t−1

Wt

A1t

A2t−1

A2t
Mt−1

A3t−1

Mt
A3t

A4t−1

A4t

Yt−1

Yt

Fig. 4.3.: A causal DAG representing the causal process from treaty monitoring
procedures A1 (state reporting under Art. 19), A2 (inquiry under Art. 20), A3 (individual communication under Art. 22), and A4 (country visit under the OPCAT) to
Y (human rights outcome) with time-varying confounders W . Time-invariant confounders X, which precede and potentially affect all time-varying covariates, are
not represented. All exogenous variables U ’s are assumed to be jointly independent
and are not represented. Two shaded blocks indicate two time periods. The conditioning set ZA1 = {X, A1t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , Wt } is suffcient to identify the causal effect
of A1t on Yt . Similarly, the conditioning sets ZA2 = {X, A2t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt },
ZA3 = {X, A3t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt }, and ZA4 = {X, A4t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt } are
suffcient to, respectively, identify the causal effect of A2t , A3t , and A4t on Yt .

First, the causal graph represents both the contemporaneous direct effect of each
monitoring procedure on human rights outcome (At → Yt ) and their contemporaneous indirect effects that go through all the mediators (At → Mt → Yt ). I make
one key assumption with respect to the relationships between four treaty monitoring procedures. In order to participate in any optional monitoring procedures
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(inquiry, individual communication, and country visit), a state has to be a party to
the CAT in the frst place. Since we have no reasons to believe in any particular
causal order between the three optional monitoring procedures, I assume they are
not directly causally related to each other. In other words, within the same temporal period, A2, A3, and A4 are independent conditional on treaty ratifcation A1
and other covariates. This assumption of conditional independence among three
optional monitoring procedures is necessary for causal effect identifability. Otherwise, if these procedures mutually cause each other, we would not be able to
identify their causal effects.
Second, to represent potential confounding by various time-varying covariates
W , I include directed arrows from these covariates to all treatments (Wt → At ),
mediators (Wt → Mt ), and outcome (Wt → Yt ). For a clear and concise presentation, I do not represent time-invariant confounders X, but they are assumed to
precede and affect all other variables in the model.
Third, I incorporate in the graphical model the selection effect argument [von
Stein, 2005, Simmons and Hopkins, 2005]. This argument claims that mostly only
those states that intend to comply in the frst place would join a human rights
institution and, as a result, selection into a human rights treaty or, similarly in this
case, a treaty monitoring procedure would be potentially biased. I represent this
argument about the potential effect of the lagged human rights outcome on the
treatments, using the directed arrows Yt−1 → A1t , Yt−1 → A2t , Yt−1 → A3t , and
Yt−1 → A4t .
Fourth, I further include the directed arrow Yt−1 → Mt to denote the causal
effect of the lagged outcome variable on the time-varying mediators. These causal
arrows refect the possibility that the use of torture by the executive could threaten
the opposition parties and weaken legislative constraints; intimidate the judges and
undermine judicial independence of the court system; suppress social movements
even while potentially provoking mass mobilization; and possibly prompt international censure, criticisms, and condemnation.
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Fifth, to further enable the graphical causal model to capture a potentially complex reality, I add the directed arrows Mt−1 → A1t , Mt−1 → A2t , Mt−1 → A3t , and
Mt−1 → A4t . Substantively, this means the lagged mediators might have a causal
infuence on the ratifcation/participation status of treaty monitoring procedures.
This is meant to incorporate the fnding that states may enter into reservations to
certain human rights treaty provisions based in part on the effectiveness of their domestic judicial system [Hill, 2016a]. It is also based on the research that suggests
countries may ratify human rights treaties due to mobilization by human rights
NGOs [Simmons, 2009] or an entrenchment of human rights norms through international socialization [Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998].
Finally, given the time-series cross-sectional structure of the data, I allow the
possibility that the lagged value of a variable has an infuence on its current value.
Thus, for every time-varying covariate I include a directed arrow such as A1t−1 →
A1t , Yt−1 → Yt , and so forth.
In summary, all potential causal relationships between variables in the model
are derived on the basis of the background knowledge in the literature and then
represented by directed arrows in a graphical model. It should be noted that a
directed arrow in a graphical causal model does not necessarily indicate an actual
causal infuence, but rather a possible one. Thus, including a directed arrow is synonymous to not making a causal assumption whereas a missing arrow is equivalent
to assuming that a direct causal relationship is absent.
As a graphical representation, a causal DAG compactly represents the causal
structure of the data generating process without making any assumptions about the
forms of any generative functions f or the probability distribution of the exogenous
variables U = (UX , UW , UA , UM , UY ) other than that these exogenous variables are
assumed to be jointly independent. The causal graph also exhibits the invariance
property [Pearl, 2009a, 30], according to which a node/variable is independent
from its non-descendants (nodes that are not on a causal path from that variable)
conditional on its parent nodes (nodes that have a directed arrow entering that
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variable). This concept of invariance lies at the heart of identifcation using the
backdoor criterion.
The backdoor criterion is used to determine non-parametrically the identifability of a causal effect via covariate adjustment [Pearl et al., 2016, 61–66]. To
identify the causal effect of A1t on Yt , for example, the backdoor criterion requires
a suffcient adjustment set that:
(a) blocks any non-causal paths between A1t and Yt that have an arrow entering
A1t ;
(b) leaves open all causal paths from A1t to Yt ; and
(c) creates no spurious paths when conditioning on a collider (a node that lies on
a path between A1t and Yt and has two arrows coming into it) or a descendant
of a collider.
Suffcient adjustment sets for causal effect identifcation are derived based on
the structure of the causal DAG in Figure 4.3. According to criterion (a), the set
ZA1 = {X, A1t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , Wt } is suffcient to identify the causal effect of A1t
on Yt . To satisfy criterion (b), a suffcient adjustment set should not include any
of the mediators Mt . It also should not include any interaction terms between a
mediator and the treatment or a mediator and other covariates. Nor should the
adjustment set include any of the optional monitoring procedures {A2t , A3t , A4t }
when estimating the causal effect of A1t . The reason is that these optional procedures are the child nodes of A1t since participation in any of these three procedures
is legally premised on being a state party to the CAT (A1) in the frst place. Criterion (c) is automatically satisfed since we do not have any colliders on any paths
emanating from the treatment At to the outcome Yt . Applying the same backdoor
criterion, I derive three other adjustment sets ZA2 = {X, A2t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt },
ZA3 = {X, A3t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , At , Wt }, and ZA4 = {X, A4t−1 , Mt−1 , Yt−1 , A1t , Wt } to
respectively identify the causal effects of the other three monitoring procedures.
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The idea of the backdoor criterion is to fnd an adjustment set of covariates that
blocks all non-causal paths (usually known as backdoor paths because they include
arrows that enter the treatment variable/node) between the treatment and the outcome while leaving open the causal path from A1t to Yt [Pearl, 2009a, 79–81].
When we condition on a suffcient adjustment set to make the treatment and the
outcome (for example, A1t and Yt ) conditionally independent, we have effectively
removed all non-causal paths between A1t and Yt and any remaining association
is evidence of a causal relationship. In short, a successful backdoor adjustment
will render an interventional query E(Y |do(A = a)) equivalent to an observational




query E(Y |A = a). The causal effect τ = EPO Yt |do(A1t = 1) −EPO Yt |do(A1t = 0)
then becomes estimable as ψ(Pn ) = E(Yt |At = 1, ZA1 = z) − E(Yt |At = 0, ZA1 = z).

4.3.3 Machine learning-based estimation
For causal effect estimation, I employ the machine learning-based targeted maximum likelihood estimator (TMLE) [van der Laan and Rose, 2011]. The estimation procedure has three steps. First, we ft an initial predictive outcome model
Q0n (A, Z) = E(Y |A, Z) and the predictive treatment model gn0 (Z) = P (A|Z) where
Z is the suffcient adjustment set for causal identifcation. Second, we modify the
initial model Q0n into an updated outcome model Q1n using the updating equation
logit(Q1n ) = logit(Q0n ) + n Hn and the “clever covariate” Hn (A, Z) =
I(A=0)
.
gn (A=0|Z)

I(A=1)
gn (A=1|Z)

−

The coeffcient n is estimated from a separate logistic regression model

logit(Y ) = logit(Q0n ) + n Hn . Finally, we plug in the two binary treatment values a = {1, 0} into the updated model Q1n to compute the causal effect estimate


ˆ n ) = 1 Pn Q1 (Ai = 1, Zi ) − Q1 (Ai = 0, Zi ) . Statistical uncertainties around
ψ(P
n
n
i=1
n
the estimate are approximated by the variance of the effcient infuence function
[van der Laan and Rose, 2011].
The case for this targeted estimator is made in more details by van der Laan
and Rose [2011, 101–118]. Suffce here to note that this estimator has many de-
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sirable properties that few others can match. First, it is doubly robust, producing
unbiased estimates if either the initial outcome model Q0n or the treatment model
gn0 is consistent. It is more robust than, for example, propensity score-based estimators, the consistency of which depends on the correct specifcation of the propensity
score model. If both Q0n and gn0 are consistent, the targeted maximum likelihood
estimates are maximally precise.
Second, when using standard parametric regression models for effect estimation, researchers often make assumptions about the forms of functions that characterize the relationships between the variables. These functional form assumptions
include, for example, linearity of parameters and additivity of covariate effects.
Given that many social and political dynamics are non-linear, these assumptions are
likely unwarranted. If a model is not correctly specifed in terms of its functional
form, the estimates will be biased. The TMLE method circumvents this limitation
by incorporating a machine learning ensemble technique called Super Learner that
adapts to the data and better approximates the true underlying functions [Polley
and van der Laan, 2010].
Super Learner uses a collection of parametric (in our case, ordinary least squares
linear regression and regularized linear regression with lasso), semi-parametric
(generalized additive models and spline regression models), and non-parametric
algorithms (random forest and gradient boosting). They are then assembled in a
weighted combination with an individual weight for each algorithm that is proportionate to its cross-validated predictive performance. The use of cross-validation
helps make sure that the algorithms should generalize well and avoid overftting.
This cross-validated combination of algorithms creates a hybrid and much more
powerful predictive function, which is then used to build both the initial outcome
model Q0n and the treatment model gn0 . Super Learner-based models are much more
likely to approximate the true underlying data generating process and satisfy the
assumption of correct model specifcation. Table 4.3 lists the algorithms I use for
causal effect estimation.
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Table 4.3.: Algorithms used in Super Learner-based targeted maximum likelihood
estimation
Algorithm

Description

glm
glmnet
gam
polymars
randomForest
xgboost

Main-term generalized linear models.
P
Regularized linear models with lasso penalty pj=1 |βj |.
Generalized additive models (deg. of polynomials = 2).
Adaptive polynomial spline regression.
Random forest (ntree = 1,000).
Extreme gradient boosting (ntree = 1,000, max depth = 4, eta = 0.1).

For ease of interpretation, all three measures of human rights outcome are
rescaled into a bounded 0–1 range with zero indicating the worst torture practice and one indicating the best human rights record. To handle missing data, I
conduct multiple imputation (m = 5), using the Amelia II program [Honaker et al.,
2011], and combine the effect estimates from each imputed data set. Appendix
C.3 provides the summary statistics of the data and Appendix C.4 summarizes the
imputation process.

4.3.4

Results and interpretation

Machine learning-based TMLE estimates of the causal effect of participating in
each of the four monitoring procedures are reported in Table 4.4. In the top panel of
Table 4.4, the results indicate that across three different measures of human rights
outcome, the country visit procedure is the only monitoring procedure that has a
consistently signifcant causal impact in terms of reducing torture and improving
government respect for physical integrity rights. Its causal effect ranges from a 1.2
percentage point increase in human rights protection score to a 4.6 percentage point
decrease in political terror scale to a dramatic 11.8 percentage point reduction in
CIRI torture index.
The CIRI torture index specifcally measures the torture practice by state offcials
and private individuals at the instigation of the government. It is probably the most
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Table 4.4.: Average causal effect point estimates and 95% CI of treaty monitoring
procedures under the CAT and the OPCAT.
Procedure

PTS score

HR protection score

CIRI torture index

Super Learner-based Targeted Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Infuence Function-based CI with Multiple Imputation
State reporting (Art. 19)
Inquiry (Art. 20)
Individual complaint (Art. 22)
Country visit (OPCAT)

−0.023
[−0.044, −0.001]
0.058
[0.031, 0.084]
0.173
[0.142, 0.204]
0.046
[0.026, 0.065]

0.003
[−0.006, 0.011]
0.007
[0.004, 0.009]
0.116
[−0.348, 0.580]
0.012
[0.009, 0.015]

−0.165
[−0.313, −0.018]
−0.064
[−0.087, −0.041]
0.144
[0.033, 0.256]
0.118
[0.029, 0.207]

Linear Models of Human Rights Outcome
Least Square Estimation with Multiple Imputation
−0.001
[−0.031, 0.028]
0.058
[0.019, 0.098]
0.049
[0.006, 0.092]
0.014
[−0.025, 0.053]

0.002
[−0.001, 0.005]
0.006
[0.001, 0.010]
0.007
[0.002, 0.012]
0.003
[−0.002, 0.007]

−0.030
[−0.081, 0.020]
0.046
[−0.021, 0.113]
0.040
[−0.032, 0.112]
0.036
[−0.032, 0.104]

Number of years (CAT)
Number of observations (CAT)

29 [1987–2015]
5,414

27 [1987–2013]
5,032

25 [1987–2011]
4,648

Number of years (OPCAT)
Number of observations (OPCAT)

10 [2006–2015]
1,929

8 [2006–2013]
1,547

6 [2006–2011]
1,163

State reporting (Art. 19)
Inquiry (Art. 20)
Individual complaint (Art. 22)
Country visit (OPCAT)

targeted measure of the outcome. However, its limited timeframe of measurement
leads to a smaller number of observations. I therefore use two other indicators that
measure a larger variety of government abuses of physical integrity rights, including political imprisonment, extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearances, and
other violations. As a result, the causal effect estimates naturally vary, but they
nonetheless empirically confrm my theoretical argument about the causal impact
of the country visit procedure under the OPCAT. Given the large number of deter-
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minants of human rights outcome, some of which are highly resistant to meaningful
changes, the fnding that ratifying a single intrusive monitoring procedure can lead
to a substantial improvement in human rights conditions is signifcant.
The next causally effective monitoring procedure is the individual communication mechanism under Art. 22 of the CAT. In terms of magnitude, its causal effect
could be even greater, averaging at around a 15 percentage point improvement in
human rights conditions. However, when we measure human rights outcome using
the human rights protection score, its causal impact is no longer signifcant due to
the large variation of the effect estimate. The causal effect of the inquiry procedure
is smaller and inconsistent across different outcome measures. Counter-intuitively,
but not without similar fndings in the literature [Hill, 2010, Lupu, 2013a], the state
reporting system, if anything, has a damaging impact on human rights protection.
This surprising negative impact is even statistically signifcant, increasing torture by
16.5 percentage points when we measure state practices of torture using the CIRI
torture index. It is not implausible that abusive governments may use participation
in this relatively low-cost, almost symbolic reporting procedure as a cover for their
domestic repression and to defect international criticism.
In short, the monitoring procedures under the CAT and the OPCAT have substantially different effects on human rights outcome, ranging from a high of a 17.3
percentage point improvement to a low of a 16.5 percentage point decline in human
rights conditions. Importantly, these fndings provide the empirical evidence in support of the argument that intrusive procedures have a positive causal effect whereas
the same claim cannot be made with respect to less intrusive ones. By implications,
the fndings suggest that one major way to improve human rights practices is to design and promote treaty monitoring procedures that are able to exercise intrusive
oversight over state compliance. Among the fve types of monitoring procedures
available, the country visit procedure and, to a lesser extent, the individual complaint procedure represent the most effective protection mechanisms. Moreover,
ongoing efforts to reform the reporting procedures of the UN human rights treaty
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system should be directed toward building a more intrusive system. Otherwise, the
current reporting system is unlikely to have any positive impact or even backfre.
To contrast the machine learning-based TMLE estimator with the conventional
practice of effect estimation, I report in the bottom panel of Table 4.4 the effect
estimates from linear regression models of human rights outcome. Covariate selection for causal effect identifability remains the same. The results indicate that
only in the case of the inquiry procedure with human rights outcome measured in
the PTS scores and human rights protection scores are the effect estimates somewhat similar between the two estimation methods. In other cases, a simple linear
regression model fails to produce any similar effect estimates. It is particularly off
the mark with respect to the country visit procedure and when one uses the CIRI
torture index to measure the outcome variable.
It is worth emphasizing that I include ordinary least squares linear regression in
my user-selected library of Super Learner algorithms underlying the targeted maximum likelihood estimator. It means that if a linear regression model happened
to accurately capture the underlying data-generating process, the Super Learnerbased estimator would have recovered the same estimates and there would be no
differences in results. This is an indication that the functional form assumptions of
linearity and additivity are probably not appropriate in this case. More broadly, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, one should employ estimators that can
incorporate fexible machine learning methods to accommodate potentially nonlinear, complex data-generating processes and produce more robust estimates than
is the case with parametric statistical models.

4.4

Conclusion
In one of the opening examples of this chapter, after Milan Ristic died of police

brutality in Yugoslavia in February 1995, his father exhausted all domestic remedies
and had to turn to the Committee against Torture under the CAT to demand for jus-
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tice. Despite the state’s argument to dismiss his case on the basis of inadmissibility
and then to deny its responsibilities in its arguments on the merits, the Committee
“fnds that the State party has violated its obligations under articles 12 and 13 of the
Convention to investigate promptly and effectively allegations of torture or severe
police brutality.” It also urged the state to “provide [...] an appropriate remedy”
(Communication No. 113/1998), which was later ordered by the state’s Supreme
Court. This outcome was only possible because the individual complaints procedure
under the CAT was designed to monitor state compliance more intrusively despite
the state’s protest to dismiss the case. It also underscores the greater effcacy of
a relatively more intrusive treaty monitoring procedure in providing justice and
extending government accountability.
The quantitative political science literature, however, rarely focuses on compliance monitoring mechanisms under the UN human rights treaties. Its focus on the
issue of institutional design more generally is also mostly confned to institutions
in international political economy. In this chapter, I bring to bear evidence from
international institutions in the area of international human rights and examine
the issue of institutional design and institutional impact from an explicit causal inference perspective. Specifcally, I disaggregate treaty compliance monitoring into
state participations in different monitoring procedures and address the question of
whether these monitoring procedures have differing causal effects on human rights
outcome because of their different designs. Answering this question has important
implications.
First, it contributes to the larger body of literature that examines the empirical
implications of institutional design for substantive policy outcomes [Downs et al.,
1998, Koremenos, 2005, Gilligan and Johns, 2012, Abbott and Snidal, 2013]. Estimating the causal effects of four monitoring procedures under the CAT and the OPCAT, my causal analysis suggests that human rights institutions that impose more
binding obligations, operate according to more precise rules, and enjoy greater delegation of authority tend to be more causally effective and lead to better outcomes.
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Second, in terms of human rights research, the contribution of this chapter involves examining the causal impact of an important human rights treaty from a
different level of analysis. In the existing empirical literature, contradictory fndings unfortunately abound when it comes to estimating the causal effect of the CAT
ratifcation. One major reason could be that the CAT as well as other human rights
treaties have mostly been examined at a more aggregate level. Instead of focusing
on treaty ratifcation as a whole, I shift the investigative focus onto treaty monitoring processes. I then develop an argument as to why monitoring procedures may
have differing causal impacts, arguing that the magnitude of their causal effect on
human rights outcome is likely a function of the intrusiveness in their design.
Overall, the empirical evidence indicates that not all treaty monitoring procedures are created equal or have similar causal impact. Rather more intrusive procedures such as the country visit procedure may have the best ability to improve
human rights conditions. My causal analysis also informs the current debate on
how to reform the operation and improve the performance of the UN human rights
treaty bodies. The research fndings in this chapter favorably support more intensive monitoring and extensive information-gathering by international bodies and
panels of independent experts. More broadly, this research is certainly only an initial step in evaluating and determining the kind of institutional design that works,
has no causal impact, or even backfres in protecting human rights and improving
government accountability. Further research is needed with respect to other human
rights treaties as well as international institutions in other domains.
Methodologically, I employ the structural causal model framework that Pearl
[2009a] and others have developed to address the question of causality in an observational setting. By putting the task of causal identifcation front and center, I
attempt to endow a causal interpretation to the effect estimates on a transparent
basis. Many, if not most, research questions in political science are indeed queries
about cause and effect. Researchers should therefore openly embrace and employ a
causality framework within which to conduct their research. In this chapter, I also
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apply the machine learning-based targeted learning methodology for effect estimation. Its purpose is to relax the assumption of correct model specifcation, which is
required in parametric statistical models. Because of its desirable properties, targeted learning is likely to become more popular and widely used across different
felds of scientifc inquiry in the future.
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5. WHAT CAUSES STATE REPRESSION? A PREDICTION-BASED
CAUSAL INQUIRY
5.1

Introduction
The previous two chapters have investigated the causal effects of human rights

treaties and treaty monitoring procedures on state practices of torture and other
human rights violations. In addition to international human rights law, however,
the literature has also identifed many other covariates that are shown to have a
statistically signifcant relationship with human rights outcomes, ranging from demographic factors to economic indicators and from domestic institutional features
to international variables. However, the way these covariates are identifed could
very well render their importance an artifact of statistical modeling and a product
of a specifc methodological approach. In this chapter, I re-examine from two different methodological perspectives the covariates that may also have an impact on
state repression and human rights violations. The goal is to identify the covariates
of state repression and human rights violations that are truly predictive and, more
importantly, causally signifcant.
This chapter starts from the argument that empirical evaluations of different
theories as to why governments violate human rights should go beyond the null
hypothesis signifcance testing framework [Hill and Jones, 2014].1 It is also sympathetic to the prediction-based approach, which argues that that empirical inquiries
should focus more on estimating the predictive power of covariates that correlate
with and potentially determine the levels of state repression rather than testing
their statistical correlation with the outcome [Hill and Jones, 2014, 661]. An even
1

For a recent discussion, debate, and proposed reforms of this inference framework, see Johnson
[2013], Benjamin et al. [2017], McShane et al. [2017].
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better and more substantively relevant approach, however, would be to incorporate
algorithmic prediction into a causal analysis to estimate the causal effects of multiple determinants of state repression. The reason is that a causal analysis produces
fndings that have a causal interpretation and thus could form the empirical basis
for policy interventions to effect desired changes in the outcome values, which in
our case is to reduce state repression and prevent human rights violations.
In summary, explanatory variables of state repression that are identifed through
an application of the null hypothesis statistical signifcance testing approach are
not necessarily predictive or causally relevant to the outcome. Predictive covariates that are identifed through an application of the machine learning predictionbased approach are predictive, but not necessarily causally relevant. Finally, causal
determinants of state repression that are identifed through an application of the
causal inference approach have a causal interpretation and thus are causally relevant and more substantively useful. Taking both the prediction-based approach and
the causal inference approach, I replicate and extend the study by Hill and Jones
[2014] in the following three directions to further learn about what predicts and
what causes state repression and human rights violations.
First, I replicate part of the predictive analysis by Hill and Jones [2014]. Their
study is motivated by the skepticism about existing empirical studies in the literature that mostly rely on statistically signifcant coeffcients of covariates in statistical
models. Hill and Jones [2014, 662] express their concern about the issue of overftting. That is, researchers, following currently prevalent research practices, ft
statistical models to all of their data and therefore “have no way of knowing if the
patterns they uncover are the result of the peculiarities of a particular dataset or
whether they are more general.” As a result, the fndings in the existing literature
may not be generalizable and reliable.
A related problem is that, in the vast majority of the literature, researchers often
rely on data models using a simple linear functional form that may or may not
be able to capture the true data-generating process. If a model’s functional form
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does not capture the underlying data-generating process, statistically signifcant
estimates could be biased. Hill and Jones [2014, 662] propose to address “this
defciency in the literature through the use of cross-validation and random forests.”
My replication, however, shows that, for this particular human rights dataset,
random forest, a popular machine learning technique that uses an ensemble of decision trees to make predictions with each decision tree using a randomly selected
subset of covariates, is actually not an effective machine learning algorithm. I empirically demonstrate that extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost) is a better algorithm in terms of predictive accuracy for their dataset. The result of my replication
is nevertheless relatively consistent with the original study although the specifc
ranks of covariates in terms of their predictive power are slightly different.
Second, I then take the causal inference approach and convert the predictive
analysis into a causal analysis. For the purpose of making causal inference, I frst
build a causal model, making explicit the causal assumptions about the underlying
data-generating system through a causal graph. I the embed the XGBoost prediction
method into the structural causal model framework to estimate and compare the
causal power, as opposed to the predictive power, of time-varying variables among
the same set of predictive covariates. A causal analysis, it should be noted, is not
only complementary to a predictive analysis. It is also more directly useful in terms
of providing the basis for policy-making decisions.
My causal analysis suggests that boosting economic development, promoting
international trade, intensifying shaming on the international media, and protecting
the independence of the domestic judicial system likely represent some of the most
impactful measures to reduce and prevent human rights violations. Overall, though,
my causal analysis paints a bleaker picture, showing how persistent state repression
can be and how much it can resist meaningful changes even if one could stage
signifcant interventions on its causal determinants. By implications, it is highly
unlikely that government violations of human rights could be prevented as a result
of intervening on a single covariate or implementing a single policy change.
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Third, when making causal inference without the benefts of randomization of
the treatment values or exogenous variation in the values of the independent variable, researchers have to assume that there are no omitted variables that cause both
the outcome and the independent variable of interest. This assumption, however,
cannot be empirically verifed based on a scrutiny of the observed data alone. This is
because, fundamentally, the same joint probability distribution of the variables can
be generated by different underlying causal processes [Pearl, 2009a, Peters et al.,
2017]. As a result, one has to rely on domain expertise and suffcient subject matter knowledge to make and justify the assumption about the causal structure that
governs how the underlying causal process transpires. Nevertheless, I present a
heuristic to investigate the validity of this crucial assumption about the underlying
causal structure, using the invariant causal prediction method [Peters et al., 2016].
This heuristic offers a practical approach to diagnosing the residuals of causal prediction, thereby lessening or boosting our confdence in the accuracy of the causal
model. I then apply this heuristic to diagnose the causal model in the second section
and fnd it to be suffcient.

5.2

Predictive Model of State Repression

5.2.1 Measures, metric, and models
The empirical question that Hill and Jones [2014] set out to investigate is rather
straightforward: for a certain measure of state repression (the dependent variable)
across countries and over time, which covariates are most important in terms of
predicting repressive practices? To answer that question, a set of “theoretically
informed covariates” [Hill and Jones, 2014, 668] and their measurements are gathered from the literature (Table 1 in the original paper). These covariates are chosen
because they are often included in statistical models in previous studies either as
the key independent variable or as control variables. In other words, they are be-
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lieved to have a causal infuence either on state repression or, if they are included as
control variables, on both state repression and the independent variable of interest.2
Hill and Jones [2014] examine various measures of state repression. I focus on
one measure in particular—the human rights protection latent score [Fariss, 2014].
This outcome measure has some nice properties, being a continuous measurement
with relatively few missing values. It is also a model-based composite measure that
incorporates a variety of other measures of human rights violations, including two
major human rights datasets: the Political Terror Scale (PTS) [Gibney et al., 2015]
and the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) indicators [Cingranelli et al., 2013]. Most importantly, the Fariss score accounts for the changing standards of accountability in
human rights reports. This property is critical to an assumption we need later for
the invariant causal prediction method, which is that the same generative causal
model should work consistently across different time periods. If left unaccounted
for, a gradual improvement in the accountability standards and in human rights information over time [Clark and Sikkink, 2013] would introduce a systematic bias in
the measurement of human rights outcome and make our causal model empirically
inconsistent across temporal environments.
I use the replication dataset of 2,096 country–year observations for 154 countries from 1982 to 1999 as well as the computer code that Hill and Jones [2014]
provide to conduct model-based imputation of missing values.3 To avoid overftting
2

In regression models, which remain the major workhorse in the literature for inferring cause-andeffect relationships, a covariate is included as a control variable only if it is believed to be a potential
confounding factor that causes both the independent variable and the outcome. That they “are correlated with both state repression and the variable of interest” [Hill and Jones, 2014, footnote 2],
however, is not a sound justifcation for their inclusion. When a covariate is a mediator or an intermediate variable that both causally follows the independent variable and has a causal infuence
on the outcome, its inclusion as a control variable results in a post-treatment bias. Additionally,
if a covariate is directly or even indirectly caused by both the independent variable and the outcome variable, its inclusion leads to a collider bias. In both of these cases, this covariate would be
correlated with both state repression and the independent variable of interest, but it should not be
included as a control variable. Determining whether a covariate is a confounder or a mediator or a
collider on which specifc causal pathways is usually very diffcult, if at all possible, since it requires
concrete causal knowledge about the underlying data-generating system, which is a point that could
be emphasized more often in the literature.
3
A number of models in the original paper do not include the lagged dependent variable and thus
use observations from 1981 to 1999. Similar to the authors, I do not impute missing values of the
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and increase the generalizability of my prediction models, I perform 5-fold crossvalidation (instead of 10-fold cross validation as in the original paper to reduce the
computational cost). To quantify the variability of my estimates, I create 500 bootstrap datasets from a single imputed dataset (instead of 100 bootstrap datasets from
each of the fve imputed datasets as in the original study) and run an XGBoost algorithm on each of these 500 datasets to obtain the estimates. I then use the 2.5% and
97.5% quantiles of the bootstrap distribution of the estimates to create distributionfree 95% confdence intervals. This combination of non-parametric bootstrap and
single stochastic imputation is shown to be valid for making effcient inference [Tsiatis, 2007, Daniel et al., 2011]. In terms of evaluating metrics, similar to part of
q Pn
2
i=1 (yi −yˆi )
the original study, I use the root-mean-squared error RMSE =
where
n
yi is the observed outcome value and ŷi is the predicted outcome value for each
country–year observation. This is a proper scoring metrics for comparatively evaluating various prediction algorithms for a continuous outcome variable.
Finally, I set up three baseline models as in the original study by Hill and Jones
[2014]. The frst baseline model has only two covariates: gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita and population size. The second one additionally includes the
binary covariate of civil war. The third baseline model has three covariates: GDP
per capita, population size, and the lagged dependent variable. I further implement
a fourth baseline model that is analogous to the jackknife regression analysis, iteratively dropping a covariate rather than an observation, I . That is, to measure the
predictive power of each covariate, I use a baseline model that includes all other
covariates, but not the lagged dependent variable. For each of the baseline models,
I iteratively add each of the predictive covariates, computing the new RMSE as a
ratio of the baseline model’s RMSE. A ratio smaller than one suggests that the additional covariate increases the baseline model’s predictive performance. Smaller
ratios indicate greater power of the covariates in predicting state repression. I use
the RMSE reduction ratio to measure the predictive power of covariates because it
lagged dependent variable (the frst year for each country). Thus, the time period covered in the
replication dataset that I use with the lagged dependent variable is from 1982 to 1999.
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is more straightforward and easily interpretable than the decision rule used in the
original paper.4

5.2.2

Predictive algorithms

My predictive analysis uses the replication dataset from Hill and Jones [2014].
The set of predictive covariates are essentially “fxed” as well in the sense that they
are chosen on the basis of some theoretical justifcation and the domain knowledge in the existing literature. As a result, the performance of predictive models
now mostly depends on how closely the algorithms we use are able to approximate
the unknown, underlying function that generates the measured outcome (state repression). I examine a variety of different predictive algorithms and comparatively
evaluate their performance, using the Super Learner prediction function [van der
Laan et al., 2007, Polley and van der Laan, 2010]. Super Learner computes the
10-fold cross-validated mean-squared error (MSE) when each algorithm is used to
predict the human rights protection score as a function of all predictive covariates
and the lagged dependent variable.
Table 5.1 lists the algorithms I use for this comparative analysis. This list covers
a diverse array of algorithms that make different trade-offs between interpretability
and complexity and between bias and variance [James et al., 2013]. In addition to
the ordinary least squares regression and conditional random forest that Hill and
Jones [2014] use in their paper, I also include regularized regression with lasso,
ridge regression, generalized additive models, local regression, polynomial spline
regression, random forest, and extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost). These are
some of the most commonly used algorithms in the machine learning and algorithmic predictions literature.
4

The decision rule that Hill and Jones [2014, 670] use is “if the lower bound (the .025 quantile)
of the prediction error [i.e., the RMSE in the case of a continuous outcome variable] for the model
including that covariate is above the upper bound (the .975 quantile) of the prediction error for the
baseline model, then the covariate is marginally important.”
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Table 5.1.: Algorithms used in Super Learner-based predictive analysis
Algorithm

Description

glm
glmnet
glm.ridge
gam
polymars
loess
randomForest
cforest
xgboost (default)
xgboost (tuned)

OLS linear regression.
P
Regularized linear regression with lasso penalty pj=1 |βj |.
P
Ridge regression with penalty pj=1 βj2 .
Generalized additive model (degree of polynomials = 2).
Polynomial multivariate adaptive regression splines.
Local regression
Random forest (ntree = 1,000).
Conditional random forest (ntree = 1,000).
Extreme gradient boosting (default hyper-parameters).
Extreme gradient boosting (fne-tuned hyper-parameters).

Of particular interest is the XGBoost algorithm [Chen and He, 2015, Chen and
Guestrin, 2016], a faster and more effcient implementation of gradient boosting
machine [Friedman, 2001, Natekin and Knoll, 2013]. XGBoost is an especially
powerful, non-parametric ensemble method that is able to capture non-linear, interactive dynamics among the predictive covariates. I use a combination of 10-fold
cross-validation and grid search to separately fne-tune the hyper-parameters of XGBoost (the number of trees, the tree depth, and the learning rate) to the imputed
dataset. The results are reported in Figure 5.1. I then select the three best confgurations of XGBoost learners and include them in my comparative analysis of
algorithmic performance.
The evaluation result in Figure 5.2 shows that XGBoost is the most powerful
predictive algorithm for this replication dataset. Generalized additive model and
regularized regression, including both lasso and ridge regression, come in a close
second, followed by linear regression of varying degrees of fexibility. The random
forest technique registers a surprisingly disappointing performance. This comparative evaluation suggests that the predictive accuracy in the analysis by Hill and
Jones [2014] could be further improved, using a more effective supervised machine learning algorithm. I thus adopt the best confguration of XGBoost for my
predictive analysis of state repression in the following section.
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XGBoost configurations by (mean, min, and max) cross−validated MSE in predicting state repression
Super Learner
XGB_2000_4_0.01_All
XGB_1000_3_0.05_All
XGB_500_4_0.05_All
XGB_500_5_0.05_All
XGB_1000_5_0.05_All
XGB_500_3_0.05_All
XGB_2000_5_0.01_All
XGB_2000_5_0.05_All
XGB_1000_4_0.01_All
XGB_500_4_0.1_All
XGB_1000_4_0.05_All
Discrete SL
XGB_500_3_0.1_All
XGB_500_5_0.1_All
XGB_1000_5_0.01_All
XGB_2000_3_0.01_All
XGB_1000_5_0.1_All
XGB_2000_4_0.05_All
XGB_2000_5_0.1_All
XGB_2000_3_0.05_All
XGB_2000_6_0.01_All
XGB_1000_6_0.05_All
XGB_1000_3_0.01_All
XGB_500_6_0.1_All
XGB_2000_6_0.05_All
XGB_1000_6_0.1_All
XGB_1000_4_0.1_All
XGB_2000_6_0.1_All
XGB_500_6_0.05_All
XGB_2000_4_0.1_All
XGB_1000_3_0.1_All
XGB_500_4_0.01_All
XGB_2000_7_0.1_All
XGB_1000_6_0.01_All
XGB_1000_7_0.1_All
XGB_500_7_0.1_All
XGB_2000_7_0.05_All
XGB_1000_7_0.05_All
XGB_500_7_0.05_All
XGB_500_5_0.01_All
XGB_2000_8_0.1_All
XGB_1000_8_0.1_All
XGB_500_8_0.1_All
XGB_2000_7_0.01_All
XGB_500_3_0.01_All
XGB_2000_8_0.05_All
XGB_1000_8_0.05_All
XGB_500_8_0.05_All
XGB_2000_3_0.1_All
XGB_1000_7_0.01_All
XGB_2000_8_0.01_All
XGB_500_6_0.01_All
XGB_1000_8_0.01_All
XGB_500_7_0.01_All
XGB_500_8_0.01_All
0.026

0.028

0.030

0.032

Fig. 5.1.: Predictive performance of different XGBoost confgurations via ten-fold
cross-validation with Super Learner.
Algorithms by cross−validated MSE in predicting state repression

Super Learner
XGBoost 500_4_0.05
XGBoost 2000_4_0.01
Discrete Super Learner
Generalized additive model
XGBoost 1000_3_0.05
XGBoost (default)
Linear model with lasso
Ridge regression
Linear model
Polynomial spline regression
Local regression
Random forest
Conditional random forest
0.03

0.04

0.05

Fig. 5.2.: Predictive performance of different algorithms by ten-fold cross-validated
MSE in predicting human rights protection score.

5.2.3

Predictive power of covariates

Figure 5.3 reports the predictive power of each covariate measured in terms of
how much its inclusion reduces the RMSE of each of the four baseline models. First,
for the baseline model that has only GDP per capita and population size, the most
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important covariates, in descending order of predictive power, are the youth population, the number of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the country, civil war, democracy, competitiveness of political participation,
state reliance on oil revenues, constraints on the executive, and trade openness.
Each of these covariates increases the predictive power of the baseline model by
somewhere between 10% and 20% on average. Overall, this is roughly consistent
with the fndings by Hill and Jones [2014, 674] in their Figure 2 and especially
Figure 7 although the ranks of specifc covariates are slightly different.
Second, when the baseline model further includes civil war, the RMSE reduction
when adding each covariate becomes smaller, indicating lesser predictive power of
additional variables. In addition to democracy and its three individual components
(constraints on the executive, competitiveness of political participation, and openness in executive recruitment), only three other variables can reduce the RMSE of
the baseline model by more than 10% on average: the youth population, international NGOs, and state reliance on oil resources. Nevertheless, the most predictive
covariates are relatively consistent across the frst two predictive analyses.
Third, once I have the lagged dependent variable in the baseline model, the
predictive performance of this baseline model does not change very much when
additional covariates are included. In fact, only two covariates signifcantly reduce
the RMSE of the third baseline model: the youth population and the number of
international NGOs. Although Hill and Jones [2014] do not conduct a predictive
analysis with the third baseline model when state repression is measured in human
rights protection score, they reach a similar conclusion that the lagged dependent
variable basically “dampens the predictive power that other covariates add to the
model” and they interpret this fnding as supporting the argument that “the governments can become habituated to the use of violence to resolve political confict”
[Hill and Jones, 2014, 674].
Finally, the “jackknife” predictive models that I introduce further underscore the
limited power of individual covariates in predicting state repression. The only vari-
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Variable importance: reduction ratio in RMSE
IMF Struc. Adj.
HRO Shaming (lag)
International War
WB Struct. Adj.
WB/IMF Struc. Adj.
Common Law
PTA w/ HR Clause
Court Decision Final
Military Regime
Fair Trial
CAT
AI Press (lag)
ICCPR
Western Media Shaming (lag)
Executive Recruit Open
FDI
Public Trial
British Colony
Judicial Independence
AI Background (lag)
Left Executive
Executive Recruit Competition
Legislative Approval
log Trade/GDP
Executive Constraints
log Oil Rents
Participation Competition
Polity
Civil War
log INGOs
Youth Budge

Variable importance: reduction ratio in RMSE
International War
IMF Struc. Adj.
HRO Shaming (lag)
WB Struct. Adj.
WB/IMF Struc. Adj.
AI Press (lag)
Common Law
PTA w/ HR Clause
Western Media (lag)
Court Decision Final
AI Background (lag)
Military Regime
CAT
Fair Trial
FDI
ICCPR
Public Trial
British Colony
Executive Open
Legislative Approval
Left Executive
Judicial Independence
log Trade/GDP
Executive Competition
log Oil Rents
Participation Competition
Polity
Executive Constraint
log INGOs
Youth Budge

0.80

0.85

0.90

0.95

1.00

0.80

0.85

(a)

0.95

1.00

(b)

Variable importance: reduction ratio in RMSE
HRO Shaming lag
International War
Common Law
WB Struct. Adj.
Fair Trial
ICCPR
Left Executive
Court Decision Final
AI Press lag
IMF Struc. Adj.
PTA w/ HR Clause
WB/IMF Struc. Adj.
CAT
British Colony
Judicial Independence
Military Regime
Western Media lag
Public Trial
Legislative Approval
Civil War
Executive Open
Executive Competition
AI Background lag
Participation Competition
Executive Constraint
log Oil Rents
FDI
Polity
log Trade/GDP
log INGOs
Youth Budge
0.92

0.90

Variable importance: reduction ratio in RMSE
FDI
HRO Shaming (lag)
IMF Struc. Adj.
Executive Recruit Open
Executive Recruit Competition
International War
WB/IMF Struc. Adj.
Western Media Shaming (lag)
Left Executive
WB Struct. Adj.
AI Press (lag)
AI Background (lag)
CAT
Military Regime
PTA w/ HR Clause
British Colony
Common Law
Public Trial
Court Decision Final
ICCPR
Fair Trial
Polity
Executive Constraints
log Oil Rents
Judicial Independence
Legislative Approval
Participation Competition
log Trade/GDP
log INGOs
GDP per capita
Youth Budge
Population size
Civil War

0.94

0.96

(c)

0.98

1.00

1.02

0.90

0.95

1.00

1.05

(d)

Fig. 5.3.: Predictive power of covariates measured by the reduction ratios from the
baseline model’s root-mean-squared error (RMSE) with bootstrap-based (B = 500)
95% confdence intervals when a covariate is added to the baseline model. The
predictive algorithm is XGBoost with fne-tuned hyper-parameters. The predicted
outcome is state repression measured in Fariss human rights protection score. Four
different baseline models: (a) GDP per capita and population size; (b) GDP per
capita, population size, and civil war; (c) GDP per capita, population size, and
lagged dependent variable; and (d) “jackknife” baseline model with all covariates
except for the one whose predictive power is being estimated.
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able that has any signifcant predictive power is civil war, reducing the RMSE of its
corresponding baseline model by about 9%. No other covariates consistently adds
any predictive power even though the youth population comes in a close second,
increasing its baseline model’s predictive performance by about 5% on average.
In summary, based on the results across different predictive models, one can
roughly divide covariates predicting state repression into three tiers of predictive
importance. The frst tier includes the youth population, the number of international NGOs, and possibly civil war. The second tier includes democracy and its
various components, GDP per capita, and trade openness. The rest of the covariates, including constitutional settings and other time-invariant covariates, are not
reliably signifcant in predicting state repression. It should be reiterated that, other
than Hill and Jones [2014], few other studies have adopted the algorithmic modeling approach [Breiman, 2001a] to examine the predictive power of covariates that
correlate with state repression. By employing a more effective algorithm to improve
upon the study by Hill and Jones [2014], my replication presents fndings about important predictors of state repression that are likely more accurate, informative, and
reliable.
Substantial changes in the predictive power of covariates in the presence of the
lagged dependent variable or when all other covariates are already in the baseline
model are not particularly surprising. If there is indeed a self-perpetuating dynamics in state repression, the prediction results suggest that the causal impact of
these covariates could vary, perhaps signifcantly, from their predictive power. More
broadly, there are some reservations with respect to the adequacy of a predictive
analysis of state repression.
First, unlike coeffcient estimates from a linear regression model, for example,
measures of variable importance in terms of cross-validated reduction in RMSE or in
marginal permutation importance [Hill and Jones, 2014, 668–669] do not have an
immediately clear substantive interpretation. It is not obvious how the predictive
power estimates can be interpreted in terms of concrete real-world implications.
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They may facilitate a thoughtful discussion as Hill and Jones [2014, 677] have
about the measurements of certain underlying theoretical constructs and the implications for research, but measures of predictive power remain of limited utility.
Most importantly, predictive power does not necessarily imply any useful insights
about possible interventions for desired changes in the outcome, which is ultimately
what we care about in our scientifc research.
Second, the most important reason a predictive analysis is not adequate is that
its fndings do not have a causal interpretation and thus cannot provide a directly
useful basis for policy-making decisions. For that, one has to transition from a predictive analysis to a causal analysis, predicting how the outcome would change if
we could intervene on a predictive covariate. In other words, the object of inquiry
is not the observational distribution of the outcome but rather its interventional
distribution. Aside from other practical concerns about policy implementation, any
proposed policy change or intervention has to address the question as to how much,
for example, state repression will be reduced if the values of a covariate are intervened upon and externally modifed. My causal analysis provides some answers to
that question by estimating the causal effects of all time-varying predictive covariates when they are switched from their observed minimum values to their observed
maximum values.

5.3

Causal Model of State Repression

5.3.1

Model formulation and causal identifcation

Estimating causal effects from observational data always assumes some concrete knowledge about the underlying causal system, which I will make explicit in
the form of a directed acyclic graph. To formulate a model of this system, I frst
categorize the large number of predictors in Hill and Jones [2014, 670] into a set
of time-invariant covariates W and another set of time-varying covariates. I focus
on the latter set for the practical reason that they tend to be more amenable to a
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policy change or intervention. Among the time-varying covariates, I further divide
them into contemporaneous predictors At and the lagged predictors Xt−1 as in the
original study. The predictors Xt−1 include the number of Amnesty International
background reports, Amnesty International press releases, Western media shaming,
and human rights NGOs shaming. These variables “are all lagged by one year” [Hill
and Jones, 2014, 670] based on the justifcation that international shaming might
possibly have an impact on state practices in the following year.
Following the recommendations by Hill and Jones [2014, 676–679], I omit the
civil war covariate, the Polity measure of democracy, and its two competition component indicators due to their measurement issues. Specifcally, measures of the
concept of civil war likely pick up noncombatant casualties from the use of lethal
violence, thus overlapping with the outcome measure of state repression. Measures
of the competition components in the Polity dataset also overlap with measures of
government repression as well [Hill, 2016b]. Including these variables would lead
to a partially tautological causal model. The entire set of covariates in my causal
analysis are summarized in Table 5.2.
A structural causal model that purports to represent an underlying causal system
expressed is simply a collection of functions that generate the values of the variables
in the model [Peters et al., 2017, 33–39]. I then further express the structural model
using the directed acyclic graph (DAG) in Figure 5.4. In a DAG, each variable is
denoted by a node and its values are strictly a function of its parent nodes and
an error term where the parent nodes are the variables that have a direct causal
infuence on it [Elwert, 2013, Pearl, 2009a]. A direct causal infuence is graphically
represented by a direct arrow or edge from the parent node to the child node. DAGs
are also acyclic because within the same temporal period, there are no directed
paths (arrows or a sequence of arrows that have the same direction) going from
one node to itself.
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Table 5.2.: State repression model variables
Sets

Variables from Hill and Jones [2014]

W

Constitutional provisions for a fair trial.
Constitutional provisions for a public trial.
Constitutional provisions for fnal decisions by constitutional courts.
Constitutional provisions for legislative approval of liberties suspension.
Common law legal system.
Former British colony.

At

Demographics:
Population size.
Youth population.
Macroeconomic factors:
GDP per capita.
Oil revenue per capita.
Violent confict:
International war.
Political institutions:
Military regime.
Left/right regime.
Executive constraints.
Executive recruitment openness.
Domestic legal institutions:
De facto judicial independence.
International law:
ICCPR ratifcation.
CAT ratifcation.
International economic factors:
Trade openness.
Foreign direct investment.
Structural adjustment programs (World Bank and IMF).
Preferential trade agreements with human rights clauses.
Civil society/INGOs:
INGO presence.

Xt−1

Civil society/INGOs:
Amnesty International background reports (lagged).
Amnesty International press releases (lagged).
Western media shaming (lagged).
Human rights organization shaming (lagged).

Yt

Human rights protection latent score [Fariss, 2014].
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In our case, for example, the state repression variable at time t is Yt and its
values are generated as a function of its parent nodes P AYt and an error term. That
is, the generative function for the outcome variable is Yt = fY (P AYt , UY ). The set of
parent nodes of Yt are P AYt = {W, Yt−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 , A1t , A2t } where W are timeinvariant covariates, Yt−1 is the lagged dependent variable, and all X1t−1 , X2t−1 ,
A1t , and A2t are the lagged and contemporaneous covariates. To create a clear
causal graph, I do not include the nodes W and, without loss of generality, I only
represent two lagged predictors (X1 and X2) and two contemporaneous predictors
(A1 and A2). The generative function fY as well as the generative functions for all
other variables are assumed to work consistently across temporal environments.
While I make no assumptions about the form of any generative functions f ’s
for any variables, my causal model nonetheless makes several assumptions as follows. First, I assume the underlying joint probability distribution of state repression and its predictors are Markov and faithful to the causal DAG, ensuring a
one-to-one interchangeability and consistency between the distribution and the
causal graph [Peters et al., 2017, 101–109]. The Markov and faithfulness assumptions mean that any conditional independencies in the probability distribution are
encoded in the DAG and vice versa. As a result, conditional independencies in
the distribution can be read off directly from the DAG, using the concept of dseparation [Pearl et al., 2016, 45-48]. For example, conditional on the set of its
parent nodes P AYt = {W, Yt−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 , A1t , A2t }, Yt is independent from its
non-descendant nodes such as A1t−1 , A2t−1 , and Yt−2 , that is, those variables that
do not lie on a directed path emanating from Yt . The importance of the Markov and
faithfulness assumptions is that they connect the underlying distribution with the
DAG and allow us to use graphical tools such as the backdoor criterion to establish
identifability and conduct effcient computation of causal effects.
Second, I assume the error terms of the generative functions in my structural
causal model are jointly independent. Graphically, it means, for example, there are
no hidden nodes that simultaneously cause the dependent variable Yt and any of
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the predictive covariates Xt−1 and At . The assumption of joint independence of the
error terms is equivalent to the no omitted variable bias assumption, which can only
be justifed based on the domain knowledge in the current literature. Absent some
form of randomization, there are no empirical methods that can use observational
data alone to guarantee the validity of this assumption. The role of causal graphs is
to help make this assumption as well as its justifcation explicit and transparent.
Third, following Dı́az et al. [2015, 6], I assume time-varying covariates during
the same time period such as A1t and A2t do not mutually cause each other. This
assumption is necessary because otherwise no causal effects would be identifable.
This assumption is not as restrictive as it might seem since each time-varying covariate is allowed to causally infuence every other time-varying covariate in the
next time period. For example, trade openness is assumed not to directly cause
foreign direct investment (FDI) during the same year but it could easily increase or
decrease the net fow of FDI in the following year.
To avoid cluttering the causal graph, I consider but do not represent the edges
X1t−1 → X2t and X2t−1 → X1t in Figure 5.4. Adding these edges increases the
fexibility of the causal model, but does not change any adjustment sets for causal
identifcation. One should not assume that these potential causal links do not exist.
Substantively, these arrows allow for the possibility that, for instance, NGOs reporting of human rights violations at time t − 1 could be the basis for media shaming
and Amnesty International’s advocacy at time t.
Given these causal assumptions, I now briefy justify the topology of the causal
DAG in Figure 5.4. In essence, a graphical model like this instills our knowledge and
assumptions about the underlying, unobservable causal process. Most importantly,
the directed arrows connecting the variables refect our understanding about how
the causal process unfolds. A description of these causal arrows in substantive
terms therefore should look relatively reasonable and justifable for people who are
familiar with the literature.
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Fig. 5.4.: A dynamic graphical causal model with shaded blocks indicating temporal periods. Time-invariant covariates W , assumed to affect all other covariates,
are not represented. The same suffcient adjustment set to identify both the causal
effects of A1t → Yt and A2t → Yt is ZA = {W, Yt−1 , A1t−1 , A2t−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 }.
The suffcient adjustment sets to identify the causal effects of X1t−1 → Yt and
X2t−1 → Yt are, respectively, ZX1 = {W, Yt−1 , A1t−1 , A2t−1 , X2t−1 } and ZX2 =
{W, Yt−1 , A1t−1 , A2t−1 , X1t−1 }.

First, given the panel data structure of the replication dataset, I allow the value
of a time-varying covariate at time t − 1 to affect its value at time t. This is represented by all the arrows Yt−1 → Yt , At−1 → At , Xt−1 → Xt , and so forth.
Second, state repression and human rights violations can have all kinds of effects
on the predictive covariates in the following time period. Notationally, Yt−1 → A1t
and Yt−1 → A2t . State repression, for instance, could erode democracy, undermine
domestic political and legal institutions, restrict the space and presence of civil society, and even lead to international economic sanctions and other repercussions.
State repression could certainly provoke condemnations, criticisms, and international shaming during the same year as well, which is represented by the arrows
Yt → X1t and Yt → X2t .
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Third, the direct arrows from all At to all Xt refect the recognition that international shaming by the media, civil society, and human rights NGOs in response
to human rights violations does not happen in a vacuum. Rather, it could depend
on the specifcities of a particular country such as its political and legal institutions, macroeconomic conditions, and international economic factors. These arrows also represent the argument by Simmons [2009] and others that one of the
key mechanisms through which the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture (CAT) infuence state behavior
is by facilitating NGOs mobilization (At−1 → Xt−1 ) to pressure state offcials for
human rights protection (Xt−1 → Yt ).
Finally, the causal effects I am estimating are those of time-varying covariates,
both lagged (X1t−1 → Yt and X2t−1 → Yt ) and instantaneous (A1t → Yt and
A2t → Yt ). To compute these causal effects, I intervene to set the value of each
covariate at zero (its observed minimum value) and one (its observed maximum
value) and compute the difference between the means of the two interventional
outcome distributions. To do that with observational data, we need to translate the
interventional distributions back into the observational distribution by making them
essentially equivalent, using suffcient adjustment sets of covariates [Peters et al.,
2017, 109–118]. These adjustment sets are identifed by applying the backdoor
criterion [Pearl et al., 2016, 61–66] to the graphical causal model in Figure 5.4. The
causal identifcation via covariate adjustment suggests that the same adjustment
set ZA = {W, Yt−1 , A1t−1 , A2t−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 } can be used to identify the causal
effects of A1t → Yt and A2t → Yt . Two separate adjustment sets suffcient to
identify the causal effects of X1t−1 → Yt and X2t−1 → Yt are, respectively, ZX1 =
{W, Yt−1 , A1t−1 , A2t−1 , X2t−1 } and ZX2 = {W, Yt−1 , A1t−1 , A2t−1 , X1t−1 }.
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5.3.2

Causal power of covariates

Once we have determined the suffcient adjustment sets for identifying the causal

P 
effects, I use the substitution estimator τ̂ = n1 ni=1 Qn (1, Z) − Qn (0, Z) to com



pute the causal effect τA = E Yt |do(At = 1) − E Yt |do(At = 0) of a contemporane



ous covariate A and the causal effect τX = E Yt |do(Xt−1 = 1) − E Yt |do(Xt−1 = 0)
of a lagged covariate X [Robins, 1986, Robins et al., 1999]. The do-operator indicates an intervention to fx the value of a treatment. In this estimator, Qn is a
predictive model of state repression and Z is the corresponding suffcient adjustment set. Key to the consistency of this estimator is the ability of Qn to closely
approximate the function Yt = fY (·) that generates the outcome values.
In terms of implementation, for each covariate Xt−1 and At , I ft two XGBoost
predictive model of state repression (with previously fne-tuned hyper-parameters),
setting the value of the treatment covariate alternately at one and zero and compute
the mean difference of the predicted outcomes. The major difference between using
an XGBoost predictive model for causal effect estimation and for predictive power
estimation previously is that this time, rather than an relatively arbitrary baseline
model, I use the adjustment set Z that is deemed suffcient for the purpose of causal
identifcation. If the causal assumptions are satisfed, this will enable us to give our
effect estimates a causal interpretation. For variance estimation, I similarly generate
nonparametric bootstrap datasets (B = 500) and derive the quantiles-based 95%
confdence intervals. The causal effect estimates are graphically summarized in
Figure 5.5.
For ease of interpretation and comparison, I have standardized the human rights
outcome measure into a bounded range between zero (lowest protection of human
rights) and one (highest protection of human rights). The results indicate some
divergence between the predictive power and the causal power of most covariates.
While many covariates are predictive of state repression, at least marginally, most
do not have any consequential causal impact at all. Only three variables have any
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Causal effects of covariates on human rights protection
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Fig. 5.5.: Causal effects of time-varying covariates on state repression when switching from their observed minimum to observed maximum values with bootstrap (B
= 500) quantiles-based 95% confdence intervals. Outcome measures are standardized into a bounded 0–1 range, including (a) Fariss human rights protection score
with higher scores indicating greater respect for human rights; (b) CIRI physical integrity rights with higher scores indicating better rights protection; and (c) Political
Terror Scale with higher scores indicating worse repression.

signifcant causal power to improve human rights protection, including GDP per
capita, international shaming on the Western media, and domestic judicial independence. Even then, their causal impact is quite limited. Each of them increases
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human rights protection by less than two percentage points on average. This fnding is certainly disappointing, but it is important to be clear-eyed about the heroic
challenge of promoting and protecting human rights.
I apply the same estimation procedure to two other human rights outcome measures, including the CIRI indicators of physical integrity rights and the PTS scores.
Emerging from this additional effect estimation is the marginally negative impact of
international war and the positive causal infuence of trade openness. Most important, though, is the consistent effect of judicial independence in improving protection of physical integrity rights by 5.2 percentage points and reducing the level of
political terror by 3.4 percentage points on average. There are some similar fndings
in the literature about the role of an effective domestic court system in preventing
torture [Powell and Staton, 2009], particularly the easily detectable forms of torture practices [Conrad et al., 2018], because of its ability to impose higher costs on
abusive leaders.
In summary, the fndings of my predictive and causal analyses seem to overlap
somewhat with respect to the marginally important role of economic development
and trade openness in improving human rights protection. Other than that, a causal
analysis overturns some of the conclusions from previous predictive analyses about
the importance of the youth population, international NGOs, and even some components of democracy such as constraints on the executive and openness of executive recruitment. Instead, judicial independence emerges as the most consistently
impactful covariate. Permutation importance measures from random forest predictions in Hill and Jones [2014] back up this conclusion although their fndings
are not supposed to have any causal interpretation. The implications for the cause
of human rights protection are nonetheless to focus on boosting economic development, promoting international trade participation, intensifying the scrutiny by
the international media, and protecting the independence and effectiveness of the
domestic court system.
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5.4

Partial Diagnostics of Causal Model
Causal effect estimation using observational data requires prior causal knowl-

edge about the underlying data-generating system, which can be assumed implicitly or represented explicitly in the form of a causal DAG. Either way, one of the
questions that almost always arises is whether this causal knowledge is empirically
accurate. More concretely, in the absence of a clearly exogenous variation in the
predictor values, how can it be guaranteed that there is no omitted variable bias
that could threaten causal inference? As I have claimed previously, there are simply no empirical methods that can properly address this concern and researchers
have to rely on the domain knowledge to justify their models of the causal process. Matching methods, for example, often include a coterie of balance tests and
diagnostic tools to assess how well the covariates are balanced across the treatment
and control groups. However, one can only compare the balance before and after
the matching process in the observed variables and still has to assume that all the
unobserved covariates are somehow balanced as well.
Given the ultimately unverifable nature of this causal assumption, in this section
I nonetheless apply a heuristic to assess our confdence as to whether there are any
missing causal determinants of state repression. Any confounders that can create
omitted variable bias are necessarily a subset of this set of direct causes of state
repression. Specifcally, I rely on a recent methodological development in the causal
discovery literature known as invariant causal prediction [Peters et al., 2016] to
inform this diagnostics.
The invariant causal prediction method is inspired by a key insight of the structural causal model framework known as invariance [Pearl, 2009a, 22–26]. The
invariance principle states that “the conditional distribution of the target variable
of interest (which is often also termed the ‘response variable’), given the complete
set of corresponding direct causal predictors, must remain identical under interventions on variables other than the target variable itself” [Peters et al., 2016, 948].
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For example, assuming a generative function for state repression Y = fY (P AY , UY )
that works consistently across different environments and an environmental variable E that is neither a parent nor a descendant of Y [Peters et al., 2016, 960], if the
parental set (that is, the direct causes) of state repression P AY is complete—which
implies no omitted variable bias—then the conditional independency Y ⊥
⊥ E|P AY
should stay invariant across all environments.
The ingenuity of the invariant causal prediction method is that it exploits this
invariance principle to test all possible sets of predictive covariates in order to derive
⊥
sets of plausible causal predictors XS that satisfy the invariance requirement Y e ⊥
E|XSe for all e ∈ E. In essence, it reduces the problem of causal discovery to one
of testing for statistical conditional independence across multiple sets of covariates
XS . Based on this method and making no assumptions about the functional form
of the generative function fY , I use the time indices as the environmental variable
[Heinze-Deml et al., 2017, 6] and XGBoost as a nonlinear prediction algorithm in
the following diagnostic procedure [Pfster et al., 2017, 7].5
1. Use XGBoost to predict Ŷt = fY (P AYt ) from the pooled data where the theoretically informed parent set is P AYt = {W, Yt−1 , X1t−1 , X2t−1 , A1t , A2t }.
2. Compute the scaled residuals Rn = (r1 , . . . , rn ). Assuming XGBoost approximates the generative function fY , Rn should be approximately independent
and identically distributed.
3. Conduct pairwise permutation tests for independence between the temporal
environment variable E (the time indices) and the scaled residuals Rn .
The diagnostic results are reported in Figure 5.6. They indicate that the residuals are roughly normally distributed with slightly more observations around the
zero mean. Importantly, the pairwise permutation tests indicate a clear degree of
5

I should reiterate my preference in favor of the Fariss human rights protection score as the outcome
measure here for the reason that it accounts for the changing standards of human rights accountability and thus removes a potential correlation between the temporal environment variable E and
the outcome Y .
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Histogram of XGBoost−predicted scaled residuals
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Fig. 5.6.: Diagnostics of scaled residuals from causal invariant prediction of state
repression measured in Fariss human rights protection score: (a) a histogram of
scaled residuals from XGBoost causal prediction; (b) a box-plot of scaled residuals
by year; (c) logged unadjusted p-values from pairwise permutation tests of XGBoost
causal prediction residuals across temporal environments (years) with the horizontal line at log(0.05) = −3; and (d) logged adjusted p-values from pairwise permutation tests with Benjamini & Hochberg adjustment to control the false discovery
rate.
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independence between the environmental variable and the scaled residuals with
only six unadjusted p-values smaller than 0.05 out of 153 comparisons. Once I use
the Benjamini–Hochberg adjustment to control the false discovery rate [Benjamini
and Hochberg, 1995], all adjusted p-values are signifcantly larger than the conventional threshold of statistical signifcance. This suggests that, conditional on the
set of parental predictive covariates, the distribution of state repression does not
change across temporal environments. We are therefore more confdent that there
are no omitted variables that causally infuence state repression.
The invariant causal prediction method is certainly much more ambitious than
my application. It aims to learn the underlying causal structure with a statistical
guarantee. For our case, though, this is not possible just yet given that the problem
of testing all possible subsets from the set of covariates theoretically identifed as
potentially direct causal factors of state repression is of O(2p ) complexity and exponential in computational time. The promise of learning the underlying causal structure from observational data remains extremely challenging to fulfll, but it also
represents a huge potential for methodological advances [Pearl, 2009a, Spirtes and
Zhang, 2016, Mooij et al., 2016, Eberhardt, 2017]. After all, uncovering the underlying causal structure is not just the inverse of the better known task of estimating
causal effects. It actually goes to the foundation of making causal inference from
observational data by providing an empirical basis for the assumed data-generating
process that underlies any causal effect estimation.

5.5

Conclusion
This chapter revisits the question of what causes state repression from two

methodological approaches: algorithmic prediction and causal inference. I frst
replicate part of a previous predictive analysis by Hill and Jones [2014], using the
more recent and effective learning algorithm of XGBoost. The fndings that this
machine learning prediction-based approach produces suggests three key variables
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that are generally most predictive of state repression, including the youth budge in
the population, the number of human rights NGOs, and civil war. They are followed
by democracy, economic development, and trade openness as the next tier of the
most predictive covariates. The rest of other covariates under examination do not
have much predictive power over state repression.
I then take the causal inference approach, converting my predictive analysis into
a causal analysis and examining the causal determinants of state repression. The results of the causal analysis overlap somewhat with those of the predictive analysis,
both of which underscore the critical role of economic development and international trade participation in reducing state repression. But there are also clear differences between the two analyses. The fndings from the causal analysis describe a
more challenging situation for human rights defenders and anyone who cares about
preventing state repression. It also highlights the importance of an independent domestic court system as the most consistently signifcant factor in improving human
rights protection. Only two other variables that have some causal power to reduce
state repression are economic development and international shaming by human
rights NGOs.
Methodologically, there are important tradeoffs between different approaches.
The algorithmic prediction-based approach is more straightforward and does not
need to make many assumptions about the underlying data-generating process. Its
fndings, however, are only suggestive at best and less applicable for the purpose of
assisting policy-making decisions. The causal inference approach produces fndings
that have a causal interpretation and, by implications, are more directly useful.
However, it has to rely on a set of causal assumptions, many of which are not
empirically testable.
The third approach, lesser known in social sciences but also arguably very promising, is to examine questions like state repression from the perspective of causal discovery, particularly using the invariant causal prediction method. Unfortunately,
this method is still not computationally feasible for my application. For now, how-
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ever, I nonetheless rely on the insights from this method to develop a diagnostic
procedure that can help evaluate whether a set of potential direct causes of state
repression is complete and, by corollary, whether there is any potential omitted variable bias. Empirical researchers should keep a close watch on further developments
in this method and, more generally, on advances in the feld of causal discovery and
causal structure learning.
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6. CONCLUSION
For the last two decades, Judea Pearl’s graph-based structural causal model (SCM)
framework has gradually revolutionized his core feld of artifcial intelligence and
computer science and had transformative ripple effects on many other disciplines
such as philosophy, psychology, and epidemiology. My dissertation adopts and applies his monumental work on causality to international relations research. In each
of the previous four empirical chapters, I combine machine learning and the SCM
framework to investigate the causal determinants, causal mechanisms, and causal
impacts of major United Nations (UN) human rights treaties as well as the causes
of human rights violations. This conclusion chapter will briefy review the substantive premise of each empirical chapter; explain how the machine learning-based
causal inference approach contributes to answering the research questions and provides new insights into the substantive debates in the literature; and summarize the
benefts, tradeoffs, and implications of this new methodological approach.
The substantive premise of Chapter 2 is the ongoing and still unresolved debate
in the literature about why states commit to human rights treaties. Many theories of treaty ratifcation have been proposed, but political scientists have not yet
come to any consensus as to which factors are most important in explaining human rights treaty ratifcation. Is it international socialization and the pressure of
normative conformity? Do states commit to universal human rights treaties in exchange for foreign aid, international investment, and preferential trade agreements
as the instrumental approach to treaty ratifcation suggests? Are democratic domestic institutions the most important factors? Furthermore, there are other theories
that explain treaty ratifcation as an interactive function of democracy, prior treaty
compliance records, and the existence of multiple political parties.
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My research in this chapter weighs in on this unresolved debate in the literature. It applies a new methodological framework to conduct a causal variable
importance test of three major theoretical approaches to treaty ratifcation. Because each theoretical approach proposes a different set of covariates as the most
important determinants of treaty ratifcation, my test strategy is to directly assess,
evaluate, and compare the causal effects of these theoretically informed covariates.
Specifcally, I employ the graph-based SCM framework and the ensemble prediction
method of Super Learner to estimate the causal effects of multiple determinants of
state ratifcations in the case of three UN human rights treaties on civil and political
rights (the ICCPR), women’s rights (the CEDAW), and the right not to be tortured
(the CAT).
The results tell us about the most important factors that cause states to ratify these three human rights treaties and provide an empirical basis to adjudicate
among different theories of treaty ratifcation. The fndings indicate that among the
covariates, the density of regional ratifcation turns out to be the single most consistent and the second most causally important predictor across all three human rights
treaties. These causal fndings strongly support the norms-based theories of treaty
ratifcation in the literature. In contrast, given the limited causal relevance of economic factors such as economic development, international trade participation, and
offcial development assistance, my causal analysis casts doubt on the instrumental
explanations that focus on the economic rationale of treaty ratifcation.
One of the other key results is that democracy is the most causally important
variable for the ratifcation of the ICCPR and the CEDAW. In fact, having a democratic regime causes the probability of being a state party to the ICCPR and the
CEDAW to go up by 23.7 and 11.6 percentage points, respectively. For the CAT
ratifcation, however, it is not democracy per se that has a signifcant causal impact.
Rather it is the de facto existence of multiple political parties that raises the probability of ratifcation by 19.2 percentage points on average. However, other domestic
institutional factors such as regime transitions and judicial independence have no
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signifcant causal impact on state commitment to human rights treaties. In addition,
I estimate the causal effect of democracy conditional on prior compliance records
as well as the causal effect of prior compliance records conditional on democratic
regime. Contrary to many theoretical expectations in the literature, I fnd no signifcant negative causal impact by either of these two factors on treaty ratifcation.
Overall, my causal analysis offers very mixed support for the institutional approach
to treaty ratifcation.
In short, the machine learning-based SCM framework enables researchers to
construct reasonable causal models based on suffcient background knowledge and
then conduct robust causal effect estimation. My research in chapter 2 uses the ongoing debate about treaty commitment as its substantive premise, recasts theoretically predictive variables as causal determinants of treaty ratifcation, and applies
a new methodological framework to fexibly estimate the causal effects of these
variables. These causal effect estimates offer a direct test of multiple theories of
treaty commitment from a causal inference perspective, advancing our understanding about the causes of human rights treaties.
Judea Pearl’s causality framework has also transformed how research questions about mediation are defned and answered. In Chapter 3, I present a machine learning-based causal mediation analysis of the same three UN human rights
treaties (ICCPR, CEDAW, and CAT) in the context of panel data structure, multiple
causally connected mediators, and no functional form assumptions. The substantive
premise of this chapter is a lack of any quantitative empirical evaluations of various
theories in the literature about the causal pathways of human rights treaties. In
fact, the existing literature has articulated multiple causal mechanisms that potentially transmit the effects of human rights treaties, including legislative constraints,
domestic judicial litigation and enforcement, political mobilization of civil society
organizations, and international socialization. Yet, there has never been a concrete
quantifcation of how much the causal effect of human rights treaties is actually
transmitted through these causal mechanisms.
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My examination of the literature suggests that this research gap remains because human rights researchers have not taken advantage of recent advances in
the causal inference literature to shed new lights on the causal mechanisms of human rights treaties. The causal mediation analysis in Chapter 3 flls in this gap
and, to the best of my knowledge, is the frst quantitative evaluation of the ways in
which international human rights treaties constrain and infuence state behaviors.
Methodologically, the empirical strategy of this chapter combines (a) the mediation
formula within the SCM framework, (b) the felicity of causal graphs in assisting
causal identifcation, and (c) the fexibility of the Super Learner prediction method
for robust estimation.
The substantive fndings indicate that all three human rights treaties have a
positive causal impact on human rights protection and promotion. Participating in
the ICCPR reduces state violations of physical integrity rights by 13.6 percentage
points on average while committing to the CAT leads to a more modest decrease of
government’s torture practices by about 7.7 percentage points. For the CEDAW, the
average causal effect of treaty participation is more substantial, enhancing women’s
political empowerment by 22 percentage points on average.
However, there is something concerning about the direct effects of the ICCPR
and the CAT, both of which actually lead to more torture and violations of physical
integrity rights. If all four causal mediators do not change their values in response to
treaty ratifcation, being a member of these two treaties exacerbates human rights
violations by 0.8 and 3.4 percentage points, respectively. The good news is, at the
same time each of these two treaties has a positive indirect causal effect that is
both statistically signifcant and substantively larger, averaging about 14.4 and 11
percentage points. CEDAW participation, on the other hand, improves women’s empowerment both directly and indirectly with its indirect causal impact being much
more substantial. The four causal pathways that I examine are jointly responsible for transmitting roughly 90% of the CEDAW’s total causal effect. Overall, my
causal mediation analysis underscores the importance of the causal mediators in
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transmitting human rights treaty effects. Without these causal mediators, which
include legislative constraints, domestic judicial litigation and enforcement, civil
society mobilization, and international socialization, all three human rights treaties
under examination here would lose most, if not all, of their positive causal impact.
Chapter 4 is substantively premised upon an oversight in the human rights literature with respect to the issue of treaty compliance monitoring. While the quantitative literature on human rights treaties contains a lot of studies that examine
the impact of UN human rights treaties as a whole, it rarely investigates the various forms and mechanisms of treaty compliance monitoring. I therefore focus on
the UN treaty on torture and unpack the ongoing monitoring practices under this
treaty into multiple monitoring procedures and compare the individual causal effect
of each monitoring procedure on human rights outcome.
Methodologically, this chapter presents a straightforward application of the machine learning-based SCM framework to a set of relatively new human rights institutions in the quantitative empirical literature. Specifcally, I use a causal graph
to assist causal identifcation and the targeted learning methodology for robust
estimation. Substantively, I estimate the causal effects of four treaty monitoring
procedures under the Convention against Torture (CAT) and its Optional Protocol
(OPCAT), including state reporting, inquiry, individual communication, and country visit. The results show that only the country visit procedure has a signifcant,
positive causal impact on human rights protection. Other monitoring procedures do
not. The differing causal effects, I argue, are a function of the varying intrusiveness
among the treaty monitoring procedures.
The fndings improve our understanding about the granular effectiveness of human rights treaties. Importantly, both my causal theory and the empirical fndings
suggest that more intrusive procedures tend to have a positive causal effect whereas
other less intrusive procedures do not. In terms of implications, one key strategy to
improve the effcacy of international human rights regimes is to design procedures
that are able to exercise intrusive monitoring and oversight over state compliance.
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Among the existing monitoring procedures, the country visit procedure and, to a
lesser extent, the individual complaint procedure are probably the most effective
protection mechanisms. Relatedly, ongoing efforts to reform the reporting procedures under the UN human rights treaty system should be directed towards designing more intrusive mechanisms. Otherwise, the current reporting system is unlikely
to have any positive impact and maybe even backfres. The causal fndings in this
chapter also have important implications for larger body of literature on the relationship between institutional design and institutional impact, providing one more
data point from a set of international institutions in the area of human rights.
Finally, Chapter 5 bridges the gap between algorithmic prediction and causal
inference in investigating the causes of state repression and human rights violations.
The substantive premise is to fnd out which factors are most predictive of state
violations of human rights, but also more substantively important, which factors
are causally relevant in preventing state repression. The obvious implication is that
the most causally important variables will be the best candidates to be intervened
upon to reduce state repression and enhance human rights protection.
Based on that substantive premise, I frst replicate part of a recent predictive
analysis, perhaps the frst one in the quantitative human rights literature. I use
the demonstrably more effective machine learning algorithm of extreme gradient
boosting to estimate the predictive power of covariates that, according to the literature, are associated with state repression. I then incorporate this prediction method
into the SCM framework to evaluate and compare the causal effects of these same
covariates. Finally, I present a new heuristic to partially diagnose my causal model
of the underlying data-generating process.
The fndings from the predictive analysis suggest three tiers of covariates in
terms of their ability to predict state repression. The frst one includes the youth
population, the number of international NGOs, and possibly civil war. The second
tier includes democracy and its various components, gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, and trade openness. The rest of the covariates that are examined, includ-
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ing constitutional settings and other time-invariant covariates, are not signifcantly
predictive of state repression.
There is a divergence, however, between the predictive power and the causal
power of most covariates under examination. While many covariates are predictive
of state repression, most do not have much causal impact. Only three of them have
the causal power to improve human rights protection, including GDP per capita,
international shaming on the Western media, and domestic judicial independence.
Even then, their causal impact is quite limited with each of them increasing human
rights protection by less than two percentage points on average.
I also apply the same causal effect estimation procedure, using two other measures of human rights outcome: the Cingranelli-Richards indicators of physical integrity rights and the Political Terror Scale scores. Emerging from these additional
causal analyses is the marginally negative impact of international war and the positive causal infuence of trade openness. Most important, though, is the consistent
effect of judicial independence in improving protection of physical integrity rights
by 5.2 percentage points and reducing the level of political terror by 3.4 percentage points on average. Overall, the results of both the predictive analysis and the
causal analysis are generally discouraging for the cause of human rights protection,
but they also identify the most impactful factors that can reduce and prevent state
repression, most likely including economic development, domestic judicial independence, and the naming and shaming by human rights NGOs.
The previous four empirical chapters of this dissertation combine to demonstrate
the great potential of a machine learning-based SCM framework. A more expanded
research agenda going forward could be to investigate a series of substantive questions in international relations and political science, using this new methodological
approach. Some of the questions I would like to revisit and investigate include:
• What are the causes of the freedom of the press and its consequences for the
protection and promotion of other human rights?
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• What are the causal determinants of state ratifcation and implementation of
the UN treaty and protocols on transnational human traffcking?
• What are the causes of domestic judicial independence and its consequences
for development and governance?; and
• What are the causes and (economic and political) consequences of international immigration?
To answer each of these questions and a countless number of other questions
in political and social sciences is to engage in a study of causation. At the most
fundamental and intuitive level, causation is defned as follows: a variable X is
a cause of variable Y “if Y in any way relies on X for its values” [Pearl et al.,
2016, 5]. Equivalently, if X is an input to the function that generates the values
of variable Y , then X is a direct cause of Y and “X is a cause of Y if it is a direct
cause of Y , or of any cause of Y ” [Pearl et al., 2016, 26]. Adopting this defnition
of causation means that I subscribe to a functional theory of causation, according
to which “causal relationships are expressed in the form of deterministic, functional
equations” [Pearl, 2009a, 26], for example, {X ← UX ; Y ← fy (X, UY )} where the
variables U s are exogenous variables and UX is independent of UY .
A collection of functional assignment equations is called a structural causal
model [Peters et al., 2017, 33–34] and its associated graphical representation is
called a graphical causal model or simply a causal graph. The critical role of structural causal model and graphical causal model is to describe the causal reality, also
known as the underlying causal structure, as we understand it. Causal structure is
the ultimate basis of any causal study because to study the causal effect is to study
the effect (or consequence) of an intervention on the causal structure.
The concept of intervention is most clearly understood in the context of a randomized controlled experiment where intervention is the act of assigning the treatment values and the causal analysis involves observing and analyzing what happens
under that intervention. In observational studies, there is no actual intervention and
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all the researchers have at their disposal is the observed data from the joint observational distribution. As a result, the researchers have to imagine the intervention
and what would happen under the intervention, that is, the interventional or counterfactual distribution of the outcome. They then have to attempt a one-to-one
translation from the imagined interventional or counterfactual distribution back to
the observational distribution. If that translation is reasonable and credible and the
interventional or counterfactual distribution can be expressed in terms of the observational distribution, then causal identifcation is said to be established. This means
that the causal effect is estimable and computable from the observational data. The
entire enterprise of identifcation is to fnd a way, using the front-door criterion or
the back-door criterion or an instrumental variable, etc., to link together the interventional/counterfactual distribution and the observational distribution and specify
the conditions under which such one-to-one mapping is possible.
Once it is determined that the effect of an intervention is estimable, different statistical methods can be used to actually compute the causal effect from the observed
data. To do that, these methods attempt an approximation of the functions that Nature uses to generate the values of the variables. In a SCM framework, these generative functions are represented by the generic function notation f ’s. Parametric
statistical models assume that we have accurate prior knowledge and information
about the forms of these functions. If that prior knowledge is accurate, parametric
models tend to perform well in estimating the target parameters that correspond
to the causal quantities of interest. In social science research, however, usually we
do not have concrete and credible knowledge about these functional forms. In that
case, an application of fexible machine learning methods will be preferable because
these methods do not depend as much on assumptions about the true functional
forms as parametric models do. Instead, a machine learning method adopts a performance metric (loss function) and then approximates the data-generating mechanisms through a trial-and-error process by optimizing its predictive performance

165
measured by the chosen performance metric. Machine learning-based estimation
therefore would likely produce more robust causal effects.
The above description is a summary of the machine learning-based causal inference approach that I adopt to study human rights and human rights treaty commitment and compliance. This approach adds value to political science research and
empirical scientifc research in general in a variety of ways. First, it offers a rigorous, yet intuitive, step-by-step workfow to make robust causal inference in applied
research. One of the key benefts of this approach is that it demystifes the entire
task of making causal inference. I believe the study of causality using machine
learning should be as accessible as possible to every researcher rather than being
the exclusive repertoire of a select group of academics sitting at the top echelon of
the scientifc community.
Second, my application of this methodological approach to the study of human
rights and human rights treaties hopefully introduces and further promotes the use
of the SCM framework in political science. The study of causality in the discipline
is still being dominated by the potential outcomes framework. Political scientists
not familiar with the SCM framework are thus being deprived of its benefts and
more scientifc progress might be delayed. It is worth noting, however, that the logical equivalence between these two frameworks has been frmly established [Pearl,
2009b] whereas the practical advantage of the SCM framework remains the subject of heated debates in the causal inference literature. There have been recent
attempts to unify these two approaches as well [Richardson and Robins, 2014].
Similar empirical research that applies the SCM framework could make important
contributions in and of itself while also offering useful application examples for
other researchers to consider and follow.
Third, my application of graphical causal models also underscores the crucial
importance of substantive domain knowledge in making causal inference. It should
not be a surprise that when one is trying to make causal inference using observational data, one becomes hyper-aware of the centrality of the subject matter knowl-

166
edge and insights from qualitative research. It is those qualitative domain expertise
that determines how one’s graphical causal model should look like and whether and
how the causal effect could be identifed and made computable from observational
data. As a result, adopting the SCM approach to causal inference more widely will
bring more fruitful interactions, collaboration, and mutual appreciation between
quantitative and qualitative scholars in any disciplines.
From my own experiences, however, reviewers and discussants, upon encountering a graphical causal model that purportedly represents the background knowledge
about the underlying causal process, often raise immediate questions about what
they believe are unsettled areas of disagreements in the human rights literature.
That, I believe, is a testament to the power of transparency that graphical causal
models hold over their algebraic counterparts in the potential outcomes framework.
On the other hand, it also goes to show that causal inference research on human
rights and international human rights law remains diffcult mostly because of a lot
of remaining uncertainties and disagreements in the domain knowledge.
By corollary, the kind of research questions that I believe are most amenable
to, and most likely to beneft from, this machine learning-based causal inference
approach are those that are supported by a suffcient amount of domain knowledge
and, thus, graphical models of the underlying causal structure are credible and easy
to justify. Moreover, these questions should likely involve potentially complex relationships among a large number of variables and, hence, fexible machine learning
methods would prove more benefcial. Last but not least, these research questions
should ideally be legitimate subjects of investigation in a discipline that is relatively
open to adopting methodological advances from other felds and disciplines such as
computer science and epidemiology.
There are certainly some tradeoffs, nevertheless. A machine learning-based
causal inference approach might require additional investment in terms of time
and resources on part of the applied researchers to get themselves familiarized and
conversant with the framework and all the methods involved. It is a worthwhile
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investment, though, because the skills and knowledge are transferable across felds
and disciplines, in both academia and industry. Possibly it could also bring some
intellectual curiosity and satisfaction when one starts to think deeply about the
question of causality in the way, as quoted in Pearl et al. [2016, vii], that Virgil (29
BC) might have felt, “Lucky is he who has been able to understand the causes of
things” (Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas).

APPENDICES
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A. CHAPTER 2: APPENDIX
A.1

Variable Description

• Treaty ratifcation status of the ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT: A country–year binary
variable coded 1 for ratifcation and 0 otherwise. Data are coded manually
from the database of the Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx).
• Human rights dynamic latent protection scores: a country–year interval
variable that measures respect for physical integrity rights. Rescaled to a 0–
1 range from the empirical range for ease of estimation and interpretation.
The scores were generated by Fariss [2014] using a dynamic ordinal itemresponse theory model that accounts for systematic change in the way human
rights abuses have been monitored over time. The human rights scores model
builds on data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, the Political Terror
Scale, the Ill Treatment and Torture Data Collection, the Uppsala Confict Data
Program, and several other public sources.
Variable name in original dataset is latentmean.
(http://humanrightsscores.org).
• CIRI women’s political rights: an ordinal variable from 0 – 3 that measures
the extent to which women’s political rights are protected, including the rights
to vote, run for political offce, hold elected offce, join political parties, and
petition government offcials.
A score of 0 indicates these rights are not guaranteed by law; a score of 1
indicates rights are guaranteed by law but severely restricted in practice; a
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score of 2 indicates rights are guaranteed by law but moderately restricted in
practices; and a score of 3 indicates rights are guaranteed in law and practice.
(http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html).
• CIRI toture index: an ordinal index that measures the extent of torture practice by government offcials or by private individuals at the instigation of government offcials. A score of zero indicates frequent torture practice; a score of
1 indicates occasional torture practice; and a score of 2 indicates that torture
did not occur in a given year.
(http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html).
• Legal origins: a cross-sectional (country) multinomial variable coded for
British, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal origins. Data are
from La Porta et al. [2008]. I recoded 1 for common law and 0 otherwise.
• Ratifcation rules: a cross-sectional (country) fve-point ordinal variable (1,
1.5, 2, 3, 4) by [Simmons, 2009]. Its empirical maximum value, however, is
only a score of 3. It measures “the institutional “hurdle” that must be overcome in order to get a treaty ratifed.” The coding is based on descriptions of
national constitution or basic rule.
(http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/APP_3.2_Ratification_
rules.pdf).
• Global and regional ratifcation rates: continuous variables measuring the
cumulative ratifcation rates globally and by region. Regional classifcation is
defned using the United Nations Regional Groups of Member States, including Africa Group (AG), Asia-Pacifc Group (APG), Eastern European Group
(EEG), Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and Western European and Others Group (WEOG).
(http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml).
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• Democracy: measured by the dummy variable democracy in the DemocracyDictatorship dataset by Cheibub et al. [2010]. It is coded 1 if the regime
qualifes as democratic and 0 otherwise. This measure is preferred to the
Polity 4 dataset to avoid a conceptual overlap between democracy and physical integrity rights [Hill, 2016b].
(https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracyand-dictatorship-revisited).
• Multiple parties: a ordinal variable coded 0 for no parties, 1 for single party,
and 2 for multiple parties. Variable name in original dataset is defacto. I
recoded 1 for multiple parties and 0 otherwise.
(https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracyand-dictatorship-revisited).
• Democratic transition: a binary variable coded 1 when there is transition to
or from democracy and 0 otherwise.
Variable name in original dataset is tt.
(https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracyand-dictatorship-revisited).
• Judicial independence: a time-series cross-sectional latent score (0 – 1) measuring judicial independence. The scores range from 0 (no judicial independence) to 1 (complete judicial independence).
(http://polisci.emory.edu/faculty/jkstato/page3/index.html).
• GDP per capita: a country–year interval variable measuring gross domestic
product divided by midyear population measured in current US dollars. A few
country-year observations have a GDP per capita value of zero. I change that
into the next smallest value of 65.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD).
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• Population: a country–year interval variable measuring the total number of
residents in a country regardless of their legal status.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL).
• Trade: a country–year interval variable measuring the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services as a share of gross domestic product.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS).
• Net ODA received (current USD): data are from the World Bank Indicators
database.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD).
• Involvement in militarized interstate dispute: a country–year binary variable from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (MIDB dataset, version 4.1).
It is recoded 1 to indicate a country’s involvement in any side of an militarized
dispute and 0 otherwise between the start year and the end year of a dispute.
(http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs).
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A.2

Summary Statistics

Table A.1.: Summary Statistics
Statistic
COW country code
Year
ICCPR ratifcation
CEDAW ratifcation
CAT ratifcation
Human rights scores
CIRI women’s political rights
CIRI torture index
Legal origins
Ratifcation rules
ICCPR global rate
CEDAW global rate
CAT global rate
ICCPR regional rates
CEDAW regional rates
CAT regional rates
Democracy
Multiple parties
Transition
Judicial independence
Population
GDP per capita
Trade
Net ODA
Militarized dispute

A.3

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

8,062
8,062
8,062
8,062
8,062
8,062
4,840
4,850
7,956
7,796
8,062
8,062
8,062
8,062
8,062
8,062
6,886
6,886
6,886
7,679
7,798
7,055
6,536
7,490
7,501

—
—
0.560
0.563
0.370
0.345
1.780
0.778
—
1.800
0.561
0.564
0.369
0.563
0.565
0.372
0.442
1.650
0.018
0.465
31,846,961
6,907
75.7
268,622,622
0.308

—
—
0.496
0.496
0.483
1.420
0.649
0.747
—
0.640
0.268
0.379
0.316
0.311
0.397
0.356
0.497
0.653
0.134
0.321
115,863,080
14,088
49.3
619,681,691
0.462

2
1966
0
0
0
−3.110
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
9,419
37.5
0.021
−943,150,000
0

990
2013
1
1
1
4.710
3
2
5
3
0.869
0.964
0.792
1
1
1
1
2
1
0.995
1,357,380,000
193,648
532
22,057,090,000
1

Multiple Imputation of Missing Data

Multiple imputation is used to fll in missing data and create fve imputed datasets,
covering 192 countries from 1965 – 2013. All variables in Table ?? are used to make
the MAR assumption as plausible as possible. When modeling and estimating causal
effects, however, I subset the observations by their appropriate time periods. For example, I only use observations from 1985–2013 when estimating the causal effects
of predictive covariates on CAT ratifcation and 1982–2013 for modeling CEDAW
ratifcation. As a result, the fractions of imputed missing data that are actually used
for estimation tend to be lower. Variables with the highest missing fractions that
are in use are CIRI torture index (missing fraction is 0.197) and CIRI measures of
women’s political rights (missing fraction is 0.196).
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Table A.2.: Fractions of missing data by variables
Variables

Missing fraction

CIRI women’s political rights
CIRI torture index
Trade participation
DD transition
DD multiple parties
DD democracy
GDP per capita
Judicial independence
Net ODA
Involvement in militarized dispute
Population size
Ratifcation rules
Legal origins
CAT ratifcation
CAT global ratifcation rate
CAT regional ratifcation rates
CEDAW ratifcation
CEDAW global ratifcation rate
CEDAW regional ratifcation rates
ICCPR ratifcation
ICCPR global ratifcation rate
ICCPR regional ratifcation rates

0.400
0.398
0.189
0.146
0.146
0.146
0.125
0.048
0.071
0.070
0.033
0.033
0.013
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

N of obs. after list-wise deletion
N of obs. after imputation

3,615
8,062
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Missingness Map

Fig. A.1.: Map of missing data
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202
31
40
41
42
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
60
70
80
90
91
92
93
94
95
100
101
110
115
130
135
140
145
150
155
160
165
200
205
210
211
212
220
221
223
225
230
232
235
255
290
305
310
316
317
325
331
338
339
341
343
344
345
346
349
350
352
355
359
360
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
375
380
385
390
395
403
404
411
420
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
450
451
452
461
471
475
481
482
483
484
490
500
501
510
516
517
520
522
530
531
540
541
551
552
553
560
565
570
571
572
580
581
590
591
600
615
616
620
625
626
630
640
645
651
652
660
663
666
670
679
690
692
694
696
698
700
701
702
703
704
705
710
712
731
732
740
750
760
770
771
775
780
781
790
800
811
812
816
820
830
835
840
850
860
900
910
920
935
940
946
947
950
955
970
983
986
987
990
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B. CHAPTER 3: APPENDIX
B.1

Variable Description

• Ratifcation Status of ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT: A country–year binary variable
coded 1 for ratifcation and 0 otherwise. Data are coded manually from the
database of the Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx).
• Political Terror Scale: a country–year fve-point ordinal variable measuring
levels of political murders, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances. This variable was originally coded from 5 for worst level of abuses to
1 for least abuses. For consistency of interpretation with the other two measures of human rights outcome, we reverse-coded into 0 (worst performance)
to 4 (best performance).
(http://www.politicalterrorscale.org).
• Women’s Political Empowerment Index: a country–year interval variable
gauging women’s political empowerment from 1900 to 2012 in 173 countries. The index is an aggregation of three sub-indices that range from 0
(lowest level of political empowerment) to 1 (highest level of political empowerment), including a women civil liberty index, a women civil society
participation index, and a women political participation index. The overall
women’s political empowerment index is the average of these three indices.
Variable name in original dataset is v2x gender.
(https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-5).

176
• CIRI toture index: an ordinal index that measures the extent of torture practice by government offcials or by private individuals at the instigation of government offcials. A score of zero indicates frequent torture practice; a score of
1 indicates occasional torture practice; and a score of 2 indicates that torture
did not occur in a given year.
(http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html).
• Political Constraints Index: an expert-coded country–year interval variable
on a scale from 0 (most hazardous - no checks and balances) to 1 (most
constrained–extensive checks and balances).
Variable name in original dataset is polconiii
(https://whartonmgmt.wufoo.com/forms/political-constraint-index-polcondataset/).
• Judicial independence: a time-series cross-sectional latent score, measuring
judicial independence. The scores range from 0 (no judicial independence) to
1 (complete judicial independence).
(http://polisci.emory.edu/faculty/jkstato/page3/index.html).
• Name and shame index: An country–year index that Cole [2015, 423] computes that “sums the standardized scores of four variables: media reporting
of human rights abuses in (1) The Economist and (2) Newsweek; (3) Amnesty
International press releases targeting a country’s human rights blemishes; and
(4) UN Commission on Human Rights resolutions condemning a country’s human rights performance.”
Variable name in original dataset is name shame.
• Treaty Commitment Preference: a country–year interval variable, ranging
from −1 to 1, that Lupu [2016] computes to measure a country’s commitment
preference across a large number of treaties in different domains. We use
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the frst-dimension coordinates as a proxy of the degree to which states are
internationally socialized as measured by their participation in the pool of 280
universal treaties.
Variable name in original dataset is coord1d.
• Legal Origin: a cross-sectional (country) multinomial variable coded for British,
French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal origins. Data are from
La Porta et al. [2008]. We recoded 1 for British origin and 0 otherwise.
• Ratifcation Rules: a cross-sectional (country) fve-point ordinal variable (1,
1.5, 2, 3, 4) by [Simmons, 2009]. It measures “the institutional “hurdle” that
must be overcome in order to get a treaty ratifed.”
Coding is based on descriptions of national constitutions or basic rule.
(http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/APP_3.2_Ratification_
rules.pdf).
• Electoral System: a cross-sectional (country) categorical variable coded Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected President (1), Presidential (0). Some missing values are flled in using a relatively comparable coding system by Simmons [2009], in which the variable is coded 2 for primarily parliamentary
system, 1 for hybrid system, and 0 for primarily presidential system. We recoded 0 for presidential system and 1 otherwise.
(http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-details,3169.
html?pub_id=IDB-DB-121).
• Population: a country–year interval variable measuring the total number of
residents in a country regardless of their legal status.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL).
• GDP per capita: a country–year interval variable measuring gross domestic
product divided by midyear population measured in current US dollars.
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(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD).
• Trade: a country–year interval variable measuring the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services as a share of gross domestic product.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS).
• Democracy: measured by the dummy variable democracy in the DemocracyDictatorship dataset by Cheibub et al. [2010]. It is coded 1 if the regime qualifes as democratic and 0 otherwise. This measure is preferable to the Polity
dataset since it may help avoid a conceptual overlap between democracy and
physical integrity rights [Hill, 2016b].
(https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracyand-dictatorship-revisited).
• Multiple parties: a ordinal variable coded 0 for no parties, 1 for single party,
and 2 for multiple parties. Variable name in original dataset is defacto.
(https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracyand-dictatorship-revisited).
• Regime Durability: a country–year interval variable measuring the number
of age in years of the current regime as classifed by regime.
Variable name in original dataset is agereg.
(https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracyand-dictatorship-revisited).
• Involvement in militarized interstate dispute: a country–year binary variable from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (MIDB dataset, version 4.1).
It was recoded 1 to indicate a country’s involvement in any side of an militarized dispute and 0 otherwise between the start year and the end year of a
dispute.
(http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs).
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B.2

Summary Statistics

Table B.1.: Summary Statistics
Statistic

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

COW country code
Year

5,460
6,005

—
—

—
—

2
1981

990
2008

ICCPR ratifcation
CEDAW ratifcation
CAT ratifcation

5,460
5,460
5,460

0.614
0.663
0.410

0.487
0.473
0.492

0
0
0

1
1
1

Political Terror Scale
Women’s empowerment index
CIRI torture index

4,642
4,077
4,285

2.503
0.630
0.787

1.161
0.205
0.748

0
0.107
0

4
0.965
2

Political constraints
Judicial independence
Name and shame index
Treaty preference (1d)

4,844
5,042
3,388
4,880

0.234
0.505
−0.001
0.105

0.218
0.320
2.943
0.481

0
0.011
−1.499
−1

0.726
0.995
26.310
0.993

Legal origins
Ratifcation rules
Electoral system

5,320
5,096
4,872

1.958
1.791
0.718

0.978
0.644
0.875

1
1
0

5
3
2

Population size
GDP per capita
Trade/GDP
Democracy
Multiple parties
Regime durability
Militarized disputes

5,206
4,646
4,217
4,937
4,937
4,937
4,863

31,003,645
7,324
78.710
0.509
1.720
26.920
0.333

115,540,360
13,849
50.470
0.500
0.612
27.120
0.471

8,160
64.810
0.021
0
0
1
0

1,324,655,000
193,648
531.700
1
2
139
1
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B.3

Multiple Imputation of Missing Data

Multiple imputation is used to fll in missing data and create fve imputed datasets.
All variables in Table B.2 are used to make the MAR assumption as plausible as possible. The 1981–2008 time frame for observations was used to conduct multiple
imputation.
Table B.2.: Fractions of missing data by variables
Variables

Fraction of Missing

Name and Shame Index
Women’s Political Empowerment Index
Trade Participation
CIRI Torture Index
Political Terror Scale Score
GDP per capita
Political Constraints
Militarized dispute
Electoral Systems
Treaty Commitment Propensity (1d)
Democracy
De facto Multiple parties
Age of Regime
Judicial Independence
Ratifcation Rules
Population
Legal Origins
ICCPR Ratifcation status
CEDAW Ratifcation status
CAT Ratifcation status

0.379
0.253
0.228
0.215
0.150
0.149
0.113
0.109
0.108
0.106
0.096
0.096
0.096
0.077
0.067
0.047
0.026
0.000
0.000
0.000

N of observations after list-wise deletion
N of observations after imputation

2,624
5,460
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Missingness Map

Fig. B.1.: Map of missing data
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C. CHAPTER 4: APPENDIX
C.1

United Nations Human Rights Treaties

C.1.1

Status of ratifcation
CAT

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-

ing Treatment or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, adopted 10 December 1984, entered
into force 26 June 1987, ratifed by 158 states.

CED

Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappear-

ance, UNTS 2715 Doc.A/61/448, adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force
23 December 2010, ratifed by 50 states.

CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women, 1249 UNTS 13, adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981, ratifed by 189 states.

CERD

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,

GA Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, UN Doc. A/6014
(1966), 660 UNTS 195, adopted 7 March 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969,
ratifed by 177 states.

CMW

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant

Workers and Members of their Families, GA Res. 45/158, Annex, 45 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, UN Doc. A/45/49, adopted 18 December 1990, entered
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into force 1 July 2003, ratifed by 48 states.

CRC

Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3, adopted 20 Novem-

ber 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, ratifed by 194 states.

CRPD

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc. A/61/611,

adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008, ratifed by 157 states.

ICCPR

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171,

adopted 16 December 16 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, ratifed by 168
states.

ICESCR

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993

UNTS 3, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, ratifed by
164 states.
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C.1.2

Monitoring procedures

Table C.1.: Monitoring procedures under UN core human rights treaties

CERD
ICESCR
ICCPR
CEDAW
CAT
CRC
CMW
CRPD
CED

State
reporting

State
communication

Individual
communication

Inquiry

Country
visit

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X(OP)
X(optional)
7
X(optional)
X(OP)
X(optional)
7
X(optional)

X(optional)
X(OP)
X(OP)
X(OP)
X(optional)
X(OP)
X(optional)
X(OP)
X(optional)

7
X(OP)
7
X(OP)
X(optional)
X(OP)
7
X(OP)
X

7
7
7
7
X(OP)
7
7
7
7

OP: Optional Protocol.
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C.2

Variable Description

• Ratifcation Status of Monitoring Procedures: A country–year binary variable coded 1 for ratifcation and 0 otherwise. Monitoring procedures include
(i) Art. 19 of the Convention against Torture (CAT), (ii) Art. 20, (iii) Art. 22,
and (iv) Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT). Data
are from the Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights database.
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx).
• Political Constraints Index: an expert-coded country–year interval variable
on a scale from 0 (most hazardous - no checks and balances) to 1 (most
constrained–extensive checks and balances).
Variable name in original dataset is polconiii.
(https://whartonmgmt.wufoo.com/forms/political-constraint-index-polcondataset/).
• Judicial independence: a time-series cross-sectional interval variable ranging from 0 (no judicial independence) to 1 (complete judicial independence).
(http://polisci.emory.edu/faculty/jkstato/page3/index.html).
• Name and shame index: An country–year index that Cole [2015, 423] computes that “sums the standardized scores of four variables: media reporting
of human rights abuses in (1) The Economist and (2) Newsweek; (3) Amnesty
International press releases targeting a country’s human rights blemishes; and
(4) UN Commission on Human Rights resolutions condemning a country’s human rights performance.”
Variable name in original dataset is name shame.
• Treaty Commitment Propensity: a country–year interval variable, ranging
from −1 to 1, that Lupu [2016] computes to measure a country’s commitment preference across a large number of treaties in different domains. I use
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the frst-dimension coordinates as a proxy of the degree to which states are
internationally socialized as measured by their participation in the pool of 280
universal treaties.
Variable name in original dataset is coord1d.
• Political Terror Scale: a country–year fve-point ordinal variable measuring
levels of political murders, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances. This variable was originally coded from 5 for worst level of abuses to
1 for least abuses. For consistency of interpretation with the other two measures of human rights outcome, we reverse coded into 0 (worst performance)
to 4 (best performance).
(http://www.politicalterrorscale.org).
• Human Rights Scores: a country–year interval variable that measures respect
for physical integrity human rights. Rescaled to a 0–1 range from the empirical range for ease of interpretation. Low scores indicate low government’s
respect for physical integrity right whereas high scores indicate greater government’s respect. The scores were generated using a dynamic ordinal itemresponse theory model that accounts for systematic change in the way human
rights abuses have been monitored over time. The human rights scores model
builds on data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, the Political Terror
Scale, the Ill Treatment and Torture Data Collection, the Uppsala Confict Data
Program, and several other published sources.
(http://humanrightsscores.org).
• CIRI toture index: an ordinal index that measures the extent of torture practice by government offcials or by private individuals at the instigation of government offcials. A score of zero indicates frequent torture practice; a score of
1 indicates occasional torture practice; and a score of 2 indicates that torture
did not occur in a given year.
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(http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html).
• Legal origins: a cross-sectional (country) multinomial variable coded for
British, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal origins. Data are
from La Porta et al. [2008]. We recoded 1 for common law and 0 otherwise.
• Ratifcation rules: a cross-sectional (country) fve-point ordinal variable (1,
1.5, 2, 3, 4) by [Simmons, 2009]. Its empirical maximum value, however, is
only a score of 3. It measures “the institutional “hurdle” that must be overcome in order to get a treaty ratifed.” The coding is based on descriptions of
national constitution or basic rule.
(http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/APP_3.2_Ratification_
rules.pdf).
• Electoral System: a cross-sectional (country) categorical variable coded Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected President (1), Presidential (0). Some missing values are flled in using a relatively comparable coding system by Simmons [2009], in which the variable is coded 2 for primarily parliamentary
system, 1 for hybrid system, and 0 for primarily presidential system. We recoded 0 for presidential system and 1 otherwise.
(http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-details,3169.
html?pub_id=IDB-DB-121).
• Population: a country–year interval variable measuring the total number of
residents in a country regardless of their legal status.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL).
• GDP per capita: a country–year interval variable measuring gross domestic
product divided by midyear population measured in current US dollars.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD).
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• Trade: a country–year interval variable measuring the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services as a share of gross domestic product.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS).
• Regime Type: measured by the Polity Score. The Polity Score is a country–
year interval variable measuring regime authority spectrum on a 21-point
scale ranging from −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).
• Regime Durability: a country–year interval variable measuring the number of
years since the most recent regime change (defned by a three-point change in
the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition
period defned by the lack of stable political institutions.
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).
• Involvement in militarized interstate dispute: a country–year binary variable from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (MIDB dataset, version 4.1).
It is recoded 1 to indicate a country’s involvement in any side of an militarized
dispute in a given year and 0 otherwise between the start year and the end
year of a dispute.
(http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs).
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C.3

Summary Statistics

Table C.2.: Summary Statistics
Statistic

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

COW country code
Year

5,609
5,609

—
—

—
—

2
1986

990
2015

Reporting (Art. 19)
Inquiry (Art. 20)
Individual complaint (Art. 22)
Country visit (OPCAT)

5,609
5,609
5,609
5,609

0.586
0.555
0.250
0.107

0.493
0.497
0.433
0.309

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Political Terror Scale scores
Human rights scores
CIRI torture index

5,178
5,227
4,198

2.515
0.559
0.741

1.170
1.442
0.733

0
−2.940
0

4
4.705
2

Political constraints index
Judicial independence
Name shame index
Treaty commitment propensity

5,285
4,900
2,775
4,115

0.267
0.514
0.188
0.086

0.216
0.314
3.140
0.483

0
0.013
−1.499
−1

0.726
0.995
26.310
0.993

Legal origins
Ratifcation rules
Electoral systems

5,503
5,337
5,081

1.949
1.782
0.715

0.975
0.643
0.876

1
1
0

5
3
2

Population size
GDP per capita
Trade/GDP proportion
Polity 4 scores
Regime durability
Involvement in MID

5,386
5,130
4,657
4,611
4,676
4,983

34,533,273
9,330
82.090
2.630
24.480
0.282

126,414,302
16,654
49.720
6.861
30.290
0.450

9,419
64.810
0.021
−10
0
0

1,371,220,000
193,648
531.700
10
206
1
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C.4

Multiple Imputation of Missing Data

Multiple imputation is used instead to fll in missing data and create fve imputed
data sets. Estimates computed from these fve datasets are then pooled according to
Rubin’s rules. All variables in the data summary statistics table (Table ??) are used
in the multiple imputation stage to make the missing at random (MAR) assumption
as plausible as possible. The 1986–2015 time frame is used to impute missing data.
Table C.3.: Fractions of missing data by variables

Variables

Fraction

Name and shame index
Treaty commitment propensity
CIRI torture index
Polity 4 scores
Trade/GDP proportion
Regime durability
Judicial independence
Involvement in MID
Electoral system
GDP per capita
Political Terror Scale
Human rights protection scores
Political constraint index
Ratifcation rule
Population size
Legal origin
State reporting procedure
Inquiry procedure
Individual complaint procedure
Country visit procedure

0.505
0.266
0.252
0.178
0.170
0.166
0.126
0.112
0.094
0.085
0.077
0.068
0.058
0.048
0.040
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Number of observations after listwise deletion
Number of observations after imputation

2,302
5,609

191

Missingness Map

Fig. C.1.: Map of missing data for multiple imputation

cow

year

reporting

inquiry

complaint

visit

legor

population

ratifrule

polcon

hrs

pts

gdppc

system

dispute

ji

durable

trade

p4

torture

coord1d

nameshame

202
31
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53
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58
60
70
80
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91
92
93
94
95
100
101
110
115
130
135
140
145
150
155
160
165
200
205
210
211
212
220
221
223
225
230
232
235
255
290
305
310
316
317
325
331
338
339
341
343
344
345
346
349
350
352
355
359
360
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
375
380
385
390
395
403
404
411
420
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
450
451
452
461
471
475
481
482
483
484
490
500
501
510
516
517
520
522
530
531
540
541
551
552
553
560
565
570
571
572
580
581
590
591
600
615
616
620
625
626
630
640
645
651
652
660
663
666
670
679
690
692
694
696
698
700
701
702
703
704
705
710
712
731
732
740
750
760
770
771
775
780
781
790
800
811
812
816
820
830
835
840
850
860
900
910
920
935
940
946
947
950
955
970
983
986
987
990
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Summary Statistics
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Table D.1.: Summary Statistics
Statistic
COW country code
Year
INGOs presence
Democracy (Polity 2)
Competitiveness of exe. recruit.
Openness of exe. recruit
Executive constraints
Competitiveness of participation
CIRI physical integrity rights
CIRI disappearance
CIRI extrajudicial killings
CIRI political imprisonment
CIRI torture
Judicial independence
PTS score
Population (millions)
GDP per capita
Oil revenue per capita
Military regime
Left/right regime
Trade/GDP
Foreign direct investment
Public trial
Fair trial
Final decision by court
Legislative approval
WB structural adjustment
IMF structural adjustment
WB/IMF structural adjustment
British colony
Common law
PTA w/ human rights clause
CAT ratifcation
ICCPR ratifcation
Youth population
Latent score (Fariss 2014)
Civil war
International war
AI press release (lagged)
AI background reports (lagged)
Wester media shaming (lagged)
HRO shaming (lagged)

D.2

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

3,443
3,443
3,443
2,181
2,181
2,181
2,181
2,181
2,625
2,625
2,625
2,625
2,625
2,625
2,412
3,234
3,234
3,048
3,265
2,935
2,934
2,761
2,970
2,970
2,958
2,970
3,169
3,169
3,187
3,443
3,443
2,309
3,443
3,443
3,071
3,238
3,443
3,443
2,286
2,286
2,286
1,257

—
—
565.3
1.834
2.063
3.779
4.591
3.067
4.846
1.639
1.332
1.030
0.845
1.194
2.740
29,854
6,213
447.8
0.191
1.370
76.950
2.367
0.547
0.355
0.586
0.083
0.133
0.139
0.222
0.332
0.249
0.267
0.289
0.553
29.52
0.273
0.132
0.008
0.930
3.885
0.297
0.168

—
—
650.8
7.646
0.922
0.708
2.210
1.495
2.400
0.658
0.776
0.847
0.765
0.753
1.137
111,857
6,559
2,134
0.393
1.282
46.720
7.467
0.637
0.662
0.883
0.937
0.340
0.346
0.415
0.471
0.432
0.443
0.453
0.497
7.195
1.394
0.339
0.091
2.505
6.376
1.102
0.857

2
1981
0
−10
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
16.650
155.1
0
0
0
1.064
−82.890
0
0
0
−1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11.6
−3.134
0
0
0
0
0
0

990
1999
3,523
10
3
4
7
5
8
2
2
2
2
2
5
1,252,766
43,138
49,588
1
3
401
145.2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
45
4.311
1
1
26
77
25.5
13

Multiple Imputation of Missing Data: R code from Hill and Jones [2014]

• R version 3.4.1 (2017-06-30)
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• Platform: x86 64-w64-mingw32/x64 (64-bit)
• Running under: Windows ¿= 8 x64 (build 9200)

1

rm(list = ls())

2

cat(’\014’)

3
4

## Use setup from original R code

5

df <− read.csv("rep published.csv")

6

df$gdppc <− log(df$gdppc)

7

df$pop <− log(df$pop)

8

df$rentspc <− log(df$rentspc + 1)

9

df$trade gdp <− log(df$trade gdp)

10

df$ingo uia <− log(df$ingo uia + 1)

11

df$disap <− as.ordered(df$disap)

12

df$kill <− as.ordered(df$kill)

13

df$tort <− as.ordered(df$tort)

14

df$polpris <− as.ordered(df$polpris)

15

df$physint <− as.ordered(df$physint)

16

df$amnesty <− as.ordered(df$amnesty)

17

df$wbimfstruct <− as.integer(df$wbimfstruct)

18

df <− df[!is.na(df$physint) & !is.na(df$amnesty), ]

19
20

## Use MI from original R code

21

require(mice)

22

MI ITER <− 5

23

methods <− c(rep("", 3), rep("ri", 5), rep("", 5), "", "", rep("ri", 3),

24

"rf", rep("ri", 3), rep("rf", 7), "", "", "rf",

25

"", "", "ri", "rf", rep("", 2), rep("rf", 4), rep("", 7))

26
27

mi <− mice(df, m = MI ITER, method = methods, print = FALSE)

28

df.mi <− lapply(seq(1, MI ITER), function(x) complete(mi, x))

195

29
30

for(i in 1:5){
write.csv(complete(mi, i), paste0("midata", i, ".csv" ), row.names = FALSE)

31
32

}

33

save.image("MI.RData")
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